



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





REPORT
OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE
AGAINST *APARTHEID*

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

OFFICIAL RECORDS: FORTY-FOURTH SESSION

SUPPLEMENT No. 22 (A/44/22)

UNITED NATIONS

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UNITED NATIONS

New York, 1990

NOTE

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[5 February 1990]

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

12 October 1989

Sir,

I have the honour to send you herewith the reports of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* - the annual report and the report on recent developments concerning relations between Israel and South Africa - which were adopted unanimously by the Special Committee on 11 October 1989. These reports are submitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council in accordance with the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolution 2671 (XXV) of 8 December 1970 and 43/50 A to K of 5 December 1988.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(*Signed*) Glodys ST.-PHARD
Acting Chairman
Special Committee against *Apartheid*

His Excellency
Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York, New York

PART ONE

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Special Committee against Apartheid, established by General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) of 6 November 1962, is now composed of the following 19 Member States:

- Algeria
- German Democratic Republic
- Ghana
- Guinea
- Haiti
- Hungary
- India
- Indonesia
- Malaysia
- Nepal
- Nigeria
- Peru
- Philippines
- Somalia
- Sudan
- Syrian Arab Republic
- Trinidad and Tobago
- Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
- Zimbabwe

2. At its 623rd meeting, on 20 December 1988, the Special Committee unanimously re-elected Major-General Joseph N. Garba (Nigeria) as its Chairman and Mr. Guennadi I. Oudovenko (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) and Mr. Jai Pratap Rana (Nepal) as its Vice-Chairmen. Mr. Glodys St.-Phard (Haiti) was elected as Vice-Chairman and Mr. Virendra Gupta (India) as Rapporteur.

3. The Special Committee also re-elected Mr. James Victor Gbeho (Ghana) as Chairman of its Sub-Committee on the Implementation of United Nations Resolutions and Collaboration with South Africa and Mr. Tewfik Abada (Algeria) as Chairman of its Sub-Committee on Petitions and Information. It elected Mr. Jose Bellina (Peru) as Chairman of the Task Force on Political Prisoners. Mr. Nasreldin A. M. Idris (Sudan) was re-elected as Chairman of the Task Force on Women and Children under Apartheid and Mr. Oseloka Obaze (Nigeria) as Chairman of the Task Force on Legal Aspects of Apartheid. (For the names of the members of the subsidiary bodies of the Special Committee, see annex I to the present report.)

4. The Special Committee decided unanimously to submit the present report to the General Assembly and the Security Council.

II. REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

A. General political conditions

5. Developments in the period under review (August 1988 to August 1989) underline the fact that the impasse continues in South Africa, in spite of a number of internal and external developments. While the *apartheid* régime has made pronouncements concerning proposed changes in the political structure of the country, its "reform" plan fails to fulfil the demands of the black majority for full political rights and maintains the fundamental aspects of white minority rule. The plan reflects further the régime's concern with averting international action against South Africa at a critical juncture for its economy. With an arsenal of repressive legislation already in place, the renewal of the state of emergency for the fourth consecutive year marked Pretoria's intention to continue suppressing the *apartheid* opposition. It also underscored the régime's unwillingness to establish the conditions that would create the necessary climate for negotiations, even though such demands have been made by both the national liberation movements and the international community.

6. Notwithstanding the state of emergency, internal resistance to the régime was able to regroup and adapt to conditions, and in doing so, experienced a resurgence. *Apartheid* opponents undertook a co-ordinated campaign of defiance of repressive laws, not only to make those laws ineffectual but also to regain the political space and momentum to continue peaceful opposition to the régime. While such actions strengthened the growing alliance of forces against the régime, they also pointed to the failure of the state of emergency to disrupt the functioning of anti-*apartheid* organizations.

7. A number of political developments have had an impact on southern Africa. The evolving relaxation in political relations among the major Powers is improving the climate of international co-operation and is leading to an active search for peaceful settlements to regional conflicts, notably in Namibia. The economic sanctions against South Africa adopted by a number of Member States have contributed to positive developments in the region. Pretoria appears to have felt the impact even of the current limited and unco-ordinated sanctions. Economic growth has slowed owing to several factors, primarily the burden of the foreign debt, lack of new investment and limited access to capital markets. The vulnerability of the economy to sanctions was visible in South Africa's conduct of the undeclared war against Angola. It is widely accepted that a diminished military capability, as a result of the mandatory arms embargo, reverses in the battlefield, combined with a sluggish economy and a growing opposition to conscription among whites, were critical factors in persuading South Africa to enter into negotiations with Angola and Cuba.

8. At the international level, thus, South Africa finally signed an agreement with Angola and Cuba, under the auspices of the United States of America and with the support of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which is to bring about the independence of Namibia through the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 435 (1978) of 29 September 1978. Such hope for peace was elusive in other States of the region that faced a critical situation, partly as a result of Pretoria's aggressive policies against its neighbours.

9. Notwithstanding positive developments in Namibia with regard to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), Pretoria undertook no fundamental initiatives to dismantle the apartheid system. It was forced, however, to release hundreds of political detainees following a successful hunger strike and to undertake other steps concerning political prisoners: it transferred Nelson Mandela, the leader of the African National Congress (ANC), to a private prison, and released Zephania Mothopeng, the leader of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), as well as senior ANC member Harry Gwala. 1/ But most of Pretoria's actions sought to weaken further the anti-apartheid opposition through the banning of organizations, the restrictions imposed on former detainees, the selective use of the courts to silence dissent and the tolerance shown to the activities of vigilante groups and death squads.

10. In this context, recent political differences between Mr. P. W. Botha, who resigned in August 1989, and Mr. Frederik Willem de Klerk seem to reflect more a concern with the viability of the apartheid system rather than an essential break with the ideologico-political conception of apartheid. Mr. de Klerk has reiterated his Party's conviction that "group rights" will be protected under any political dispensation offered to the black majority. The five-year plan for political reform made public in June 1989 is rooted in the maintenance of racial divisions and seeks to entrench the veto power of whites. 2/

11. The elections for the three houses of the racially segregated Parliament (Whites, Coloureds and Indians), held on 6 September 1989, once again excluded the African majority and indicate that Pretoria will continue to impose its policy of "reforms" through repression, regardless of the widespread opposition to it. This policy is based on a four-pronged approach devised by the National Management System (NMS), which is a key component of the régime's security strategy, to undermine the anti-apartheid opposition. 3/ The actions of NMS attempt (a) to smash all opposition, in particular community organizations and activists; through detentions and intimidation, the growth of vigilante groups and death squads being part of this repressive strategy; (b) to co-opt blacks by "improving" the living conditions in selected townships, thereby defusing the community's grievances; (c) to restore the authority of the régime-created town councils through elections; and (d) to address the issue of constitutional rights for blacks. 4/

12. The régime's constitutional plan envisages that the municipal council representatives that were "elected" in the 26 October 1988 municipal elections will become political representatives to the regional and national councils and the building blocks of the National Council or Great Indaba. Through an intricate consultative process, the Council will devise a "new constitution" which will provide Africans with a limited political representation at the national level, while denying them the power to challenge the foundations of apartheid. It should be noted that, in the October 1988 municipal elections, which were widely boycotted, on the average, only 5 per cent of the eligible voters in the African townships voted - no more than the percentage who voted in 1983 in the elections for black local authorities. 5/ These figures show overwhelming rejection of the local councils and of any national structure based on them.

13. Current urbanization trends indicate a growing gap between the traditional urban working class - located mainly within established urban townships - and the rapidly increasing masses of unemployed and unhoused living in informal settlements on the fringes of the urban areas. It is many of the unemployed who join the ranks of vigilante groups. The "upgrading" schemes in the urban areas appear to be

14

deliberately selective and designed to favour certain areas at the expense of others; their real objective is to divide and control communities.

14. The constitutional plan is bound to fail because of persistent resistance to the régime's policies, as is evident in the Defiance Campaign. In 1984, the nation-wide boycott of the elections to the racially segregated tri-cameral Parliament yielded dismally low polls in the Coloured and Indian communities, notably, 18 and 16 per cent, respectively. Furthermore, the "upgrading" schemes will not be easily implemented, given the economic problems faced by the régime.

15. Although the repressive actions of the régime have disrupted the activities of opponents, they have been unable to destroy anti-*apartheid* organizations. Resistance to the régime is resurging with a new vigour. The growing participation of whites in the opposition is adding an important dimension to the struggle and is a reflection of the gradual erosion of the National Party monolith. Both within and outside South Africa, the liberation forces are developing initiatives concerning the future of the anti-*apartheid* struggle in South Africa and are enlisting the support of the international community for these initiatives.

B. Repression of the population

1. Overview

16. During the period under review, Pretoria undertook further repressive measures in its attempts to eliminate even peaceful opposition to its rule. There was an escalation of repression against anti-*apartheid* opponents, in particular, in the build-up to the September 1989 elections. This repression had two main objectives: first, to curb the ability of anti-*apartheid* organizations and individuals to undertake activities at a national level; and second, to re-establish the régime's control in black communities so as to implement the reform programme without opposition. Under the four-year-old state of emergency, police violence increased, as did attacks by vigilante groups and death squads against *apartheid* opponents within the country, resulting in the creation of a new category of people in South Africa: internal refugees from repression. The courts became an increasingly important instrument used by Pretoria to quash its opponents. A draconian press censorship, the tightest South Africa has ever known, hid from world scrutiny human rights violations, including incommunicado detention without trial, death sentences, torture and deaths in police custody, bannings and restrictions and forced removals of population. In this climate of increasing fear and intimidation, a group of leading South Africans formed the Human Rights Commission in September 1988 to investigate and monitor violations of human rights in South Africa on an ongoing basis. 6/ The 28 per cent increase in the budget allocation for the police and the renewal of the state of emergency on 9 June 1989 for the fourth consecutive year would indicate that the level of repression is unlikely to abate.

2. Political trials, death sentences and executions

17. Shifting its patterns of repression, Pretoria made selective use of the courts to silence peaceful opposition to its policies and, at the same time, to assert that the judiciary in South Africa is independent. The Appellate Division had already begun this trend in 1987 by reversing a series of successful challenges

made by the opposition to the emergency regulations. Its decisions conferred legality on aspects of the emergency regulations that granted widest powers and immunity for security officials. Legal observers within and outside South Africa point out that the active role of the courts in repression - with a few exceptions - constitutes a "determined judicial activism" by an all-white judiciary operating under the guise of independence. 7/

18. The substantial escalation in the number of political trials was evident in the number of persons being tried for "high treason": 50 in 1988 alone, some of them involving the prosecution of notable community leaders on tenuous charges of conspiracy with ANC to overthrow the régime. Pre-trial detention, refusal of bail and lengthy sentences effectively removed these leaders from political activity. The best known of these trials was the "Delmas Trial" of three United Democratic Front (UDF) leaders, in which the judgement effectively criminalized peaceful dissent. Patrick "Terror" Lekota, Moss Chikane and Popo Molefe were convicted of treason and given harsh sentences for peaceful political activities that would be considered appropriate in any society abiding by the rule of law. 8/ The trial, which involved originally not only the three senior UDF leaders but also various religious and civic leaders, lasted three years. The judgement was widely condemned both within and outside South Africa. 9/

19. Another important trial involved Moses Mayekiso, the General Secretary of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), an affiliate of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Mayekiso, one of the leaders of the Alexandra Action Committee, was active in organizing joint political initiatives by trade unions and community organizations. Mayekiso and four other activists were accused of treason, sedition or subversion for forming civic associations in Alexandra township. Although they were acquitted in April 1989, their lengthy detention for most of the trial removed them from political activity.

20. A total of 88 persons were awaiting execution for politically related reasons by June 1989. In the last 10 years, there has been an increase in the number of death sentences imposed under the security laws, and at trials of individuals accused of politically related crimes committed during the nation-wide protests that began in 1984. In these cases, the prisoners are held incommunicado and most often are subjected to intensive interrogation and torture. These facts have been documented in a report published in 1989 by Amnesty International and have also been corroborated by other sources. 10/

21. The case of the "Sharpeville Six" focused the attention of the international community on death sentences rendered in political cases. The "Six", accused of the murder of a black deputy mayor of the Sharpeville township by a crowd protesting a rent increase in September 1984, had been sentenced in 1985 on the basis of the doctrine of "common purpose", according to which a group can share in the aim of committing a murder, even if it did not actually take part in committing the crime. Upholding the convictions and sentences of the "Six", the Appeal Court acknowledged that "it has not been proven in the case of any of the six ... that their conduct had contributed causally to the death of the mayor ...". 11/ Domestic and international pressure persuaded the authorities to commute their death sentences on 23 November 1988 to terms of imprisonment of from 18 to 25 years.

22. In its report, Amnesty International noted that "the Appeal Court's interpretation of the doctrine of "common purpose" spreads the net of criminal

liability very widely and raises the prospect of many death sentences being imposed in future trials arising out of political conflict ...". 12/ This assessment proved to be correct in the case of the "Upington 26", in which 14 persons were sentenced to death on 26 May 1989, on the ground that they had shared a "common purpose" to commit the murder of a municipal policeman on 13 November 1985, during political protests against rent increases in Paballelo near Upington. 13/ In July 1989, the appeal against the death sentence failed. The 14 individuals constitute the largest number of people to be sentenced to death at a single trial for a politically related incident. The other 12 persons were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment (see para. 210 below).

23. The increasing number of executions, in particular, for offences arising out of political protests, has generated a renewed discussion on the death penalty in South Africa. Already, by June 1989, 37 persons had been executed at Pretoria Central Prison. According to a recent report by the Black Sash, the vast majority of death row prisoners are black and have been processed by a legal system that does not have a single black judge. Several anti-*apartheid* organizations and others outside South Africa have called for the appointment of a judicial commission of inquiry into the death penalty and have urged a moratorium on all executions pending the report of such a commission. 14/

24. Hundreds of persons faced other charges in dozens of political trials, ranging from "terrorism", membership in and/or furthering the aims of banned organizations, undergoing military training, and possession of arms and explosives, to murder and public violence. Sentences of those convicted ran the gamut from death, 25 years in prison or flogging, to a fine. By January 1989, the number of persons being held in prison for political activities was 804. It is certain that the number of political prisoners is underestimated, as the statistics are compiled on the basis of press reports, which provide extremely uneven and fragmentary information. These figures, in addition, belie the large number of children and youth under 21 years of age who are serving prison terms, although it is difficult to determine the number of children detained for their involvement in political activity. 15/

3. Detention without trial

25. Detentions were used to suppress organized opposition at the national and local levels. In an attempt to stem the Defiance Campaign against *apartheid* laws, authorities detained a number of anti-*apartheid* activists in August and September 1989, including UDF leaders Mohammed Valli Moosa, Titus Mafolo, Trevor Manuel and Curnick Ndlovu. Rallies and marches organized in connection with the Campaign were violently disrupted by the security forces using whips, tear-gas and rubber bullets. Following demonstrations against the celebration of the "independence" of the Venda "homeland" in July 1989, reports emerged of police brutality against and torture of detainees without charge. 16/

26. Although there has been an overall decrease in the number of detentions, the period of detention has increased. Some detainees have been in prison for almost three years, becoming, in effect, long-term prisoners. It is estimated that 100 children (under 18) are still in detention. Since 1984, at least 51,000 detentions have taken place, over 70 per cent of all detentions since 1960. Human rights monitors estimate that 75 to 80 per cent of all detentions end in release without any charge in a court of law. Specific groups that appear to be the target of

detention without trial include students and youth groups, political and religious bodies, civic and resident associations and trade unions.

27. The plight of detainees was underscored on 25 January 1989 by an indefinite hunger strike begun by 20 detainees held under the state of emergency at Diepkloof Prison. Their demand for the immediate and unconditional release of all detainees sparked off a national wave of hunger-strike protests by detainees, as well as a series of solidarity actions in South Africa and around the world. By the end of March 1989, over 700 detainees had participated in the hunger-strike protests. It should be noted that, between June 1986 and January 1989, monitoring human rights groups had recorded 37 hunger strikes by detainees held under emergency regulations. 17/

28. As detainees on hunger strike became ill and were taken to hospitals, it became clear that the protest was creating a crisis with major local and international implications for the régime. Many detainees were released, although they were immediately served with severe restriction orders. Since the process of release was slow, a large number of the detainees managed to escape from hospitals and sought refuge in foreign embassies and consulates, thereby increasing the international publicity on detention without trial.

4. Vigilante groups, death squads and covert activities

29. Another form of repression was the escalation of vigilante activity, sponsored by or condoned by the régime, on a hitherto unprecedented level. The vigilante phenomenon and the death squads, or the "Z" squad, had already emerged in 1986. 18/ The objective of the vigilantes' actions is to eliminate political activists and destabilize black communities and their popular organizations without the direct intervention of the security forces. Vigilante action is intended to lend credence to the régime's argument that the real source of conflict in the townships is a propensity to "internecine strife". The activities of these groups are seldom brought to court, let alone successfully prosecuted. 19/

30. An ominous development was the number of political activists who were assassinated or "disappeared" in the past year. The assassins operate with the tacit support of the security forces and some observers have even suggested that they are a group within the security forces. The assassination on 1 May 1989 of Dr. David Webster was the latest in a long line of as yet unresolved assassinations of anti-*apartheid* activists. Dr. Webster was a white democrat who played a leading role in support of detainees and their families, as well as in the recent hunger strike by political detainees (see para. 212 below). As the co-author of a report on clandestine violence, he had called attention to the growing activities of the death squads. He prophetically wrote: "Assassinations have the effect of controlling opposition when all other methods, such as detention or intimidation have failed. It is very rare that such assassinations are solved ...". 20/

31. Anti-*apartheid* organizations and activists increasingly became the target of sabotage. The bombing of the headquarters of the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and of the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference (SACBC), appear to have been carried out by experts on terrorist activities. The torching of various offices of the Black Sash; repeated attacks on the regional offices of COSATU and raids and attacks on the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) offices,

community resource offices in Cape Town, East London, Johannesburg and in smaller towns; smear and disinformation campaigns against the non-racial trade union movement; all indicate a national campaign. In July 1989, religious leaders expressed their concern at the increase in incidents involving the chemical poisoning of premises used for their meetings. Reverend Frank Chikane, the General Secretary of SACC, collapsed several times and came close to death in June 1989 after apparently being poisoned by a highly toxic insecticide, which, according to a medical investigation, could have been applied to his luggage or clothes. In August 1989, the "people's poet", Mzwakhe Mbuli, and his family, were the object of a series of violent attacks, including a grenade attack on their home. 21/ A recent United States State Department human rights report, in underlining the deterioration of human rights in South Africa, pointed to the existence of police death squads, to allegations of the torture of detainees and to the régime's political influence over the judiciary. 22/

32. The violence in Natal province reached critical proportions and was regarded by anti-apartheid organizations as a national crisis, the resolution of which is important to South Africa. COSATU has called for the creation of an independent commission of inquiry into the role of the police in the Pietermaritzburg violence, pointing out that the collaboration of the security forces with vigilante groups has been a critical factor in fueling the violence. In a memorandum introduced at a press conference held at Pietermaritzburg on 29 March 1989, representatives of COSATU and UDF affiliates noted "the special contribution to the Pietermaritzburg violence which has been made through the actions and omissions of the South African police ... [However,] we need to stress that there can be no lasting peace in Pietermaritzburg so long as the police are able to manipulate the community by a partisan policing ...". 23/ The banning and restriction orders imposed on anti-apartheid organizations and individuals have made the search for a solution to the conflict in Natal more difficult, since activists are prevented by the restriction orders from engaging in any political activity. While there are political differences between UDF and COSATU, on the one hand, and the Zulu Inkatha Movement, on the other hand, at its heart, the strife in Natal is primarily a consequence of apartheid policies.

33. It is estimated that 1,300 persons have been killed in the Pietermaritzburg district alone since 1987. In 1988 between 20,000 and 30,000 persons became internal refugees in the province and the numbers continue to rise. At least 3,000 homes were destroyed in 1988, mostly by burning, often accompanied by looting.

34. A movement for peace is under way and has received the support of all the parties to the conflict, namely COSATU, UDF and the Zulu Inkatha Movement, in addition to religious and other groups. ANC and its leader, Nelson Mandela, have also backed the peace efforts. In a letter sent to Inkatha leader, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Mandela said:

> "In my entire political career few things have distressed me (so much) as to see our people killing one another as is now happening. As you know, the entire fabric of community life in some of the affected areas has been seriously disrupted, leaving behind a legacy of hatred and bitterness which may haunt us for years to come. It is a matter which requires the urgent attention of all people in this country. Nothing will please me more than to know that my concern and appeal have not fallen on deaf ears." 24/

35. Yet another example of violence was the brutal act of far right Afrikaaner Weerstandsbeweging member, Barend Strydom. On 15 November 1988, Strydom deliberately shot 22 blacks in the streets of Pretoria, killing seven. Earlier, in a separate incident, he had murdered a black woman. It is important to note that a report published in December 1988 indicated that between September 1984, when the nation-wide rent protests began, and December 1988, some 4,000 people were killed in South Africa, the monthly death toll reaching a peak of 221 in May 1986 alone. 25/

5. Security laws, banning and restriction orders

36. The régime continued to enact repressive laws to curtail further the activities of *apartheid* opponents. Despite widespread opposition within and outside South Africa, the Disclosure of Foreign Funding Act No. 26 of 1989 was adopted on 23 March 1989. The Act is designed to exercise stringent control over the activities of anti-*apartheid* organizations. Its predecessor, the Promotion of Orderly Internal Politics Bill of 1988, was withdrawn after considerable pressure was exerted on the régime from within and outside the country, including from the European Economic Community (EEC). Although the ostensible purpose of the Funding Act is to regulate the receipt of foreign funds and to "provide for matters connected therewith", its provisions, in fact, grant authorities almost unlimited access to information about the work of organizations or persons committed to peaceful change in South Africa.

37. The régime's increasing reliance on restriction orders allowed it to silence opponents without the visibility attached to detentions or trials. The restriction orders, which are tantamount to house arrest, are imposed for an indefinite period and prevent individuals from having a normal life, let alone engaging in any political activity. Individuals, in effect, "disappear" from public life without having been found guilty of any offence. Human rights organizations have warned that the severe restrictions served on more than 650 former detainees, regularizing their movements and confining them to their homes for up to 20 hours a day, make them easy targets for the violence of vigilante groups and death squads. The co-ordinator of the Natal Youth Congress, Christy Ntuli, a former detainee, was stabbed to death in April 1989, after reporting to the police station in accordance with his restriction order; and unidentified assassins killed former detainee Eric Gumede at his home on 16 August 1989, a few days after his release from detention. 26/

38. Bans and restrictions disrupted the activities of political, student/youth and civic organizations. In August 1989, authorities banned a series of rallies that had been organized as part of the ongoing Defiance Campaign. At the rallies, anti-*apartheid* organizations and activists had planned to resume operating "openly and without the shackles of unjust restrictions". However, the bannings did not succeed in preventing anti-*apartheid* activists from carrying out other protest actions. In 1988, Pretoria banned 32 anti-*apartheid* organizations and two far-right organizations. In addition, restrictions imposed on COSATU limited its activities to the work-place and narrowly to workers' issues. Attempting to prevent popular mobilization for the anti-*apartheid* conference in September 1988, authorities placed restrictions for periods of less than two weeks on leaders crucial to the organization of the conference. Some of the restriction orders went so far as to explicitly prohibit them from calling for a boycott of the 26 October 1988 municipal elections. 27/ Repression increased during the build-up

to the municipal elections, which were preceded by 10 days of "prior voting", during which a large percentage of the total number of votes was cast. Regulations then promulgated enabled the Minister of Law and Order to place activists under house arrest or under restrictions simply by publishing a notice in the official Gazette. The regulations were aimed in particular at silencing individuals "on the run" who could not be traced by police.

39. In a report concerning repression during the build-up to the elections, the Human Rights Commission documented numerous incidents of detentions, restrictions on individuals and organizations, assaults on activists, assassinations, attacks on the premises of apartheid opposition organizations, prosecutions, disinformation, the coercion of voters and the banning of meetings and publications. The objective of this intense repression was to prevent the boycott of the elections and to allow the election of "moderates" acceptable to the régime. 28/

6. Forced population removals

40. Pretoria continued the process of homeland consolidation, a keystone of its policy of creating "independent homelands". Seeking to deprive blacks of their birthright to South African citizenship, authorities used the courts and extra-legal methods to remove blacks forcibly from "white" areas into areas that are to be incorporated into the "homelands". Officials assert that the removals are now voluntary. In fact, under the emergency, they use more subtle but no less forceful methods to remove populations. For instance, authorities refuse to provide services, such as water, to areas under threat of removal, while, at the same time, they provide resources - often inadequate - to the proposed settlement areas.

41. The National Committee against Removals estimates that at present over 3 million people are threatened with evictions and removals, including: (a) more than 1 million of the 4 million squatters who live around Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth; (b) about 1 million labourers and tenants living on farms, mainly in the Orange Free State and Natal; (c) more than half a million people living in rural townships that could be incorporated into nominally "independent homelands"; and (d) large numbers of individuals who could be evicted from "gray areas" or urban areas where both blacks and whites now reside.

42. In February 1984, an estimated 4,000 people were removed forcibly from Mogopa, the village in which they had lived for more than 70 years. 29/ The village is now threatened with further removals. Reflecting international concern, in a joint démarche in April 1989, the 12 EEC member States delivered to the authorities a formal protest against the proposed removal of the Mogopa residents.

43. Another method followed by the régime is the incorporation of rural communities into the "homelands" simply by redrawing the boundaries of the "homelands". In April 1989 the Alteration of Boundaries of Self-Governing Territories Bill was tabled in Parliament, giving the authorities wide powers to alter by proclamation the borders of "non-independent homelands". The measure is intended to thwart the impact of those successful court actions brought by rural communities which have prevented authorities from incorporating certain areas under "homeland" rule. For instance, the incorporations of Moutse and Botshabelo into the "homelands" of Kwa Ndebele and Qwa Qwa, respectively, were both overturned by the courts. 30/

44. Officials of the Black Sash's Transvaal Rural Action Committee report that some of the incorporations, namely, those into the "independent homelands" of Ciskei and Bophuthatswana, have been attended by violence. In July 1989, Bophuthatswana police beat and stoned residents in the Transvaal village of Leeuwfontein, which was incorporated into Bophuthatswana in 1988. The activities of the Transvaal Rural Action Committee and the Black Sash in the "homeland" were subsequently banned in August 1989.

45. Current measures concerning Blacks in urban areas indicate that the régime is unwilling to abolish _apartheid_ pillars such as the Group Areas Act and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953, even though blacks' constant defiance of these laws has made them largely ineffectual. Authorities withdrew the Group Areas Amendment Bill following widespread criticism of its repressive provisions. They enacted the Local Government in Free Settlement Areas Act, the Free Settlement Areas Act and the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act. Rather than being a solution to the mounting urban housing crisis, these laws prevent homeless blacks from building informal dwellings near the cities or from finding accommodation where and when they can. By giving authorities the power to shift groups around without interference from the courts, these laws enforce residential segregation more strictly.

7. Press censorship

46. Using a set of stringent laws and regulations directed at the domestic and foreign media, the régime attempted to control the flow of information inside the country and to censor press reports sent abroad. Its ultimate objective was to disseminate only its own view on the situation in the country. While authorities continued their overt attacks against the media, in particular the anti-_apartheid_ (alternative) and foreign media, they also undertook a series of legal actions against a number of South African journalists for alleged violations of security laws. In June 1989, the editor of the new Afrikaans newspaper _Vrye Weekblad_, Max du Preez, was charged and sentenced to six months in prison, and suspended for five years, for quoting a "listed" person. Other charges against him are pending. _The Sowetan_ editor Aggrey Klaaste, _The Weekly Mail_ editor Anton Harber and reporters Joanne Bekker and Franz Kruger were among the journalists charged in August 1989 for contravening emergency regulations.

47. By order of the Minister of Home Affairs, Stoffel Botha, the publication of _The Weekly Mail_ was suspended for one month in November 1988 while _Grassroots_ and _New Era_ were suspended for several months in February 1989. The Minister issued warnings to several publications, including _Free Azania_, _The Sowetan_, _Al Qalam_ and _Work in Progress_. 31/ Harassment and intimidation tactics were also evident in the seizure of publications and in the continuing detention without charge of journalists.

C. Resistance to apartheid

1. Organizing broader fronts of resistance

48. Neither the repressive means available under the emergency nor the violence of the vigilante groups and death squads have managed to uproot the anti-_apartheid_ opposition. Economic conditions for fanning continued resistance persist, as

Pretoria has not succeeded in solving such structural economic problems as slow growth and chronic unemployment. Data published in 1989 showed that poverty in South Africa is caused and reinforced by deliberate racial policies. Widespread hunger, overcrowding and disease, in particular in the rural areas and the 10 "homelands", are common; in a country that exports food, 2 million children are suffering from malnutrition. 32/

49. The struggle against the régime entered a new stage characterized by the slow but steady rebuilding and strengthening of community organizations. The strategic objective of these organizations is to consolidate the anti-apartheid movement's capacities at the base, in stronger street committees and in civic, youth and other such groups. Community organizations are engaging in sophisticated tactics of negotiation on issues at the local level, thereby generating valuable political experience for their members.

50. At the same time, debate is under way about the possibility of forming a broad alliance of anti-apartheid forces. No political consensus has emerged, however, on the content of such an alliance, which is seen both as a short-term defensive strategy to rebuild community organizations and as a long-term strategy to ensure the transition to a democratic and non-racial society in South Africa. As suggested by the joint actions undertaken by the non-racial trade union movement and political and community groups, anti-apartheid forces may seek unity through a series of clearly defined political alliances focused on specific programmes of united action. In this context of growing united action, these forces have begun to function under the umbrella of the Mass Democratic Movement.

51. Defiance of apartheid laws became the focus of organized protest in South Africa. It marked both the resurgence of mass campaigns against apartheid and the participation of a broad alliance of organizations opposed to the régime. Led by the Mass Democratic Movement, the Defiance Campaign involved a successful action in August 1989, whereby black patients appeared at whites-only hospitals seeking treatment, as well as other acts of civil disobedience. The Mass Democratic Movement and trade unions, in particular, also organized protests against corporations underwriting the rugby tour in South Africa of players from Australia, France, England, Scotland and Wales. 33/

52. In September 1988, the National Anti-Apartheid Conference, with the participation of more than 70 organizations, convened by COSATU, had attempted to discuss unity and organization against repression, and one person one vote in a democratic South Africa. 34/ Even though the Conference was banned, it generated an important debate on the content of political alliances. Some of the scheduled participants met in secret at Cape Town to discuss ways of continuing the process of creating a broader coalition. Along similar lines, in August 1989, representatives of the Mass Democratic Movement, Black Consciousness Movement organizations, trade unions and religious bodies announced at a press conference, in Johannesburg, that they would convene a "Conference for a Democratic Future" in the latter part of 1989.

53. The nation-wide boycott of the elections on 26 October 1988 indicated both the depth of the popular rejection of the structures created by the régime and the ability of community groups to organize the boycott in spite of the state of emergency. In November 1988 and March 1989, the successful boycotts of white-owned businesses in Boksburg and Carletonville, which are run by officials of the Conservative Party, showed the growing potential influence of black consumer power

in thwarting any attempt by that Party to re-introduce petty apartheid. The combined action of trade unions and community organizations was instrumental in the success of the boycott. 35/

54. The extended hunger strike by political detainees in prisons throughout the country drew the attention of the international community to detentions without trial in South Africa and attracted acts of solidarity by many groups and individuals in South Africa, as well as in the United States and the United Kingdom. The strike forced the régime to release hundreds of detainees, including a significant number of the leaders of anti-apartheid organizations. It also demonstrated the susceptibility of South Africa to international action as several Governments made representations calling upon authorities either to release or charge the detainees.

55. This growing political activity was also seen in the stay-aways organized by workers and students on 21 March 1989 to commemorate the anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre. In May 1989, in defiance of emergency regulations, about 10,000 persons, whites and blacks, many of them under severe restrictions, joined the funeral service and public march for the assassinated white democrat, Dr. David Webster (see para. 30 above). In June 1989, a number of organizations representing various sectors of the community sent a letter to Parliament officials calling upon them not to re-impose the state of emergency. 36/ The renewal of the state of emergency on 9 June 1989 was met by protests throughout the country while a massive stay-away on 16 June 1989 marked the anniversary of the 1976 Soweto students uprising. To underscore the increasing use of death sentences against opponents of apartheid, a national campaign to "Save the Upington 14" was launched in June 1989 by the National Association of Democratic Lawyers (NADEL).

56. An important development in the period under review was the renewed political activity of community organizations, which focused mainly on issues of local concern, although they did have national implications. One such activity is the ongoing rent boycott in Soweto. A direct response to deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the township, the boycott is well organized and continues to be widely supported. Soweto is at present faced with an aggregate debt of at least R 701 million; this includes arrears, totalling at least R 200 million, which Sowetans have withheld during the boycott. A December 1988 report on the Soweto rent boycott commissioned by the Soweto delegation demonstrated that Johannesburg's economy is heavily dependent on the labour and consumer power of Sowetans. 37/ In its negotiations with the local authorities, the Soweto delegation therefore made a series of policy recommendations, including the establishment of one single city and one tax base to prevent the net transfer of funds from Soweto to Johannesburg resulting in the impoverishment of the former.

57. While negotiations are far from being conclusive, the Soweto delegation's creative political approach to the rent crisis is creating an opportunity for organizing and strengthening community structures. Defying the régime's concept of negotiations, the delegation suggests that if authorities were genuinely interested in negotiations, they could begin by resolving the rent boycott through discussions with representative leaders in the local communities. As the boycott persists, authorities show no signs of having a coherent plan for addressing the rent crisis, which affects not only Soweto but also other townships throughout South Africa.

58. Another creative approach to political organizing in the face of repression is the holding of meetings in commuter trains to discuss such diverse issues as strikes, community stay-away or rent boycotts. This approach gains in effectiveness as large numbers of workers face long train rides, which represent a time that can be used to discuss solidarity actions. Train coaches, selected as "mzabalazweni" ("a place of struggle"), have become the site of discussions of popular campaigns led by community and trade union organizations. Authorities have already attempted to stop this activity through the detention and trial of black commuters, who have been charged with expressing "violent and aggressive" behaviour on the trains. 38/

2. National liberation movements

59. Behind the resurgence of organized opposition to *apartheid* lies the political strategy of the national liberation movements, notably ANC and PAC. The objectives of the movements guided *apartheid* opponents in South Africa in their assessment and definition of strategies to confront the régime. The Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, a major ANC document based on the Freedom Charter of 1955, continued to be the focus of intense discussion and debate among anti-*apartheid* forces within and outside South Africa.

60. Discussions evolved around many issues, including negotiations concerning the conflict in the country and the political requirements needed for that process to begin. In that regard, on 27 June 1989, ANC issued a communiqué, in which it affirmed its adherence to its 1987 statement on negotiations underscoring "that only the continued escalation of internal resistance, including its armed component, complemented by increasing international pressure, will bring down the edifice of *apartheid*". It was also disclosed that, following a dialogue with mass-based organizations in South Africa, ANC had elaborated a consultative document, which addressed diverse issues pertinent to negotiations. That document and other political position papers were being circulated and were the subject of debate among anti-*apartheid* organizations in the country. At Harare, on 21 August 1989, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) *Ad Hoc* Committee on Southern Africa on the Question of South Africa adopted a declaration based on the ANC document, which followed consultations with the front-line States. The declaration outlined the conditions that would be necessary for a negotiated solution of the political conflict in South Africa. It stated that before negotiations could begin the régime would need to release all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally; lift all bans and restrictions on organizations and individuals; remove all troops from the townships; end the state of emergency and repeal all repressive legislation designed to circumscribe political activity; and cease all political trials and executions. Although the declaration does not foresee a specific role for the international community, it states that "the parties shall define and agree on the role to be played by the international community in ensuring a successful transition to a democratic order". 39/

61. Following a meeting between Mr. P. W. Botha and ANC leader Nelson Mandela at Tuynhuys, the official residence of Mr. Botha, a statement by Mandela was released through the Minister of Justice, Kobie Coetsee, on 12 July 1989. In the statement, Mandela reiterated his position that dialogue with the Mass Democratic Movement and, in particular, with ANC, was the only path to peace in the country. He stressed his desire to contribute to the "creation of a climate" that would promote peace in South Africa.

62. In the mean time, the military wings of the national liberation movements, notably, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), continued their actions against the symbols of apartheid repression, such as the municipal councils and the police, as well as military and police installations and personnel. In the weeks prior to the October 1988 municipal elections, armed resistance increased to the rate of one bombing per day. In May 1989, MK cadres launched a mortar attack on a radar installation of the South African Defence Force (SADF) in the Western Transvaal, causing damage to the radar and to living quarters.

63. Following an intense campaign, on 26 November 1988 the authorities released Zephania Mothopeng, the President of PAC, and Harry Gwala, a senior ANC member. Addressing a press conference subsequent to his release, Mr. Mothopeng called for the release of all political prisoners, including ANC leader Nelson Mandela and PAC member Jeff Masemola, and for the "unbanning" of PAC and all other political organizations. Calling upon blacks to unite in their fight against apartheid, he urged the international community to increase sanctions against South Africa. On 16 June 1989, he addressed a meeting held by the Special Committee against Apartheid at United Nations Headquarters to commemorate the anniversary of the 1976 Soweto students uprising.

3. Non-racial trade union movement

64. The non-racial trade union movement took a leading role in political action against the régime, thereby becoming a vital organized component of the Mass Democratic Movement. An important development was the growing efforts of the trade union federations, COSATU and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), to undertake united action focused on their opposition to the Labour Relations Amendment Act. Promulgated in 1988, the Act's provisions undermine the activities of the non-racial labour movement. 40/ An unprecedented workers' summit, held on 4 and 5 March 1989, with representatives of all COSATU affiliates, 11 NACTU affiliates and 17 independent trade unions in attendance, discussed a united response to the Labour Relations Amendment Act, a programme for building trade union co-operation in South Africa and united action against repression. Although NACTU, as a federation, did not participate in the summit, its President, James Mndaweni, stated that the federation was not opposed in principle to attending future summits, since its policy was to engage in joint action against the Act. 41/ In a communiqué issued by all the trade unions present, it is stated that "the summit transcended the differences existing between the various unions attending. While recognizing the different histories in the traditions and policies of the unions, the overriding objective was always to emphasize the need for unity in action ...". 42/ In August 1989, an agreement was reached at a second workers' summit to intensify the campaign against repressive labour laws and all other forms of repression.

65. In a memorandum sent in June 1988 to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), COSATU stated its two main objections to the Labour Relations Amendment Act: first, the preference that authorities sought to give to racially constituted unions at the expense of non-racial unions; and second, the fundamental abridgement of the right to strike. In presenting its objections, which are shared by NACTU, COSATU argued that the law would now make it more difficult to stage a legal strike, while making it easier for employers to interdict strikes and to sue trade unions for damages. COSATU's complaint against South Africa was reported to the ILO Governing Body at its 240th session, in accordance with established

procedures. 43/ The effects of the provisions of the Act are already evident in the increase in the number of employers' claims for damages arising from strikes and in the frequent lock-outs and mass dismissals of workers following strikes. 44/

66. The continued deterioration of working conditions was also the focus of action against employers. In a challenge to the Chamber of Mines, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) released a survey in January 1989 indicating that, since the 1987 mineworkers' strike, the Anglo-American Corporation had "embarked on a systematic campaign of retarding the union and intimidating union members". 45/ According to the survey, racism and job reservation remain a central experience of the corporation's black employees. The survey noted that the experiences of black workers in Anglo-American's mines are in marked contrast with internationally accepted collective bargaining practices such as the ILO Conventions and Recommendations. NUM called upon the Chamber of Mines and its affiliated companies to dismantle the migrant labour system that gives rise to institutionalized violence.

67. Despite gains made by non-racial trade unions at collective bargaining, Africans still earn the lowest average monthly income, as shown by the officially released figures presented in table 1 below. 46/

Table 1. Average monthly earnings

(in rand)

Year	Africans	Coloureds	Asians	Whites
1985	423	552	765	1 531
1986	500	634	912	1 732
1987	593	737	1 060	1 959
1988 a/	653	796	1 136	2 123

a/ First two quarters of 1988.

68. By far the most important demands precipitating strikes were improved wages and working conditions. In 1988, there were 1,025 strikes, resulting in the loss of 914,388 work-days. An estimated 161,534 black workers, as opposed to 145 white workers, participated in strikes. 47/ A series of wild-cat strikes, stoppages, go-slows, demonstrations and overtime bans - largely connected with the Labour Relations Amendment Act - affected the metal industry, in particular, as well as the mining, retail, energy and food industry.

69. At its third National Congress, held from 12 to 16 July 1989, COSATU resolved to intensify discussions within the Mass Democratic Movement concerning a democratic constitutional model for a new South Africa. The Federation also added a clause to its 1987 policy *vis-à-vis* disinvestment, stating that the withdrawing transnational corporations must negotiate with the relevant trade unions on all aspects of the disinvestment procedure. It also reaffirmed its decision to campaign with NACTU and other unions against the Act and other repressive laws and renewed its commitment to building the National Union of the Unemployed.

4. Actions by religious, youth and student groups

70. The role of religious organizations and individuals within and outside South Africa became even more prominent in the *apartheid* opposition as a result of the banning and restriction orders that curtailed severely the activities of other *apartheid* opponents. In South Africa, the activities of religious organizations and individuals focused on calls on Pretoria to create the propitious conditions for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the country. At the international level, their actions were directed at South Africa's major trading partners. South African religious leaders called upon those Governments to exert economic pressure on the régime to persuade it to abolish *apartheid*.

71. In September 1988, SACC decided to defy any laws entrenching residential segregation and to condemn the Labour Relations Amendment Act as an instrument of racism. In the same month, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and the Reverend Allan Boesak called for a boycott of the 26 October 1988 municipal elections. A SACC delegation and ANC officials held talks at Harare in November on the political prospects for South Africa and the region. In February 1989, religious leaders played a crucial role in negotiating the release of hundreds of political detainees following a successful hunger strike.

72. In April 1989, Anglican Church leaders meeting at Cape Town called for the banning of South Africa from international air routes. Arguing that intense pressure was needed to speed the process of change in South Africa, they called upon international banks to refuse to roll over loans to South Africa. At a meeting held in Washington, D.C., on 17 May 1989, a delegation composed of the Reverends Allan Boesak and Beyers Naude and Archbishop Desmond Tutu made a strong appeal for sanctions as the most meaningful instrument for bringing about negotiations. The meeting was sponsored by the United States anti-*apartheid* organization Transafrica and was hosted by Senators Edward Kennedy and Paul Simon and Congressmen Ronald Dellums and Harold Wolpe. Urging the United States to take the lead in the international campaign to isolate the régime, the three religious leaders called for targeted sanctions, notably a stricter application of financial sanctions and the imposition of sanctions in key areas of the South African economy, namely, oil, coal and gold, as well as a ban on air links. They subsequently held a meeting with President George Bush; they were the first South Africans to meet with the new President.

73. Despite the existence of a sustained attack on youth organizations since 1984, recent actions by youth and students demonstrate that their organizations have partly survived the effects of the emergency. A slow process of reorganization, primarily in underground conditions, is now under way. In line with a general political trend, the anti-*apartheid* youth and student organizations are engaged in efforts to strengthen their political constituency by reaching out to youths in churches, sports, and township clubs and such other diverse bodies. Finding common ground for political action seems to be the major purpose of these efforts.

74. The continuing crisis in *apartheid* education was a catalyst for renewed student activity. Official solutions to the crisis are elusive, as evident in a recent statement in Parliament by Mr. de Klerk, indicating that the expenditure allocated to education will be reduced. Rather than seeking to abolish the inequalities of the racially segregated educational system, Mr. de Klerk seemed to acknowledge the failure of the 10-year plan on racially segregated education that had been conceived in 1986.

75. In January 1989, hundreds of Soweto students disrupted classes to protest against the lack of facilities at community schools. In April 1989, hundreds of students in schools throughout the Western Cape began a boycott of classes over the appointment, without consultation with the elected community leaders, of white headmasters to replace black principals at township schools. Parent-teacher-student associations, elected by the communities to co-ordinate between them and school officials, view as arbitrary and politically motivated the authorities' decision to appoint individuals who can enforce vigorously official regulations, in particular the establishment of school management committees. In May 1989, students in Soweto schools organized protests against the shortage of teachers and other related school problems. Authorities banned meetings by students and teachers to discuss the crisis. About 6,000 students boycotted classes in schools in the Transvaal and the Western Cape in June 1989 to protest mistreatment by education officials.

76. In May 1989, the crisis of education in South African black colleges came to the foreground at the University of the North (Turfloop). Police persecution of students led to an urgent appeal to the international community by the South African National Students Congress and the National Union of South African Students. Both organizations called for an end to the military occupation of the campus and to the continuing death threats against activist students. Thirteen thousand students from the universities of Natal, Witwatersrand, Rhodes, Stellenbosch and Cape Town signed solidarity statements in support of the Turfloop students. 48/ Despite the withdrawal of the troops from the campus, detention and intimidation of students continues. On 18 August 1989, the University management closed the University indefinitely. The National Union of South African Students and other organizations called upon the University authorities to end the repression of students and to return the campus to its educational activities.

77. By August 1989, students in several schools and on campuses throughout South Africa had begun a protest against apartheid laws in co-ordination with the Defiance Campaign of the Mass Democratic Movement.

5. Whites in the resistance

78. The growing involvement of whites in organized opposition to apartheid remained a significant trend in the resistance against the régime. The formation of the Democratic Party in April 1989 signalled the presence of an organized body that could potentially become a force in liberal white politics. The Democratic Party, constituted by the merger of the Independent Party, the New Democratic Movement and the Progressive Federal Party, espouses universal suffrage in South Africa.

79. The Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa undertook further initiatives to build links between whites of both English and Afrikaans descent and the non-racial apartheid opposition movement within and outside South Africa. It organized a series of forums that drew participants from different spheres, such as business, labour, religious, education and community groups. The forums centred on discussions of several issues, including apartheid laws and tactics to defy them, strategies for change in South Africa, notably the concept of negotiations, and the role of white South Africans in the anti-apartheid struggle and post-apartheid society. The Institute also sponsored several meetings between whites, in particular Afrikaners, with ANC representatives, in an attempt to widen the range

of forces opposed to apartheid. In October 1988 its co-directors, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert and Alex Boraine, met with ANC and Soviet academics at Leverkusen, Federal Republic of Germany, to review Soviet policy on southern Africa and to discuss strategies aimed at ending apartheid. In April 1989, about 55 women from South Africa, white and black, met at Harare with 25 members of ANC at a conference entitled "Women in the Struggle for Peace". The discussion encompassed a broad range of topics, including conscription, violence, destabilization and the role that women can play in opposition to apartheid. In May 1989, the Institute organized a conference at Johannesburg, entitled "Options for the future", a debate based on the ANC Constitutional Guidelines.

80. Organizations such as the Five Freedoms Forum and the Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee also played a role in generating debate regarding the ANC Constitutional Guidelines and the participation of anti-apartheid whites in the October 1988 municipal elections. In June 1989, the Five Freedoms Forum sponsored a conference involving ANC representatives and over 100 white South Africans, including academics, businesspersons and politicians. The conference, entitled "Whites in a Changing Society", received substantial funding from the United States and major European Governments. In a joint communiqué, issued at Lusaka on 2 July 1989, both the Five Freedoms Forum and ANC agreed that every effort should be made to create conditions "that will establish a climate for the political resolution of the conflict" in the country. 49/ An important effort was the creation in South Africa of the Human Rights Commission, which is playing a leading role in exposing to the country and the world the extent of repression in South Africa.

81. The activities of SADF, both in the townships and in the region, continued to be the source of dissent among white youth. Even though the authorities virtually banned the activities of the End Conscription Campaign in August 1988, the organization's objectives are being expressed by other means. In February 1989, over 900 mothers of conscripts called for an alternative to compulsory military service for white youth. At press conferences held simultaneously at Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town, the women declared their support for their sons' stand. Their joint call, made under the banner "Give Our Sons a Choice" and endorsed by more than 500 women nationwide, was supported by the Federation of Transvaal Women. In May 1989, the Conscientious Objectors Support Group launched the "National Campaign on South African Conscientious Objectors to Military Service", which received broad international support.

82. Despite increased opposition to conscription, the régime continued to impose harsh sentences on war resisters. In December 1988, it imposed a six-year sentence on Charles Bester (18), and in April 1989, an 18-month term on Saul Batzofin (28). Pointing to the increasing number of young whites who emigrate on account of conscription, thus exacerbating the ongoing "brain drain", the universities of Cape Town and the Witwatersrand released in April 1989 the findings of a survey conducted at their medical schools, which showed that compulsory military service is the most important reason for medical students to leave the country. Over 50 per cent of medical students at English-language universities emigrate within three years of graduation. 50/

83. A welcome development was the result of the Vereeniging Consultation of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (Dutch Reformed Church), held in March 1989. For the first time in its history, the Church confessed, "with humility and sorrow", that its involvement in the inception, introduction and legitimation of apartheid

had been unchristian. It was nevertheless criticized for failing to address seriously the fundamental aspects of apartheid. In June 1989, a petition signed by 150 prominent Afrikaners called upon the Church to join a single racially united Reformed Church in South Africa and to work for the abolition of apartheid. Dr. Beyers Naude, an Afrikaner anti-apartheid leader, considered that the petition represented the most significant stand taken by the Church in 25 years.

D. Destabilization and State terrorism

84. Prospects for peace in the southern African region received impetus following the agreement reached by the Governments of Angola, Cuba and South Africa, which allowed the inception of the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia. The negotiations, sponsored by the Government of the United States and supported by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have opened the prospects for the independence of Namibia and, it is hoped, for peace in the region.

85. A combination of economic and political factors seems to have led Pretoria to the negotiations resulting in the withdrawal of South African troops and the departure of Cuban troops from Angola. The impact of current financial sanctions, the effects of the arms embargo, combined with victories on the ground by Cuban and Angolan forces, and the growing opposition to conscription among white youth in South Africa, all became an effective means of exerting pressure upon Pretoria so as to force it to reach an agreement. A critical element in the process of negotiations was the understanding reached between the United States and the Soviet Union favouring efforts to solve regional conflicts by peaceful means.

86. While peaceful solutions to conflicts in the region may yet emerge, the destructive effects of apartheid aggression and destabilization are evident in the region. Recognizing that reality, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted resolution 43/50 G of 5 December 1988, calling for the convening in the latter part of 1989 of a special session to focus on apartheid and its destructive consequences in southern Africa. On 11 July 1989, the Assembly decided (decision 43/462) to hold the special session from 12 to 14 December of that year. The decision was adopted without a vote, on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Special Committee.

87. The costs of the regional conflict to the nine States of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) have been substantial. Estimates show that between 1980 and 1988 the loss in its gross domestic product attributable to South Africa's acts of aggression and destabilization amounted to $US 60 billion, in terms of 1988 prices. These sums are absorbed by direct war damage, particularly in Angola and Mozambique, higher spending on defence by all the countries, the loss of economic production, boycotts and embargoes imposed by Pretoria and caring for the growing number of refugees and internally displaced people. 51/ The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) launched two emergency appeals for aid to Mozambique and Angola, the two countries whose children are most seriously affected by war and destabilization. It called for an international commitment of long-term economic aid to the region.

88. Destabilization, carried out directly by South Africa or through Resistência Nacional de Mozambique (RENAMO), has had a profoundly destructive effect on Mozambique. The disruption caused to its economy has made Mozambique dependent on

foreign donors, who supply it with $800 million, plus 500,000 tons of grain each year. At least 400,000 persons have died because of acts of destabilization, and millions of others have been displaced. Many of the community schools and health posts, symbols of the achievements in education and health following independence, have been destroyed. The dislocations in production and transport over wide areas of the country as a result of the war are cutting off large numbers of people from any process of economic rehabilitation.

89. In April 1989, a study prepared by William Minter for the Ford Foundation and the Swedish International Development Agency concluded that RENAMO was "an army with a clear hierarchical structure" that relied on forced recruitment and fear of execution to maintain its fighting strength. Minter noted that "RENAMO is not, as often portrayed, a loose collection of warlords and roving bands." 52/ He estimates that at least 90 per cent of the RENAMO rank and file are recruited by force. The study lent credence to allegations of continued violations by South Africa of the Nkomati Peace Accord signed by South Africa and Mozambique in 1984. Overall, the war in Mozambique seems to have reached a stalemate. Even though RENAMO cannot make major advances, it can still carry out its acts of crime and destabilization, thereby causing untold damage to Mozambique.

90. In April 1989, UNICEF issued an updated edition of its 1987 report, entitled Children on the Front-line - The impact of apartheid, destabilization and warfare on children in southern and South Africa. The report showed that in 1988 alone 147,000 young Angolans and Mozambicans died. According to estimates, 25 children die every hour from the effects of war in southern Africa, partly because of a breakdown in health services and in food production. Since 1980, more than 1 million people have been killed and 4 million displaced as a consequence of South Africa's wars against Angola and Mozambique.

91. The relationship between the war conflict in the region and child health, malnutrition and mortality can be seen through the destruction of facilities. In Mozambique, 822 health posts and centres have been destroyed or forced to close since 1982. More than 500,000 primary-school children are without educational facilities because some 36 per cent of rural schools have been destroyed or abandoned for security reasons. At a press conference at United Nations Headquarters, on 14 April 1989, the Prime Minister of Mozambique, Mario de Graça Machungo, stated that RENAMO aggression had increased in the past six months, in particular in the southern part of the country. He warned that severe food shortages were expected in 1989 as a consequence of the lack of food reserves and inadequate logistical capabilities.

92. It is apparent that the objective of South Africa's destabilization strategy is to destroy Mozambique as a role model for an alternative society and to ensure its economic dependence on Pretoria. More important, Pretoria has a strong interest in showing its continued military dominance, at least in part of the region. However, some prospects for peace in Mozambique have arisen as a result of initiatives by parties to the conflict and by several African countries.

93. The war in Angola experienced a reprieve following the withdrawal of South African troops from the country. In the context of the search for a peaceful solution to the southern African regional conflict, 18 African Heads of State played an important role in the Gbadolite Agreement, reached on 22 June 1989, between the Government of Angola and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). The agreement led to a fragile cease-fire.

94. Notwithstanding positive developments in Namibia with regard to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), the régime continued to carry out its terrorist actions against its opponents, in particular ANC. These acts were carried out not only in the neighbouring countries, but also in other parts of the world. ANC officials pointed to a "red alert" in ANC offices across the front-line States in response to a series of recent bombings and poisonings, including an explosion in the offices of the ANC Secretary General and Treasurer General at Lusaka.

III. EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA

A. Overview

95. Developments in the period under review underscore the continuing economic and financial fragility of the South African economy. The effects of sanctions on trade, new loans and the transfer of technology, the shortage of capital for productive investment as a result of low domestic savings rates and a dearth of foreign financing, the burden of external debt repayments and the impact of large-scale withdrawal of transnational corporations: all continue to cause strains on the economy.

96. With already inadequate reserves of gold and foreign exchange and with a substantial outflow of capital, South Africa relies heavily on the surplus accruing on its external merchandise trade to meet its foreign debt repayments. In 1988, this crucial surplus was reduced severely as an increased volume of imports was absorbed by an expanding economy. South Africa's exports also increased in 1988 as compared with 1987, but at a lower rate than imports. Reflecting the worsening balance-of-payments situation, foreign reserves decreased by over $800 million in 1988. 53/ The reduction in the trade surplus in the face of South Africa's substantial debt-servicing obligations led to the enactment of deflationary measures in the March 1989 budget, by way of increased indirect taxes. The immediate debt-related financial pressures were alleviated somewhat under agreements reached between South Africa and international banks in late 1988 and early 1989.

97. In 1988, it became evident that South Africa cannot in its present circumstances afford a modest 3.2 per cent growth rate. Yet it has been estimated that a 5 per cent real growth rate is necessary if South Africa is to accommodate new entrants to the labour market and deal with the growing unemployment, in particular among blacks. 54/ Without fundamental internal political change, and thereby changed economic relations with the rest of the world, the outlook for South Africa in 1989 and subsequent years is bleak.

98. A disquieting development was the increase in trade in 1988 between South Africa and many of its trading partners, including some major ones. While transnational corporations continued to withdraw from South Africa, fewer did so in 1988 than in 1987. Moreover, many withdrawing corporations maintain a variety of non-equity links with South Africa that are potentially profitable to the corporations and valuable to South Africa for the development of its industries.

99. The present review notes some areas in which South Africa's already fragile economy would be particularly vulnerable to increased economic pressures.

B. Economic performance

100. The South African economy grew in real terms by 3.2 per cent in 1988, the biggest increase since 1984 and surpassing the rate of growth of the population. 55/ In the first half of 1988, growth was driven by a steep rise in gross domestic expenditure. In the third quarter of the year, growth was fueled by a substantial rise in non-gold exports. The announcement in late September 1988 of a 15 per cent pay increase for South Africa's public servants, effective from

1 January 1989, contributed to a year-end revival in gross domestic expenditure. The increase was partly politically motivated, since the civil service is the backbone of the ruling National Party. For the year 1988 as a whole, gross domestic expenditure rose by 7 per cent. 56/

101. Although the rate of inflation in South Africa decelerated in 1988 for the second consecutive year, consumer prices on average were close to 13 per cent higher in 1988 than in 1987. The exchange value of the rand against other currencies weakened considerably in 1988. Against the United States dollar, the rand fell by 30 per cent between year-end 1987 and June 1989. 53/

102. The ratio of personal savings to personal disposable income slumped to a record low of around 1.0 per cent in the course of 1988, reflecting continued economic and political uncertainties on the part of South Africans. Gross domestic investment in the first three quarters of 1988, measured in constant prices, was about 7 per cent ahead of the previous nine months. However, depreciation of existing capital stock continued to squeeze the level of net new investment to rather low levels. 56/

103. The prolonged stagnation of the South African economy, the failure of the economy to grow faster than the population and the decline in capital investment as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) are evident in the staggering proportion of the economically active population that is unemployed. Estimates of the current rate of unemployment in South Africa from official sources and from independent researchers vary widely. The restrictive criteria used by the Central Statistical Services in defining "unemployed" and the exclusion of the "independent homelands" (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) from coverage result in a low end-of-the-scale estimate of about 1.4 million. According to statistics and definitions of the Central Statistical Services, in September 1987, of the economically active population the unemployment rate was 17.9 per cent for Africans, 11.9 per cent for Asians and 14.0 per cent for Coloureds. However, according to estimates made by two academics at the University of Cape Town, cited in a 1989 special report of the Director-General of ILO, unemployment could be as high as 4 million; approximately 50 per cent of the economically active population in the "homelands" was thought to be out of work. A report of the Committee of Economic Affairs of the President's Council in South Africa projected the increase in surplus labour to 7.9 million by the year 2000 if the economic growth rate was 3.1 per cent. 54/

104. South Africa's balance-of-payments situation deteriorated sharply in 1988. Over $800 million of the country's reserves of gold and foreign exchange were drawn down. 53/ In the capital account, the outflow of capital from South Africa continued, with the total net outflow for the year totalling R 6.7 billion (approximately $3 billion), of which R 5.6 billion ($2.5 billion) was short-term and R 1.1 billion ($500 million) was long-term capital. 55/ On current account, the surplus shrank in 1988 to $1.272 billion as compared with $3 billion in 1987, reflecting the reduction in the 1988 merchandise trade surplus. Imports of both consumer goods and industrial inputs rose sharply in 1988 as the South African economy expanded. The increase in total imports (f.o.b.) was 37 per cent in terms of rand and almost 24 per cent in terms of United States dollars. Export earnings also rose in 1988 but at a lower rate than imports: export revenues in 1988 were up 12 per cent over 1987 in terms of rand and 6 per cent higher in terms of United States dollars. Thus, the surplus on South Africa's merchandise trade shrank from $7.16 billion in 1987 to $5.22 billion in 1988. Against this, the second biggest

item in the current account - "invisibles" - registered a deficit of $4.13 billion. 53/

105. To reduce financial pressures, South African authorities focused particularly on two key areas: fiscal policy and negotiation with creditors with regard to external debt repayment. The national budget presented in March 1989 aimed to abort the mini-boom of 1988, the 3 per cent growth rate having to be considered as "over-heating" of the economy. Particularly in view of the priority assigned to security expenditure, the budget aimed to hold expenditure constant in real terms and to meet the deflationary goal by increasing expenditure taxes. With the inflation rate for the period estimated at around 15 per cent, the official defence budget for 1989/90, in nominal terms, was 21.3 per cent greater than the budget for 1988/89 and 13.7 per cent higher in terms of actual expenditures. 55/

106. The extent to which the financial pressures on South Africa were reduced through alleviation of the debt-servicing burden is described in the following section.

C. Economic relations and impact of sanctions

107. South Africa's economic performance is closely linked to the economic relations that it maintains with other countries. Potentially, South Africa is extremely vulnerable to externally imposed economic pressures by way of foreign trade, access to loans and trade credits, debt repayment terms, and capital investment. Yet, economic sanctions, as currently implemented, have so far not succeeded in pressing the régime to the point that it is prepared to abandon its *apartheid* policies. Loopholes, avoidance measures and an increase in third party trading practices have all served to lessen the impact of economic sanctions.

1. Trade and transport

108. South Africa is a traditionally open economy: foreign trade as a proportion of GDP has averaged somewhat over 50 per cent during the 1980s. Thus, pressures through foreign trade strike at the heart of the South African economy. Data compiled in the Independent Expert Study on the Evaluation of the Application and Impact of Sanctions, commissioned by the Commonwealth Secretariat of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa, indicate that total trade between South Africa and nine major Western States (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United States) fell by $2.135 billion, or 33 per cent, between 1983-1985 and 1987. During that period, imports from South Africa decreased from $3.481 billion to $2.230 billion, or 36 per cent, while exports to South Africa went down from $2.931 billion to $2.047 billion, or 30 per cent. 57/ However, this decreasing trend appears to be reversed in 1988. Comparison of the data for the two periods indicates that trade between South Africa and these trading partners increased in value in 1988.

Table 2. Trade between the Customs Union of South Africa and trading partners, January-September 1987 and January-September 1988 and the percentage change

(In millions of United States dollars)

	Total trade			Imports from South Africa			Exports to South Africa		
	Jan.- Sept. 1987	Jan.- Sept. 1988	Per cent change a/	Jan.- Sept. 1987	Jan.- Sept. 1988	Per cent change a/	Jan.- Sept. 1987	Jan.- Sept. 1988	Per cent change a/
Germany, Federal Republic of	2 589	3 739	44	839	1 269	51	1 750	2 470	41
Japan b/	3 018	3 153	4	1 730	1 515	-12	1 288	1 638	27
United Kingdom	1 914	2 538	33	821	1 105	35	1 093	1 433	31
Italy c/	2 081	2 467	18.5						
United States of America d/	1 975	2 434	23	1 037	1 154	11	938	1 280	37
Taiwan, province of China	676	1 255	86	360	791	120	317	464	47
France c/	997	1 213	21.7						
Belgium/ Luxembourg c/	636	873	37.3						
Switzerland	366	628	72	171	395	132	196	233	19
Hong Kong d/	405	549	36	233	302	29	172	248	44
Netherlands	339	409	20	137	158	15	202	250	24
Spain	298	387	30	229	282	23	68	105	53
Israel	229	212	-7	174	136	-22	55	76	38
Canada	143	194	36	77	107	39	66	87	33
Austria	130	161	24	76	92	21	54	69	28
Ireland	49	76	54	7	11	66	42	65	53
Norway	12	17	37	6	16	168	6	1	-84
New Zealand	15	17	10	8	6	-31	7	11	55
Denmark	14	15	4	3	5	55	11	10	-10
Finland e/	0	0	40	0	0	-50	0	0	100

Source: For the United States, the United Nations Statistical Office. For all other countries, the Independent Expert Study on the Evaluation of the Application and Impact of Sanctions (Commonwealth Secretariat), based on Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), January 1989; except for Hong Kong, Israel and Taiwan, province of China, for which national statistics were used.

Rates of exchange: OECD and Israel data in United States dollars; Hong Kong: fixed at $US 1.00 = $HK 7.8; Taiwan, province of China, median rates: 1987 $US 1.00 = 31.5 new Taiwan dollars; 1988 $US 1.00 = $NT 28.7.

a/ Based on figures before rounding.

b/ Japan, South Africa's leading trading partner in 1987, reported to the United Nations that its trade with South Africa in the year 1988 totalled $3.98 billion, representing a 4 per cent reduction compared with 1987.

c/ Figures are for 1987 and 1988 and are based on statistics compiled by the International Monetary Fund.

d/ Re-exports are included.

e/ Total trade with South Africa amounted to less than $0.5 million. The percentage reduction in imports and increase in exports between 1987 and 1988 is shown.

109. As indicated in table 2, South Africa's external trade, in respect to both imports and exports, is highly concentrated in four trading partner countries: the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Federal Republic of Germany and Japan are now South Africa's biggest trading partners, with substantially more trade (combined imports and exports) than their 1983-1985 average. In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, gold, coal and fresh and tinned fruits constitute 40 per cent of imports from South Africa. Japan's main imports from South Africa are coal, gold and other precious metals, fruit, vegetables and grain. In the case of the United Kingdom, diamonds, metal ores, fruits, vegetables and grains constitute the bulk of the imports. The United States' imports from South Africa are predominantly platinum metals and metal ores. 57/ It is significant that about two thirds of Italy's imports from South Africa are gold for use in the jewellery industry, with almost half of the output of the latter going to the United States. In 1988, the United States imported over $1 billion worth of gold, silver or platinum jewellery from Italy. 57/ South Africa ran its largest trade surplus with Italy in 1988, nearly $1.5 billion (see paras. 161 and 225).

110. South Africa's imports reflect the country's heavy dependence on foreign sources of capital goods and technology. Its imports from most of its trading partners are predominantly vehicles and transport equipment, machinery and tools, electrical and electronic goods, and chemicals. 57/ Motor vehicles represent 35 per cent of imports from the Federal Republic of Germany. Office equipment components, digital computers, aircraft and aircraft components are the principal imports from the United States. Overall, a significant shift in regional trade is taking place, a trend that was already described in the previous report of the Special Committee. 58/ As the Nordic States, the United States and the Commonwealth States reduce their trade with South Africa, some Far Eastern and Western European States are taking their place. In 1988 Taiwan, province of China, and Hong Kong significantly increased their trade. 59/ Although the picture is more complex in Europe, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland all showed major increases in their 1988 trade figures. Between the first six months of 1987 and the first six months of 1988, Taiwan, province of China, increased trade with South Africa by 110 per cent; Switzerland by 98 per cent; the Federal Republic of Germany by 50 per cent; Turkey by 47 per cent; Spain by 46 per cent; France by 39 per cent; and the United Kingdom by 38 per cent. During the same period, Switzerland's imports from South Africa increased by 233 per cent (from $US 71 million to $238 million) and those of Taiwan, province of China, by 153 per cent (from $244 to $618 million), while exports to South Africa of Turkey increased seven times (from $1 to $9 million); of Spain by 78 per cent (from $41 to $74 million); of Portugal by 76 per cent (from $7 to $12 million); and of Israel by 69 per cent (from $29 to $49 million). 57/

111. It should be noted that reported merchandise trade figures may understate the total value of trade with South Africa by excluding imports of monetary gold from that country. The Standard International Trade Classification and its revisions, which the United Nations Economic and Social Council has recommended as the basis on which Member States should report data on their external trade, excludes monetary gold from merchandise trade statistics, although countries may report this trade separately if they so desire. 60/

112. According to figures published in mid-1989 by the European Commission, the United Kingdom in 1988 imported £3,681 million (approximately $6,557 million) worth of monetary gold from South Africa, the equivalent of about three quarters of South

Africa's annual gold production. The inclusion of these imports brings the United Kingdom's imports from South Africa in 1988 to £4,485 million ($7,989 million), five and one half times the figure of £804 million ($1,432 million) for merchandise imports reported by the United Kingdom's Department of Trade. 61/ Data are not available as to re-exports of gold from the United Kingdom in 1988.

113. Close monitors of sanctions implementation have observed that, in general, it is more difficult to stop sales to South Africa than it is to stop imports from that country. Competition for export markets is keen, and many exporters are ready to take over markets vacated by other exporters. This is particularly the case during periods of economic stagnation or recession, as well as in present conditions of increasing protectionism on the part of some large industrial nations. Table 3 shows that exports to South Africa increased in 1986 and 1987, in reverse of the 1985 reductions.

Table 3. Exports to South Africa, 1980 and 1984 to 1987

(In millions of United States dollars)

1980	1984	1985	1986	1987
13 676	12 168	8 118	8 891	11 190

Source: United Nations Statistical Office.

114. The increase in trade between South Africa and some of its trading partners in recent years underscores the need to examine trade sanctions in order to devise mechanisms that may tighten and strengthen them, and thereby increase their effectiveness. The speed with which any new measures are implemented is also an important factor; the South African economy should not have the time, as it has had in the past, to adapt to new and changing trading patterns and conditions. These and other aspects are the subject of intense study by many national and international bodies. Suffice it to reiterate here that the economy of South Africa, already labouring under external debt obligations, is particularly vulnerable with respect to certain internationally traded commodities and services. Figuring high on this list are petroleum and petroleum products, coal, gold, and transport facilities.

115. Sanctions on exports of petroleum and petroleum products to South Africa would appear to be a particularly effective form of sanctions. Petroleum is virtually the sole primary raw material in which South Africa is not self-sufficient. It is essential for the effective functioning of the economy, and is vital to the régime's abilities to exercise its policies of suppression within the country and of aggression and destabilization beyond its borders. Conversion of South Africa's coal and natural gas resources is both limited and costly. At present, however, as emphasized in the report of the Panel on the Hearings on the Oil Embargo held at United Nations Headquarters on 12 and 13 April 1989 (A/44/279-S/20634), inadequacies persist in the effective implementation of the oil embargo. In the report, attention is drawn to the lack of co-operation by certain countries with respect to the activities of transnational corporations. It is also stated that

the absence of measures by many oil-exporting, shipping and handling countries has contributed to the circumvention of the oil embargo. The Panel therefore recommended the adoption by the Security Council and member States of specific measures for tightening the oil embargo against South Africa.

116. Of the non-strategic minerals that South Africa exports, coal is the single most important foreign-currency earner, accounting for around 7 per cent of the country's export revenues in 1987. South African coal is widely embargoed, except by Japan and some Western countries. The Nordic countries, the United States and the Commonwealth impose a total embargo, while some of the EEC member countries ban the import of South African coal by their parastatals. Published statistics indicate, however, that the coal embargo is being violated by importers in many countries. One reason is the $5 per ton discount offered by South Africa against world coal prices. Among the previously mentioned nine Western States, imports by some fell in 1987 by a fraction of the volume that could have been expected under full observance of sanctions. Between 1982 and 1988, Spain increased its coal imports from South Africa more than ten fold from 371,000 tons to 4.45 million tons. Coal imports into a number of EEC States, including the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, increased in 1987. Some States are importing by way of third States; others are importing South African coal that has been mixed with coal mined in other States to disguise the State of origin. 62/ Clearly, coal imports from South Africa warrant greater monitoring and possibly additional or stronger legislation on the part of those States which have subscribed to sanctions on the commodity.

117. Gold, South Africa's single largest foreign currency earner, accounting for around 40 per cent of export revenues, remains a powerful weapon that could be used in the battle against apartheid. The imposition of sanctions against South African gold would have an impact not only on vital foreign exchange earnings but also on tax revenues accruing to South Africa, with taxes raised directly or indirectly from the gold-mining industry, representing a quarter of all taxes raised by the régime. Even in present circumstances and in the absence of sanctions, South Africa's gold-mining industry is experiencing serious difficulties, having suffered from a decline of almost 20 per cent in world gold prices between mid-1988 and mid-1989. With operating costs rising in an inflationary environment, the number of marginal mines in South Africa is increasing. 63/ Added to this are the difficulties imposed on South African mining concerns by their lack of access to new technology and the lower grades of ore being encountered. Gold sanctions would tend to exacerbate not only the industry's problems but also those of the entire South African economy (see para. 161).

118. The transport of goods and persons into and out of South Africa is an area in which external pressure on the régime could be intensified. As noted above, with regard to the oil embargo, shipping companies continue to carry oil to South African ports. Export shipments of South African coal, agricultural products, manufactured goods and chemicals persist. Violators of the arms embargo find willing transporters. Stronger co-operation on the part of national States in the form of increased vigilance, stronger legislation and stiffer penalties on those shippers which violate sanctions is required.

119. South Africa's air links to the rest of the world have been reduced but further curtailment is possible. Bans on landing rights of South African aircraft and the interruption of direct air links of foreign airlines with South Africa would be a financial burden on Pretoria but, more important, would send a strong political signal to supporters of apartheid.

120. Progress is being made with regard to lessening the dependency of southern African States on transport links by way of South Africa. Two thirds of the estimated $6 billion total cost of the Programme of Action of SADCC is for strengthening the transport and communications links of member States (see A/42/452).

2. Loans and credits

121. The Stals Accord, reached in 1987 between South Africa and its creditors following the 1985 freeze imposed by South Africa on repayment of its short-term debt, expires in June 1990. With an estimated $9 billion technically due for repayment at that time, 1990/91 had been regarded by observers as a period of looming debt crisis for the country. 62/

122. Already, however, there is evidence of action by the international banking community to lessen the debt-related financial pressures on South Africa. Before the close of 1988, some Swiss banks had agreed to "roll over" some of South Africa's short-term debt. In early 1989, it was reported that South Africa's foreign creditor banks had taken up an option in the financing arrangements agreed to in 1987 that allows them to escape from negotiations on these debts and to cease being a lender to South Africa by 1997. According to bankers, banks have exchanged some $3.5 billion in loans for special exit securities which allow for a grace period of principal in 1990 and 1991 and for repayment of the bonds over five years beginning in 1992, in equal semi-annual instalments. 64/ Among the banks that agreed to such conversion are Citibank, with outstanding loans totalling $660 million, and Manufacturers Hanover, which in April 1989 announced an extension on $230 million of South African debt. 63/ Thus, in May 1989, South Africa's Finance Minister was able to announce that in a period of two months, $1.1 billion of short-term debt had been converted into long-term debt, allowing South Africa to make repayments of $1.3 billion in 1989, $1.9 billion in 1990 and $1 billion in 1991. Two months earlier, the budget had foreseen debt repayments totalling $1.7 billion in 1989, $2.1 billion in 1990 and $1.5 billion in 1991. 65/

123. With foreign banks looking to protect existing loans to South Africa and with the application of sanctions on new loans, virtually the only source of new foreign financing available to South Africa is trade credit. It is estimated that South Africa maintains an outstanding trade debt of over $3 billion. South African officials have acknowledged that there has been a "gratifying" increase in trade credits, serving to ease balance-of-payment constraints. While several States have banned some types of trade credits to South Africa, the ban is far from complete. In some cases, buyers' credits (bank loans) are banned but not suppliers' credits (delayed payment terms offered by the supplier). A concern of those States which prohibit trade credits to South Africa could be that trade will be lost to those States that continue to allow trade credits. Retaliatory measures should be imposed on those States which take advantage of the trade opportunities created by the sanctions imposed by other States.

3. Disinvestment and South African foreign investment

124. Withdrawal of transnational corporations from South Africa and disinvestment by people and organizations of shares in corporations with ties to South Africa constitute one of the most effective forms of economic pressure on the régime outside of government sanctions. A reported 500 transnational corporations have sold their holdings in South Africa since corporations began withdrawing in the 1970s. The United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations reports that, in terms of numbers of corporations withdrawing, disinvestment has been most pronounced in the case of the United States. Between 1 January 1984 and 14 April 1989, a total of 155 companies from the United States and 122 from other countries disinvested from South Africa. 66/ In the first six months of 1989, 3 United States companies withdrew from South Africa and a further 10 announced their intention to leave. 67/

125. Of United States-based transnational corporations with subsidiaries in South Africa, 60 per cent have disinvested since 1985. In the case of United Kingdom-based corporations with investments in South Africa, about 20 per cent have withdrawn since 1985. The United Kingdom proportion, however, represents a significant volume of disinvestment, since an estimated 40 per cent of all foreign investment in South Africa is United Kingdom based. Companies based in the Federal Republic of Germany have disinvested about 6 per cent of their operations. Disinvestment by companies based in Canada, Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands and a number of other Western European States has also taken place. 68/

126. Two trends have emerged in the area of disinvestment. Firstly, the number of companies, both from the United States and from other countries, ending their direct investment in South Africa dropped in 1988 from the peak 1987 levels. According to the Investor Responsibility Research Centre Inc., 28 United States companies withdrew in 1988, just one half of the number that withdrew in 1987. For companies from other countries, the decrease was even more marked: 11 disinvestments in 1988, compared with 44 in 1987. As of mid-1989, a total of 134 United States companies and 423 companies from other countries had direct investment or employees in South Africa. 66/

127. Second, a number of disinvesting companies have retained non-equity links with South Africa under agreements affecting such matters as licences, technology transfers, management, assembly, distribution and franchise. Such arrangements afford the withdrawing companies continued opportunities for profit-making, while the continued flow of technology and technical support services is valuable to South Africa for its industrial development. 69/ In addition, disinvestment under these terms allows the withdrawing companies to avoid the public criticism in their home countries as a result of their investments in South Africa. A recent study by the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations found that, of the 155 United States companies that disinvested from South Africa between 1 January 1984 and 14 April 1989, at least 83 (53 per cent) had retained non-equity ties with their former subsidiaries; at least 59 (38 per cent) did not; and 13 (8 per cent) did not respond to requests for information. Of the 122 companies from other countries that withdrew during the same period, at least 24 (20 per cent) have retained non-equity links; at least 49 (40 per cent) did not; and 49 (40 per cent) did not respond to requests for information. 66/

128. In early 1989, the largest United States company continuing to operate in South Africa, Mobil Oil Corporation, announced its intention to sell all its assets and technology in that country as of June 1989. Mobil is the second largest petroleum operation in South Africa, with 1,000 outlets and a refinery. It employs 2,800 workers. In addition to long-standing shareholder pressure, an important consideration in making its decisions was reported to be the tax effects of the United States Rangel Amendment, enacted by the United States Congress in late 1987, which eliminated foreign tax credits for taxes paid to the Pretoria régime beginning in 1988.

129. Mobil's decision became a test of the procedure used by transnational corporations to disinvest from South Africa. Following the Mobil announcement, the COSATU-affiliated Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU), speaking on behalf of the Mobil workers, revealed that the corporation's disinvestment plan allowed it to maintain non-equity ties with General Mining Union Corporation (GENCOR), the purchasing South African company. CWIU also underscored that GENCOR has a record of repression against trade unions in South Africa The trade union had already begun negotiations with 39 transnational corporations concerning a "fair disinvestment procedure" should they decide to withdraw from South Africa. Thus, in its demands to Mobil, the trade union called for negotiations between the corporation and CWIU on the terms of disinvestment, including the disclosure-of-sale agreement. A strike at Mobil refineries led to negotiations between Mobil and CWIU. Although some issues have not yet been resolved, the trade union has obtained most of its demands. CWIU has called for the inclusion of labour rights clauses in all sanctions or disinvestment procedures as a prescribed method to comply with sanctions. A recent study on disinvestment, conducted by the Community Agency for Social Enquiry, made demands similar to those of CWIU and suggested criteria that corporations could follow in disinvesting. 70/

130. Corporations are withdrawing from South Africa for reasons other than tax considerations. These include the worsening economic situation in the country and the devaluation of the rand, through its negative effect on the transfer of profits. Many companies cited public pressure in the home country as a factor. In the United States, to a greater extent than elsewhere, state, county and municipal selective purchasing and/or contracting policies were cited as an influencing factor. Although the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries have also enacted purchasing and/or contracting legislation, their initiatives have been fewer than in the United States. 66/

131. According to a study presented by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) to the International Labour Conference held at Geneva in June 1989, a total of 88 South African transnational corporations control 437 subsidiaries in 44 countries throughout the world. The United Kingdom, with 76 South African-owned companies established on its territory, takes the lead in what the study described as "companies that play an active role in maintaining and strengthening the apartheid system". The study indicates that these South African corporations play a role in the efforts of the régime to circumvent sanctions. According to the study, South African companies have been noted, especially in Europe, to acquire shares in reputable concerns, thereby avoiding sanctions and the stigma attached to South African firms. Such South African corporations as Anglo, Liberty, Rembrant and Barlow have begun to reduce their presence in South Africa by diversifying their operations abroad. 71/

D. Military and nuclear relations

132. South Africa continued to build up its military strength and to trade in armaments, in spite of the mandatory arms embargo. The official defence budget for 1989/90, in nominal terms, was 21.3 per cent greater than that for 1988/89 and 13.7 per cent higher in terms of actual expenditures. The Special Defence Account, the SADF secret account used for clandestine operations and arms purchases, rose by 26 per cent from R 4.613 billion to R 5.816 billion. Finance Minister Barend Du Plessis reported in Parliament that the total sum allocated for "protection services" was about R 16 billion or 23 per cent of total expenditure. However, this figure excludes a number of security-related outlays, such as secret services and defence force housing, which are covered by other appropriations. The expenditure allocated to "protection services" reflects the priority that continues to be assigned to the security apparatus, developments in the region notwithstanding. 72/

133. Observers point out that the increase of the defence budget will probably be used for South Africa's weapons modernization programme. In a memorandum attached to the budget, the Department of Defence stressed the need "to replace obsolete weapons systems" as long as "the arms embargo is still in force". Among the weapons development programmes likely to be modernized are the fighter aircraft fleet and the air defence system.

134. In addition to increasing its military and security expenditure, the régime expanded its armaments industry, as well as the export of military equipment. According to a statement by the South African Minister for Defence, Lieutenant General Magnus Malan, over the last 13 years, the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) has exported weapons to 39 countries, with sales totalling $800 million annually. 73/

135. The régime appears to have acquired the military technology to upgrade its existing armaments. Loopholes in the existing arms embargo allow South Africa to circumvent it. The absence of laws and regulations banning all forms of military collaboration with South Africa, the non-enforcement of current laws by specific States that have adopted legislation on the embargo, the thriving international market of weapons and military technology and the lack of firm international action to deter certain States and individuals from violating the embargo all enhance South Africa's ability to circumvent it.

136. The Special Committee has for several years been following developments relating to the delivery of microfilms of the blueprints of the U-209 submarine to South Africa by two corporations based in the Federal Republic of Germany, namely Howaldswerke-Deutsche Werft AG and Ingenieurkontor Lubeck. It should be recalled that the issue of the blueprints had appeared in the previous report of the Special Committee. 74/ It was also the subject of detailed consideration by the Consultations on the Implementation by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany of the Arms Embargo against South Africa, organized by the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, in co-operation with the Special Committee, at Bonn, on 27 April 1989. During the Consultations, it was shown that the Federal Republic lacked effective legislation to implement the arms embargo. In addition, the investigation concerning the delivery of the submarine blueprints had not reached a successful conclusion and the violators had not been prosecuted. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, however, gave assurances that it would continue to examine the implementation of the arms embargo

against South Africa (see paras. 215 and 216). Subsequently, on 21 August 1989, it was revealed that South Africa was in fact constructing submarines at the Sandock Austral Yard at Durban, contrary to official denials by the régime, and that a third company, Thyssen Nordseewerke of Emden, was also involved in the construction project. On 25 August 1989, the World Campaign disclosed elaborate attempts to conceal the construction project. 75/

137. While concern was expressed about the delivery of the blueprints, the Special Committee welcomed the withdrawal on 18 January 1989 of the licence granted in 1985 for the export to South Africa of high-technology dual-use multi-sensor platforms and related electronic and other equipment from the Federal Republic of Germany. While the withdrawal of the licence shows that effective governmental action can prevent military sales to, and other forms of military collaboration with, the régime, the delay in the Federal Republic Government's action allowed the delivery of one of the three units to South Africa. 76/

138. The Crotale missile or Cactus has been sold to many States through the Thomson-CSF Corporation of France. Although some States claim that the gun is French-made, experts in the field assert that it is South African-designed and continues to be manufactured by ARMSCOR. 77/ During February and March 1989, Lieutenant-General Malan visited Chile in order to inspect the first test-firing of the G.5 155 mm artillery gun, which has a range of over 35 kilometres. Reports indicate that, while the gun is assembled in Chile by Industrias Cardoen, the ammunition for it cannot be made locally and has to be obtained from South Africa. During his stay, Lieutenant-General Malan visited Punta Arenas, where the South African company Sandock Austral is involved in the joint construction of a $13 million shipyard with Asmar, the dockyard group managed by the Chilean navy. The Special Committee issued a statement expressing grave concern at the invitation extended to Lieutenant-General Malan. 78/ The visit revealed the extent of the co-operation between Chile and South Africa, in particular their joint weapons and ammunition production projects. Since the Security Council and its Arms Embargo Committee have been requested to strengthen Council resolution 558 (1984) of 13 December 1984 to cover the transfer of South African licences, technology and know-how for the production of arms and related material abroad, the Pretoria régime, in anticipation of this, is meanwhile embarking on several joint-production ventures in Chile (see para. 219).

139. It has often been pointed out that the régime's diplomats use their diplomatic status to acquire military and nuclear technology in violation of relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and of the laws and regulations enacted by those States to which they are accredited. This suspicion was confirmed by the arrest in Paris in April 1989 of five men as they handed over parts of a Blowpipe missile to Daniel Storm, an official accredited to the South African Embassy in Paris but widely believed to be an ARMSCOR employee (see part two of the present document). The Blowpipe is a short-range anti-aircraft missile manufactured by the Belfast-based Short Brothers. The equipment, stolen from the British army in Northern Ireland, would have enabled South Africa to develop a range of high-velocity missiles based on British technology. Following the arrests, the French and British Governments both expelled three South African diplomats. 79/

140. South Africa's ARMSCOR participated in the International Defence Equipment and Avionics Exhibition (IDEA '89), which took place at Ankara from 2 to 6 May 1989. Military items displayed at the Exhibition included the G.5 155-mm howitzer, the

Rooikat armoured vehicle, the R4 assault rifle, machine-guns, rocket systems, mortars, grenade launchers, a variety of ammunition, anti-riot weapons, night-sight equipment, laser range finders and periscopes. According to the Exhibition Catalogue, IDEA '89 was organized by a local private firm, the ABC Fair Organisation, and co-sponsored by the Monch Publishing Group, based in Bonn. It was officially supported by the Turkish Ministry of National Defence, the Turkish Defence Industry Development Administration, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Civil Aviation Association. ARMSCOR officials, as well as defence correspondents from South Africa, were granted visas to enter Turkey for IDEA '89. This was the first time that South Africa was allowed to participate in an arms exhibition in a member country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since the adoption of Security Council resolution 591 (1986) of 28 November 1986. Participation by South Africa in IDEA '89 was in breach of Security Council resolution 558 (1984), in which the Council requested all States to refrain from importing arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles produced in South Africa, and of Council resolution 591 (1986), in which the Council called upon all States "to prohibit the import or entry of all South African armaments for display in international fairs and exhibitions under their jurisdiction". In an official reply to a letter sent by the Chairman of the Special Committee concerning the participation of ARMSCOR in IDEA '89, the Government of Turkey stated that South Africa's participation in the Exhibition had been an "unfortunate incident" owing to a "regretful oversight" of the private company that had organized the Exhibition (see para. 222).

141. In May 1989, it was reported that ARMSCOR was "bidding to win an order for a towed artillery system for a NATO Power in a competition scheduled later this year". The report added that Turkey required 400-500 guns and had set a range requirement of more than 30 kilometres; most existing systems run out at 25 kilometres, whereas the ARMSCOR gun claims a range of over 35 kilometres. There are reportedly at least 10 companies competing for this order. Soon after the IDEA '89 Exhibition, and immediately after the disclosure of Turkey's participation in the competition for the 155-mm gun, the régime announced the extension of a preferential trade agreement with the Government of Turkey that allows domestic electrical appliances to be imported under permit from Turkey at a ceiling duty of 3 per cent. South African importers would normally have to pay duties and surcharges ranging from 40 to 181 per cent for such items. South Africa has a favourable trade balance of more than R 400 million per year, but according to the Financial Mail, "the concession to Turkey has less to do with the balance of trade between the two countries than with geography ... whether it's for steel, minerals, manufactured goods or weapons, Turkey is a useful conduit for South African exports into valuable Middle East markets". 80/

142. Over the years, the illegal sale of arms to South Africa and the purchase of South African armaments has become a rather profitable business. Violators of sanctions have adopted sophisticated techniques to disguise the South African origin or destination of the goods they are trading. Even though the United States adopted its Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986, it was only in April 1989 that a United States-based company was successfully prosecuted for importing four used South African jet engines. The company in question, Air Ground Equipment Sales, agreed to pay a fine of £1 million. In the same month, a United States court sentenced a former arms expert, Thomas Dolce, to 10 years in prison for passing hundreds of classified military documents to South Africa. 81/ Recently in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the illegal sale of arms has led to several

convictions. These incidents show that the arms embargo needs to be strictly enforced.

143. A well-guarded secret within South Africa is the extent of its collaboration with other States on nuclear matters. Nevertheless, investigative reporting and information emanating from intelligence agencies, and reported by the media, indicate that South Africa has developed a nuclear capability. An investigation conducted by authorities in the Federal Republic of Germany revealed that its domestic companies, Neue Technologien GmbH and Physikalisch Technische Beratung, had delivered nuclear technology to South Africa. 82/ It was also reported that a company of the Federal Republic of Germany, Rohstoff Einfuhr GmbH, and a Swiss firm, Orda AG, were involved in supplying nuclear materials to South Africa and to several other States. Both firms are controlled by Alfred Hempel, a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany who owns other companies as well, including one in South Africa. The activities of these companies were under investigation by relevant authorities in Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States. 83/

144. The development of a ballistic missile remains the most dangerous aspect of South Africa's nuclear capability. According to reports, South Africa recently conducted a successful test of a modified version of the Israeli missile, Jericho II, which could be used to launch nuclear warheads over a distance of 1,000 kilometres. In addition, as a result of close co-operation with the Government of Israel, Pretoria also has the capability to place a low-level satellite in orbit (see part two of the present document). Meanwhile, South Africa continues to benefit from its membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 84/

145. The Governmental Affairs Committee of the United States Senate was reported to be investigating evidence that South Africa, Israel and other States had received sensitive information from three top United States Energy Department weapons laboratories. It appears that such information is useful in the production and testing of nuclear weapons. 85/

E. Assessment of the impact of sanctions and other measures on the South African economy

146. The foregoing analysis reveals that sanctions have had an impact on the régime. In spite of the loopholes, a less than vigorous implementation and the lack of co-ordination, sanctions compounded seriously the structural difficulties of the South African economy. If, however, other Western States had shown the same political will manifested by the Nordic and other States in adopting sanctions against South Africa, the effects of sanctions could have been staggering, particularly if they had targeted explicitly the main areas of dependence and vulnerability of the South African economy. It should be emphasized that both the leaders of the South African black majority and the front-line States have repeatedly called for the imposition of sanctions.

147. External trade, transport facilities, foreign financing, foreign technology and expertise are crucial to the viability of the *apartheid* economy. While the fragility and vulnerability of the economy is clear, measures adopted by those States seeking an end to *apartheid* have been inadequate for achieving the objective. The ability of South Africa to purchase oil and to expand its armaments

production, albeit at a premium price, demonstrates that the oil and arms embargoes are being openly violated. Likewise, South Africa's external trade continues to thrive as a result of the relatively weak sanctions adopted thus far by major Western States. Along those lines, the current procedure of disinvestment from South Africa followed by the majority of transnational corporations provides the South African companies with invaluable access to technology and other forms of capital. Such arrangements have the effect of strengthening domestic industrial capabilities.

148. The export of South African capital also reflects to some extent the weakness of the present measures. Not only are South African transnational corporations involved in helping Pretoria to set up channels for the evasion of sanctions, but they are also becoming part, often in an unpublicized way, of other transnational corporations, thereby avoiding the stigma attached to South African firms.

149. In contrast, the effectiveness of people's sanctions is evidence of the growing world-wide rejection of the régime. More important, they reflect the collective pressure that groups and individuals can exert, as voters, consumers, trade unionists, students and shareholders to persuade their Governments, corporations and local authorities to sever economic ties with South Africa. People's sanctions have been instrumental in fostering a climate of public opinion in which it is no longer morally acceptable to deal with apartheid South Africa.

150. Overall, the uneven effectiveness of the current government sanctions lies in the lack of co-ordination, monitoring and enforcement of these measures and, above all, in the lack of political will. Existing pressures, restrictions and sanctions need to be tightened, strengthened and possibly extended; loopholes need to be closed and avoidance strategies blocked if sanctions are to achieve their goal.

IV. INTERNATIONAL ACTION AGAINST APARTHEID

A. General

151. Although proposals were made to impose further sanctions against South Africa and to strengthen current measures, Governments and intergovernmental organizations adopted few significant new measures in the period under review. Substantial progress was made at the level of people's sanctions as local authorities adopted new restrictive measures concerning their transactions with transnational corporations that maintain economic ties with South Africa.

B. Governments and intergovernmental organizations

152. In the United States Congress, initiatives have been proposed to strengthen the provisions of the Comprehensive Anti-*Apartheid* Act of September 1986, by which sanctions were imposed against South Africa. Representative Ronald Dellums (Democrat-California) introduced, on 3 January, the bill 1989 H.R. 21, which has over 100 co-sponsors. It provides for a complete withdrawal of United States corporations from South Africa, a near total embargo on trade with South Africa and support for the imposition of multilateral sanctions and restrictions on military co-operation between the United States and South Africa. It also prohibits United States oil corporations involved in South Africa from bidding on any federal oil, gas and coal leases. A similar bill, S.507, was introduced by Senator Paul Simon (Democrat-Illinois) on 3 March 1989. The bills remain under consideration in the Congress. 86/

153. On 1 August 1989, the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs convened a hearing in Washington, D.C. to examine the political implications of the rescheduling of South Africa's foreign debt repayment and the options available to the United States Government concerning the enforcement of existing prohibitions on lending to South Africa. Expert witnesses provided testimony on the subject.

154. At its meeting at Madrid in February 1989, the Council of Foreign Ministers decided that a report would be prepared regarding proposals for stepping up sanctions against South Africa. At the meeting with their counterparts from the front-line States in June 1989, the 12 Ministers stated that, before the adoption of any new measures, efforts should be made to persuade Mr. de Klerk to introduce fundamental changes in the country.

155. The Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CFMSA), at its meeting at Harare in February 1989, concluded that financial sanctions were a strong instrument against South Africa and should therefore be tightened. The Ministers (from Australia, Canada, Guyana, India, Nigeria, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) adopted proposals to enforce the arms embargo and elaborated definitions of the type of equipment that should be covered to avoid different interpretations of "arms and related material". In addition, they called for the establishment of a monitoring unit to assist the Security Council Committee established by Security Council resolution 421 (1977) of 9 December 1977 in investigating breaches of the arms embargo and in publicizing the Committee's findings. Commonwealth States were urged to implement effectively the United

Nations embargo itself, as well as the Commonwealth measures adopted to strengthen the embargo. 87/

156. At their meeting at Canberra in August 1989, the Commonwealth Ministers agreed to secure a more co-ordinated application of global sanctions. They discussed an expert report on sanctions, commissioned by CFMSA to examine new ways of extending sanctions. The Ministers shared the conclusions of the report that the existing sanctions have had an effect on the South African economy and that sanctions therefore constitute a legitimate instrument of policy to induce the eradication of apartheid. The report contained the recommendation that Governments should phase out trade with South Africa over a five-year period to force Pretoria to negotiate with the black majority. Recognizing that financial sanctions are one of the most effective forms of pressure on Pretoria, the Ministers proposed further financial sanctions, notably to tighten the conditions for debt repayment, impose further restrictions on trade finance, monitor the ban on medium-term and long-term lending and to ban new bank lending. The Ministers agreed to send a delegation of senior Commonwealth officials to meet with senior executives of the member banks of the co-ordinating committee that is currently negotiating the 1990 rescheduling of South Africa's foreign debt. The delegation will urge that banks charge the highest possible interest rates to South Africa and that they reject any request to extend repayment during the next 10 years. Noting that trade credits are allowing South Africa to cushion its balance of payments, the Ministers called upon all financial institutions in the Commonwealth and other countries to impose tougher terms for trade financing. They agreed in principle to the establishment of an independent body to monitor South Africa's links with the international financial community. 88/

157. The Ministers' decisions taken at Canberra were a reaffirmation of a decision made at Toronto in 1988 to widen and tighten financial sanctions against South Africa. Their proposals are in line with the recommendations made in a study on financial sanctions, which was launched during the CFMSA meeting by the Prime Minister of Australia, Bob Hawke. The study is based on the 1988 report prepared for CFMSA on "South Africa's relationship with the international financial system". 89/

158. In June 1989, during the seventy-sixth session of the International Labour Conference, the ILO Committee on Action against Apartheid agreed that sanctions against South Africa should be formulated within the context of the adoption of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions. The sanctions recommended by the Committee therefore focus on vital areas of the economy. They include the adoption of financial sanctions, imposition of a coal embargo and adoption of appropriate legislation to prevent the transport of oil. An important initiative was the support given by the Committee to the establishment of a Group of Three Independent Experts to monitor and evaluate the implementation of sanctions and other measures. 90/

159. Many Governments and intergovernmental organizations deplored the renewal of the state of emergency on 9 June 1989. On several occasions, they appealed for clemency for political prisoners sentenced to death on the ground of "common purpose" and reiterated their call for the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and detainees. They also called upon Pretoria to cease the forced removals of populations.

C. Non-governmental and other organizations

160. Anti-apartheid movements in the EEC countries launched a book entitled Fighting for Apartheid - A Job for Life, European Citizens in the South African Defence Force on 13 October 1988. According to information presented in the book, more than one third of SADF consists of whites who possess, or are entitled to possess, the passport of an EEC country. In a statement released with the book, representatives of these anti-apartheid movements requested that European Governments and EEC discourage their citizens from participating in the apartheid military and police forces.

161. In an initiative to promote the application of gold sanctions against South Africa, the World Gold Commission, a London-based anti-apartheid organization, was launched in June 1988. Convinced that non-South African gold suppliers can mine more than enough gold to satisfy the world's jewellery industry, the Commission has formulated specific proposals with respect to the imposition of gold sanctions against South Africa, notably a ban on gold imports, the release of gold from national reserves and the establishment of a fund for the training of students in the techniques of mining and marketing gold. In November 1988, the Commission released a report showing that the Italian jewellery industry is the largest buyer of South African gold. Italy buys about one third of South Africa's supplies, which account for about 14 per cent of the country's entire exports (see para. 109). The report demonstrated that the Italian jewellery industry could feasibly switch from South African to non-South African gold. These findings stimulated all three Italian trade union federations to launch a campaign focusing on the main jewellery manufacturing centres of northern Italy. On 20 January 1989, the first Italian conference on a boycott of South African gold supplies to the Italian jewellery industry was held at Vicenza, Italy. In May 1989, the Italian national anti-apartheid co-ordinating committee held a conference in Rome to discuss, among other things, a proposed campaign to oppose Italy's trade with South Africa. The work of both the Commission and the trade unions has led an important number of Italian manufacturers to take steps to obtain their gold supplies from countries other than South Africa. In addition, negotiations are under way with those Italian banks which act as intermediaries in the gold trade and are the main suppliers of the industry. The Commission has provided input for an initiative in the United States Congress, led by Senator Edward Kennedy, to implement a boycott of South African gold. As part of this initiative, a team from the United States Government Accounting Office held consultations in London in March 1989 with representatives of the Commission and of various London firms that fix the daily gold price. 91/

162. At a consultation convened by ANC in London in July 1989, representatives of anti-apartheid movements, church organizations and development agencies from 16 countries, including all of South Africa's creditor countries, agreed to launch a major campaign for the imposition of financial sanctions against South Africa and to focus attention on actions that will prevent the rescheduling of South Africa's foreign debt repayment. The campaign includes world-wide co-ordinated actions against the banks of the co-ordinating committee in France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The consultation was part of ANC efforts towards the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the régime. 92/

163. Following its meeting at Harare in November 1988, ICFTU launched a world-wide campaign to boycott South African coal and announced its decision to establish a

working party on the coal embargo. At the same time, several Italian trade unio agreed to deny energy companies the possibility of importing coal from South Africa. In February 1989, at a Socialist International (SI) conference attended by front-line States and the southern African national liberation movements, SI and ICFTU made a joint appeal to Governments and EEC, as well as to individual local authorities, to stop South African coal from entering through North Sea and Mediterranean ports. The Labour Party in the Netherlands, the Social Democratic Party in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Socialist Party in Belgium plan to hold a conference of local authorities to develop a co-ordinated policy to prevent individual ports from violating the coal boycott.

164. Trade unions from several countries started a campaign in November 1988 to oppose South Africa's Labour Relations Amendment Act on the ground that it contravenes internationally recognized labour standards and curtails further the activities of the non-racial trade union movement in that country. The campaign focused on the subsidiaries of those transnational corporations in South Africa which are using the Act to undermine the activities of trade unions and are refusing to negotiate with trade unions on the terms of disinvestment. In March 1989, efforts in this regard resulted in the agreement by the three largest transnational automobile manufacturing corporations (based in the Federal Republic of Germany) to abide by a set of 14 minimum labour standards in South Africa. The standards, which were devised jointly by the IG Metall trade union of the Federal Republic of Germany and the South African Co-ordinating Council of the International Metalworkers' Federation, whose most powerful member is the COSATU-affiliated National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA), are an attempt to fight provisions of the Act. Notwithstanding the agreement, the application of the standards has proceeded with some difficulties. 93/

165. The acquittal from charges of treason of Moses Mayekiso, the NUMSA General Secretary, and four other defendants on 24 April 1989 was a partial victory for international trade union solidarity. During the two-year trial, the International Metalworkers' Federation, ICFTU and national metalworkers' unions throughout the world campaigned for the release of Mayekiso and the four other accused. 94/ Along similar lines, the Joint Campaign against the Repression of Trade Unionists in South Africa and Namibia, organized by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement Trade Union Committee and the group Southern Africa - the Imprisoned Society, continued to gather strength. At present, 39 national unions are involved in the Campaign, the main objective of which is to mobilize public support for the release of all trade unionists imprisoned for their political activities.

166. The International Federation of Journalists sent a mission to South Africa on 29 April 1989 to assess the impact of press censorship on the flow of information within and outside South Africa. The mission found that censorship distorted the reality of South Africa and suppressed the possibility of democratic debate. It recommended the establishment of alternative communication networks, such as news agencies and training programmes for South African journalists, both within and outside the country.

167. On several occasions, religious leaders within and outside South Africa have called for the adoption of further sanctions against the régime. In February 1989, Pope John Paul II appeared to give cautious approval to economic sanctions in an official Vatican policy document on racism, the first ever on the subject. According to the document, which is entitled "The church and racism, toward a more fraternal society", international law allows the international community to

"exercise appropriate external pressure" to States that practice racial discrimination against their own people, but only with "the greatest care". At a meeting with leaders of the major trading partners of South Africa in February 1989, an eminent persons group, assembled by the World Council of Churches advocated the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions, the diplomatic and cultural isolation of South Africa and the adoption of national and international mechanisms to monitor sanctions (see para. 204). In March 1989, the British Council of Churches called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to impose a wide range of sanctions. World Anglican leaders expressed their support for sanctions at their meeting in Cyprus in May 1989. At the same time, South African religious leaders urged the EEC Executive Commission to take effective action against the Pretoria régime.

168. Anti-apartheid movements and solidarity organizations organized specific activities in support of the liberation struggle in South Africa and the region. In October 1988, the Association of Western European Parliamentarians against Apartheid, in co-operation with the African European Institute, organized a three-day seminar in Athens on measures to counter South African destabilization in the front-line States. The Seminar was opened by the Alternate Foreign Minister of Greece and was attended by members of Parliament from Western European countries; representatives of SADCC, the front-line States and South Africa; and delegates from the United Nations, EEC, OAU and the Commonwealth. Speakers stressed that international pressure on South Africa should continue and that emergency aid and development assistance should be given to the front-line States in order to counteract the effects of South Africa's acts of destabilization.

169. In February 1989, religious and anti-apartheid groups in Europe and the United States organized symbolic fasts in support of the hunger strike by political detainees in South Africa. At the European Parliament, on 15 February 1989, Mandla Mandela, the grandson of ANC leader, Nelson Mandela, received on the latter's behalf a prize awarded to "champions of intellectual and political freedom". 95/

170. In May 1989, a week-long campaign for the release of imprisoned South African conscientious objectors was organized simultaneously in South Africa, Europe and the United States. Protests were held outside Pretoria's embassies in 12 cities in Europe and the United States. 96/ In the same month, the Federal Republic of Germany decided to introduce compulsory visa requirements for all South Africans, save conscientious objectors from that country. The United Kingdom, Switzerland and Greece are now the only European countries without such requirements.

171. As in previous years, anti-apartheid movements and religious groups all over the world organized meetings, marches, rallies and vigils on 16 June 1989, to commemorate the 1976 Soweto students' uprising.

D. People's sanctions

172. People's sanctions are currently a major force behind the initiatives to tighten, expand and increase the scope of current sanctions. Examples of these sanctions include the refusal of consumers to purchase South African products, of workers to handle goods from that country and of local authorities to invest in or purchase from companies involved in South Africa, as well as the demands of shareholders to have their stocks divested from companies operating in or with

links to South Africa. Trade unions and anti-apartheid movements have been instrumental in organizing for people's sanctions.

173. Local authorities throughout the world have adopted policies of selective purchasing; such policies are now in place in 50 local councils in the Netherlands and in 70 councils in the United Kingdom. Regrettably, the Government of the Netherlands recently enacted regulations prohibiting certain local councils from banning South African products or from refusing to carry on transactions with firms linked to South Africa on an individual basis. In the United Kingdom, new local government legislation prevents local councils from boycotting South African products. These measures appear to be the first actions taken to protect Pretoria from the effects of people's sanctions. In contrast to these efforts, a strong initiative for increased sanctions is emerging from state and local authorities in the United States, with a total of 23 states, 19 counties, and 79 cities having disposed of stock in, withdrawn funds from and/or stopped purchases from companies involved in South Africa. 97/

174. Early in 1989, the British Anti-Apartheid Movement launched the "Boycott Apartheid 1989" campaign, which seeks the boycott of South African products and of national corporations with interests in South Africa. The Movement plans to publish a national apartheid-free shopping directory.

175. Royal Dutch Shell, one of the largest foreign investors in South Africa, has been the target of people's sanctions for a number of years (other major targets have included the Mobil Oil Corporation and Citibank). In several countries, trade unions and anti-apartheid movements have co-operated in campaigns to publicize Shell's activities in South Africa and to encourage individual and collective action against the company. In the United States, the National Labor Shell Boycott Committee organized a "Week of action against Shell" in March 1989, to coincide with the anniversary of the 1960 Sharpeville massacre. In May 1989, the World Council of Churches issued a 40-page dossier entitled "Shell shock", calling for a total boycott of Shell products. Representatives of church and anti-apartheid organizations from 11 countries met at Amsterdam, the Netherlands, in May 1989 to participate in a workshop on ways of strengthening the Shell Boycott Campaign. During the same month, anti-apartheid activists from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands attended the Shell annual shareholders meetings held in London and The Hague in an (unsuccessful) attempt to force an official poll on Shell's continued presence in South Africa. At the Hague meeting, the Reverend Beyers Naude requested that Shell withdraw from South Africa and negotiate with the relevant trade unions on the terms of its withdrawal.

E. Cultural boycott

176. The cultural boycott against South Africa is an integral component of the concerted international action to isolate the white minority régime and to support the struggle for a democratic society in South Africa. In that regard, governmental and non-governmental organizations and individuals undertook important activities and initiatives both at the United Nations and in various countries. While a number of artists have declared that they will not perform in South Africa as long as the apartheid system is still in place, others have taken concrete initiatives to support the international campaign. Notably, a group of Italian artists gave its work for inclusion in a travelling exhibit, which, with the

support of the Italian Government, has been shown in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Mali, Senegal, the Soviet Union, the United States, France and Italy, in that order.

177. Cultural activity that can be defined as collaboration with South Africa has tended to decrease, partly as a result of the cultural boycott. A matter of concern continues to be the upsurge of foreign films made in South Africa. Using both domestic and foreign capital, movie producers, from the United States in particular, have made several of these films which receive international distribution. Generous tax benefits provided by the régime appear to be one of the incentives to the producers. As noted in the fifth and the current edition of the Register of Entertainers, Actors and Others Who Have Performed in *Apartheid* South Africa, much of this film-making has taken place in the illegally occupied Territory of Namibia. Most prominent among the companies engaged in South Africa and Namibia has been The Cannon Group, which, following representations by the Special Committee and anti-*apartheid* groups, pledged on 10 October 1988 not to undertake any further business in or with South Africa until *apartheid* was abolished. However, subsequent information revealed that Cannon had not in fact ceased its activity and was somehow continuing it.

178. Another company, Moonrose Productions, is responsible for one of the most notorious films made in Namibia, "Red Scorpion". Produced in late 1987 and 1988, the film received the full backing and co-operation of the South African régime, including the use of a wide range of military personnel and equipment. Shortly after its release in the United States, the Chairman of the Special Committee's Sub-Committee on Implementation of United Nations Resolutions and Collaboration with South Africa stated that the film violated the United Nations cultural boycott against South Africa. The Special Committee and anti-*apartheid* groups continue to monitor activities connected with the production of these films and also continue to undertake joint efforts to persuade the individuals and companies involved to cease their collaboration with South Africa (see para. 236).

179. A vibrant culture of resistance to *apartheid* is flourishing in South Africa, in the townships, schools, trade union halls and political organizations, even though the régime continuously attempts to narrow the parameters of cultural expression. Since culture is seen as a component of the organized resistance to the régime, in the past few years, anti-*apartheid* artists and cultural workers have established organizations according to the various artistic disciplines and have allied them with the non-racial trade union movement. While seeking to strengthen the cultural boycott and thereby achieve the cultural isolation of the régime, these organizations have also recognized the need for the culture of resistance to come into contact with the world of culture outside.

180. Acknowledging these developments, the Special Committee adopted the policy guidelines for the implementation of the cultural boycott of South Africa in August 1988 (A/AC.115/L.656, annex VI). The policy seeks to persuade artists, entertainers and others not to perform in South Africa or to engage in any cultural contacts with it. At the same time, it acknowledges that a culture of resistance exists in South Africa; thus, specific activities and contacts that, in the view of the Special Committee, have the intent and effect of expressing opposition to *apartheid*, enriching that culture and furthering the liberation struggle do not come within the scope of the cultural boycott. The guidelines received the endorsement of the participants (artists and writers) in the Symposium on Culture against *Apartheid*, which was held in Athens from 2 to 4 September 1988 to review the cultural boycott and consider ways to make it more effective. 98/

181. In May 1989, ANC made public its redefinition of the cultural boycott in a document entitled "Position paper on the cultural and academic boycott". Noting that the cultural and academic boycott of apartheid South Africa (i.e., bodies, institutions, cultural workers and their products that promote, defend and give aid and comfort to the system of white minority domination) must be strengthened as part of the overall strategy to isolate the régime, ANC stated that "no cultural workers, artists, sportspersons or academics should be permitted to travel to South Africa to perform or to impart their services and expertise, save and except in those instances where such travel is clearly in furtherance of the national democratic struggle or any of its objectives". In addition, "democratic and anti-racist South African artists, cultural workers, sportspersons and academics - individually or collectively - who seek to perform, work or participate in activities outside South Africa should be permitted to do so without fear of ostracism or boycott". The international community and the anti-apartheid opposition both within and outside South Africa are now applying the boycott in a manner that allows international cultural figures to engage in cultural activity in South Africa and anti-apartheid South African cultural figures to participate in such activity outside the country provided that said activity furthers the anti-apartheid cause and that consultations take place with the appropriate organizations. At the same time, the international community is pursuing efforts to give financial, technical and other forms of assistance to these developing cultural alternatives inside South Africa, and to increase constructive cultural exchanges.

182. The Special Committee has begun the implementation of the recommendations of the Symposium on Culture against Apartheid, the main objective of which is to help the international artistic community become more actively involved with the liberation struggle in South Africa. Accordingly, the Special Committee has undertaken steps towards the establishment of a scholarship fund for young artists whose talents have been suppressed as a result of apartheid. In addition, it has held consultations about the formation of a board composed of representatives from the international artistic community to advise the Special Committee regarding the boycott. Preliminary discussions have also taken place concerning the establishment of a cultural resistance desk which would be composed of international and South African artists and representatives of the national liberation movements and would act as a clearing-house on issues related to the culture of resistance.

F. Sports boycott

183. The international community undertook action at different levels to strengthen the existing boycott of apartheid sports. In particular, the establishment of the Commission against Apartheid in Sports, the reaffirmation of the decision to boycott South Africa made by the International Olympic Committee, the widespread support for the Register of Sports Contacts with South Africa and the world outcry against the international rugby and cricket tours of South Africa were all important initiatives in the international campaign to isolate the régime in the field of sports. 99/

184. In that context, on 9 December 1988, at Vienna, the Chairman of the Special Committee presented citations to the President of the International Olympic Committee, Juan Antonio Samaranch, and to the President of the Association of

National Olympic Committees, Mario Vasquez Rana, for their outstanding contributions to the Olympic movement's campaign against apartheid in sports.

185. The Register of Sports Contacts with South Africa was released on 13 June 1989 and contained the names of 3,404 sportspersons. Of these, 650 had participated in sports activities in South Africa in 1988, although most are not renowned. 100/ United States sportspersons constituted the highest number (868), followed by those from the United Kingdom (770). Since the Register was first issued in 1981, a total of 224 sportspersons have pledged not to participate in sporting activities in South Africa while the system of apartheid is in place. Of these, 91 pledges were received between April 1988 and April 1989 (see para. 235).

186. In spite of the success achieved thus far in isolating apartheid sports, tennis and golf associations still allow South African individuals and teams to compete in their events. While the tennis associations have considered ending contacts with South Africa, no similar action has yet been forthcoming from the golf associations. 101/ For example, South African golfers and other golfers residing in South Africa participated in golf tournaments in the United Kingdom and the United States. 102/ The International Olympic Committee and the International Tennis Federation, have reaffirmed their opposition to the organization of tennis tournaments in South Africa. The Tennis Federation, however, could undertake further steps to ensure the end of tennis contacts with South Africa. Although the United States Tennis Association sent a letter to all professional and junior players from that country informing them of the Association's opposition to their participation in tennis events in South Africa, the United States Association of Tennis Professionals nevertheless decided to organize two tournaments in South Africa in 1990. The Wimbledon and the United States open tennis tournaments are some of the major events in which South African players are allowed to participate. It was reported that Canada had filed a protest regarding the participation of South African players in the 1989 Wimbledon games. 103/ South African tennis players also participated in other tournaments in Australia, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. 104/

187. In June 1989, sports ministers and senior officials from the States of the Council of Europe unanimously approved a resolution demanding an end to sports contacts with South Africa. Criticism was also expressed of those Western European countries which continued to maintain sports links with South Africa. 105/ The Swedish Sports Confederation has decided that sports exchanges should not take place between Sweden and countries that discriminate against sportspersons on account of their race, religion or political association and have thus terminated all sports exchanges with South Africa. Swedish sportspersons who violate this policy are penalized with a fine or expelled by their respective federations. The policy of the Swedish Sports Confederation conforms, *inter alia*, with a recommendation made by the Second United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Conference of Sports Ministers which took place in Moscow in November 1988 and which has received full support from the Swedish Government.

188. Reports about the participation of individual rugby players from Australia, France and the United Kingdom in the centenary rugby games in South Africa in August 1989 became a matter of serious concern not only to the Special Committee and anti-apartheid organizations but also to those involved in the forthcoming Commonwealth Games. Speculations arose that certain African countries might decide

to boycott the games to express their criticism of the inaction of the Government of the United Kingdom. In the view of those countries, that Government has failed to undertake measures to prevent its national players from participating in sports events in South Africa (see para. 231). In contrast, the Government of France took firm action to prevent its nationals from playing in South Africa. 106/

189. In a widely criticized move, a group of individual cricketers from the United Kingdom agreed to play in South Africa in early 1990 and in 1991. Their decision was in defiance of the agreement reached by the International Board of Cricket in 1989 to ban any player who participates in cricket events in South Africa after 31 March 1989 (see para. 234). At the time, the agreement was considered remarkable because it averted a major crisis in international cricket. 107/

190. At its meeting, held at Canberra from 7 to 9 August 1989, the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa reaffirmed its support for the sports boycott of South Africa and condemned the *apartheid* régime's efforts to "induce cricket and rugby players from Britain and other Commonwealth countries to play in South Africa". In its concluding statement, the Committee expressed "extreme disappointment at the action of players who had indicated their willingness to go to South Africa in violation of the Gleneagles Agreement ... and [called upon] the players in question who had not already done so to decline these invitations". 108/ Noting the case of cricketers who had agreed to go to South Africa, the Committee called "for the rigorous enforcement of the penalties agreed earlier this year by the International Cricket Conference". It further called upon other sporting bodies "to develop and apply similar rules and penalty structures in respect of the sports they controlled". Calling upon all Commonwealth Governments "to express their own strong opposition to such sporting contacts with South Africa and to use their utmost endeavours through all political and other channels to discourage them", the Ministers stated their appreciation for efforts already made in this regard, in particular by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand. An official spokesman of the Government of India similarly expressed outrage at the international cricket and rugby tours of South Africa. In a statement, the Government of India deplored and condemned these "attempts by South Africa to lure individual players to break the international sports boycott for monetary gains". 109/

191. International boxing organizations have expressed their opposition to *apartheid* and co-operated with the Special Committee in efforts to isolate *apartheid* sports. The World Boxing Council undertook firm measures against boxers who had been lured to compete in South Africa. In September 1988, the International Amateur Boxing Federation decided to expel Israel for five years following the participation of Israeli boxers in competitions in South Africa. The World Boxing Association also adopted measures against *apartheid* sports. The International Boxing Federation is virtually the only major boxing organization that still maintains relations with South Africa. 110/

192. In May 1989, ANC called on the international community to support current efforts in South Africa to create "broad non-racial governing bodies in every major sports discipline" in the country. 111/

V. REVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

193. The Special Committee against Apartheid proposed to the General Assembly appropriate policies reflected in resolutions adopted in 1988 and continued to monitor the situation in South Africa and the relevant actions of the international community and to promote international campaigns for the isolation of the apartheid régime. Focusing on activities that have maximum potential for influencing decision-making and for mobilizing world public opinion, the Special Committee carefully chose its targets for action in an effort to generate a multiplier effect in its anti-apartheid work. It organized and sponsored seminars and hearings with journalists, educators, religious individuals, and prominent personalities. It also promoted contacts among opponents of apartheid and assisted, within its means, the anti-apartheid resistance both inside and outside South Africa.

A. Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the item entitled "Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa"

194. During its forty-third session, the General Assembly considered the above-mentioned item in eight plenary meetings, between 28 November and 5 December 1988. Based mainly on the recommendations of the Special Committee, the General Assembly, on 5 December 1988, adopted the following 11 resolutions relating to various aspects of apartheid: "International solidarity with the liberation struggle in South Africa" (43/50 A); "Military collaboration with South Africa" (43/50 B); "Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the racist régime of South Africa" (43/50 C); "Imposition, co-ordination and strict monitoring of measures against racist South Africa" (43/50 D); "Relations between South Africa and Israel" (43/50 E); "Programme of work of the Special Committee against Apartheid" (43/50 F); "Special session of the General Assembly on apartheid and its destructive consequences in southern Africa" (43/50 G); "Dissemination of information against the policies of apartheid of the régime of racist South Africa" (43/50 H); "United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa" (43/50 I); "Oil embargo against South Africa" (43/50 J); and "Concerted international action for the elimination of apartheid" (43/50 K).

195. Through these resolutions, the General Assembly specified the necessary steps Pretoria would need to take in order to create an appropriate climate for negotiations with the leaders of the black majority. It also defined the responsibility of all members of the international community to pressure Pretoria towards a peaceful end to apartheid. Sanctions and international isolation are the main instruments of this pressure. Pending the implementation of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions, the General Assembly recommended the strict implementation and co-ordination of sanctions on a number of areas critical for the functioning of the South African economy. The General Assembly also called for international support of the liberation struggle and solidarity with the resistance to apartheid.

196. The resolutions obtained virtually the same support as those of the previous year. Notably, resolution 43/50 D obtained greater support than in the previous year; in addition, resolutions 43/50 G and 43/50 I were adopted by consensus. In expressing their support for certain resolutions, several Member States noted their appreciation for the brevity and precision of the drafts.

197. Upon the conclusion of the debate on agenda item 36, the President of the General Assembly, following consultations with the Chairmen of the regional groups, appointed Zimbabwe as a new member of the Special Committee, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 34/93 R of 17 December 1979.

B. Activities of the Special Committee in support of the anti-apartheid resistance in South Africa

198. The Special Committee availed itself of many opportunities to draw the attention of the international community to the repression in South Africa and to the resistance of individuals and organizations to *apartheid*. It organized visits, meetings and events to encourage and generate support, moral as well as material, to anti-*apartheid* forces and to victims of *apartheid*.

1. Seminar on the special needs of South African and Namibian refugee women and children

199. The Seminar was organized by the Special Committee in co-operation with the Association of Women's Clubs of Zimbabwe in accordance with paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 41/123 of 4 December 1986, and was held at Harare from 16 to 18 January 1989. Presided over by Joyce Mujuru, Minister of Community Development, Co-operatives and Women's Affairs of Zimbabwe, the Seminar was attended by special guests, representatives of Governments of States members of the Special Committee, front-line States, United Nations bodies and specialized agencies, national liberation movements of South Africa and Namibia, non-governmental organizations and other individuals. The delegation of the Special Committee was led by its Chairman, Major-General Joseph N. Garba, who opened the Seminar, and the Deputy Minister of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare of Zimbabwe, Herbert Mahlaba, addressed its concluding session. The Seminar adopted a final declaration urging the international community to give the widest possible publicity to the special situation of South African and Namibian women and children and to provide political, economic, legal, humanitarian and other assistance to them, particularly to those who have sought refuge in the front-line States; to increase support to projects designed to rehabilitate and resettle refugees as well as to facilitate the early return of Namibian refugee women and children to their country. It also called upon front-line States to facilitate prompt disbursements of international assistance to refugee women and children and to co-operate with donor Governments and agencies in that regard. The Seminar called for the establishment of a support group of eminent women that would (a) maintain close contact with local structures of refugee women and children, be guided by their experience and aspirations and co-operate with them in supporting their needs; (b) monitor the conditions of South African refugee women and children, including internal refugees, provide publicity to their conditions and needs and promote measures to alleviate their hardships; and (c) monitor the return of Namibian refugee women and children and their reintegration to independent Namibia (see annexes I and III to the present report).

2. Observance of the international days of solidarity and other special meetings of the Special Committee

200. The Special Committee held meetings on international days to mark important dates in the fight against the *apartheid* régime and to rally support for that struggle. Consultations were also held with South African anti-*apartheid* leaders and other opponents of the régime to assess developments in South Africa and to develop initiatives to strengthen the international campaign against *apartheid*.

201. On the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners (11 October 1988), the Special Committee held a meeting which was addressed by the President of the forty-third session of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General, the President of the Security Council and the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee. Guest speakers were Mme. Glenys Kinnock, member of the British Anti-*Apartheid* Movement; Mme. Lisbet Palme, Chairperson of the Swedish National Committee on UNICEF; Mme. Margarita Papandreou, International Liaison of Women for a Meaningful Summit; Mr. John Mothopeng, son of the President of PAC; Mr. Prakash Diar, attorney for the "Sharpeville Six"; Mr. Horst Kleinschmidt, Director of the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa; and Ms. Gay McDougall, Director of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. On the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (21 March 1989), the Special Committee gave particular emphasis to the abuses of the South African judicial system as manifested in the Delmas trial and such other trials and invited a former judge of the International Court of Justice, Abdalla El Khani, to address the meeting as a special guest. The Secretary-General in his statement also addressed this matter and appealed to the Government of South Africa to bring about the conditions for free consultations among all the people of South Africa, as called for by the General Assembly. On the International Day of Solidarity with the Struggling People of South Africa (16 June), the Special Committee invited the President of PAC, Zephania Mothopeng, who had recently been released from a long term of imprisonment, to address the meeting as a special guest (see para. 208). On the International Day of Solidarity with the Struggle of Women in South Africa and Namibia (9 August) the Special Committee invited, among others, Dame Ruth Nita Barrow (Barbados), Ann-Marie Lizin (Belgium), and Miranda Ebenezer (South Africa) to speak about the condition of South African women and the role of women in the liberation struggle. Ms. Ebenezer is a member of the Education section of the Media Workers Association of South Africa. A film prepared by the Centre against *Apartheid* and the Department of Public Information of the United Nations Secretariat, entitled "Asimbonanga", was shown at the end of the meeting.

202. The Special Committee also held a special meeting on 6 April 1989 to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of PAC. The meeting was addressed by the Chairman of the PAC Central Committee, Johnson P. Mlambo.

3. Consultations with apartheid opponents

203. On 31 January 1989, the Special Committee held informal consultations with Mohammed Valli Moosa and Murphy Morobe, senior officials of UDF. Both gave testimony on the current situation in South Africa, noting the escalation of repression and the imposition of an even stricter media censorship. They pointed out that, while repression has disrupted the activities of the *apartheid* opposition, it has failed to stem resistance. They also stressed the need to increase international action against the régime.

204. On 3 February 1989, the Special Committee heard a report by an Eminent Persons Group, assembled by the World Council of Churches, following its visits to Western European and other States that maintain significant economic ties with South Africa. The Reverend Canaan Banana, former President of Zimbabwe, the Reverend Frank Chikane, General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches and Mrs. Lucille Mair, a former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, emphasized the importance of continued efforts to sensitize public opinion and Governments to the situation in South Africa and on the need to increase economic pressure on Pretoria (see para. 167).

205. The Special Committee held consultations on 6 July 1989 with a delegation from the United Democratic Front headed by Albertina Sisulu, the organization's co-president. The delegation was visiting the United States at the invitation of President George Bush. Mrs. Sisulu was accompanied by Titus Mafolo, UDF national organizer; Sister Bernard Ncube, a Roman Catholic nun who was the first president of the Federation of Transvaal Women; Azhar Cachalia, UDF Treasurer and practicing attorney in Johannesburg; Curnick Ndlovu, UDF National Chairman; and Jessie Duarte, member of the Executive Committee of the Federation of Transvaal Women. In her statement, Mrs. Sisulu emphasized the urgent need to impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa and called for the immediate release of Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners and detainees. She called upon Pretoria to start a direct dialogue with the representatives of the oppressed majority in South Africa.

4. Statements and messages against the repression of apartheid opponents in South Africa

206. The Special Committee continued its efforts to disseminate information on the repressive policies of the régime, focusing in particular on the escalation of repression, the situation of political prisoners and detainees and the increasing number of death sentences pronounced on Pretoria's opponents.

207. On 12 and 26 October 1988, the Chairman of the Special Committee denounced the régime's decision to conduct nation-wide municipal elections in South Africa; on 4 November, he expressed deep concern about the banning of The Weekly Mail, and on 12 June 1989, he strongly condemned the renewal of the state of emergency for the fourth consecutive year, emphasizing that that "ruthless and desperate" act would further aggravate the conflict in South Africa. On 22 August 1989, he expressed concern at the increase in violent attacks perpetrated against *apartheid* opponents, in particular against the people's poet Mzwakhe Mbuli and his family, and at the arrest of UDF leader Mohammed Valli Moosa.

208. On the subject of political prisoners and detainees, the Chairman sent a message to Zephania Mothopeng, President and founder of PAC, on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday on 9 September 1988. Subsequently, on 29 November 1988, he welcomed Mr. Mothopeng's release after nine years of incarceration for his opposition to *apartheid* (see para. 201).

209. Following the conclusion of the Delmas trial, in which three UDF leaders were convicted of "high treason" and eight others were convicted of "terrorism", the Acting Chairman criticized the use of the judiciary to suppress the anti-*apartheid* opposition. On 9 February 1989, he expressed the Special Committee's solidarity

with detainees who were on hunger strike in prisons throughout the country to protest against their "unjustified and prolonged detention without trial".

210. In response to death sentences, executions and assassinations, the Chairman condemned the death sentences pronounced on 24 January 1989 on 14 individuals who had been part of the "Upington 26" case (see para. 22 above). Noting that the 14 persons had been convicted solely on the ground of "common purpose", the Chairman stressed that this notion of collective responsibility had long been rejected by international law.

211. On 23 November 1988, the Chairman expressed a similar concern about the scheduled execution of Paul Tefo Setlaba and condemned the planned executions of Ndumiso Silo Siphenuka, Mackezwana Menze, Sibusiso Masuku, Oupa Mbonane and Abraham Mgomezulu. On 11 August 1989, the Chairman expressed concern once again at the condition of political prisoner Robert John McBride, who is still on death row along with more than 85 other political prisoners.

212. On 5 May 1989, the Chairman condemned the assassination in Johannesburg on 1 May of Dr. David Webster, a leading South African white democrat. Pointing to his assassination as the latest in a long line of as yet unresolved assassinations of anti-apartheid activists, the Chairman called for a thorough investigation into the circumstances surrounding this case and, further, for an international inquiry into the activities of the increasing number of death squads in South Africa (see para. 30).

C. Activities of the Special Committee against collaboration with South Africa

213. The Special Committee continued its efforts to persuade Governments to cease their economic, military and other relations with South Africa, and when appropriate, brought to the Governments' attention reports concerning acts of collaboration. On several occasions, it also expressed appreciation to those States which had adopted measures to end such relations.

1. Hearings on the oil embargo against South Africa

214. The Hearings were organized by the Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa, in co-operation with the Special Committee, and were held at United Nations Headquarters on 12 and 13 August 1989. A Panel under the chairmanship of Mr. Abdelaziz Al-watteri, Secretary-General of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), and consisting of eight experts in the field, heard testimony by 16 witnesses on a number of aspects of the oil embargo against South Africa. The opening session of the Hearings was addressed by the Chairman of the Special Committee, Major-General Joseph N. Garba, and by the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Group, H.E. Mr. Tom Vraalsen (Norway). Throughout the Hearings, the Panel focused its attention on the implementation and effective monitoring of the oil embargo and on the need to co-ordinate international efforts to stop the flow of oil and petroleum products to South Africa. Among the specific issues considered were: the dependence of South Africa on oil and petroleum products and its attempts to stockpile; the development of substitutes and additives by South Africa; the legislative and administrative measures adopted nationally and

internationally to give effect to the oil embargo; the assessment of "weak links"; and suggestions and proposals for tightening the embargo. Witnesses included representatives of the non-racial trade union movement in South Africa, law and religious groups, media, national liberation movements, as well as economists. The conclusions and recommendations of the Hearings were published as a report of the Panel (see A/44/279-S/20634 and annex I to the present report).

2. Consultations on the arms embargo against South Africa

215. The Consultations on the Implementation by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany of the Arms Embargo against South Africa were organized by the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa in co-operation with the Special Committee, and were held at Bonn on 27 April 1989. The delegation of the Special Committee was led by its Chairman, Major-General Joseph N. Garba. The meetings were attended by members of the Deutscher Bundestag (Parliament), academics, individuals and representatives of religious groups and non-governmental organizations. The public session of the Consultations was addressed by Marianne Tidick, Minister for Federal Affairs for the Land of Schleswig-Holstein, Ambassador Sulimma of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Gunther Verheugen, Member of the Deutscher Bundestag of the Social Democratic Party. In a closed session the meeting discussed cases of alleged violations of the arms embargo, particularly the transfer of submarine blueprints to South Africa. Proposals were made for legal and other actions which the Federal Republic could undertake to make the arms embargo more effective (see para. 136).

3. Military collaboration

216. On 2 November 1988, the Chairman sent to the Members of the Bundestag Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, which is investigating the delivery to South Africa of microfilms of the blueprints of the U-209 submarine by a company in the Federal Republic of Germany, letters accompanied by a questionnaire which sought to elicit further information on the matter. The content of the replies was subsequently made available to the consultations on the arms embargo against South Africa held at Bonn in April 1989 (see para. 136).

217. On 2 November 1988, the Chairman sent a letter to the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations encouraging the Finnish Government not to proceed with its apparent decision to purchase Crotale missiles from the French company Thomson-CSF, which is linked to South Africa. In a reply received on 21 November 1988, the Finnish Government indicated that the purchase did not "contradict the spirit of the United Nations sanctions against South Africa". On 23 March 1989, the Chairman sent a second letter expressing the Special Committee's view that South African involvement in the manufacture of those weapons, even if modified, had not ceased and that there was no evidence that Thomson-CSF had terminated its relations with South Africa. Under those circumstances, the Chairman invited the Government of Finland to reconsider its decision to purchase the missiles and to comply with Security Council resolutions 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977 and 558 (1984) of 13 December 1984 on the arms embargo against South Africa.

218. On 16 January and 23 March 1989, the Acting Chairman and the Chairman sent letters to the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the

United Nations drawing attention to the apparent decision of that Government to purchase Crotale missiles from Thomson-CSF and indicating that the purchase would be a breach of Security Council resolutions 418 (1977) and 558 (1984) on the arms embargo. Both invited the Government of the United Arab Emirates to take appropriate measures to abide by the provisions of those resolutions. Thus far, no reply has been received.

219. On 8 March 1989, the Chairman, first in a letter to the Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations, and subsequently in a public statement, expressed the serious concern of the Special Committee over the visit to Chile by the South African Minister of Defence, Lieutenant-General Magnus Malan, to discuss closer military co-operation between the two countries. Attention was drawn in particular to the Minister's scheduled visits to the Cardoen bomb factory at Iquique in order to inspect the testing of the G.5 155-mm artillery gun and to a shipyard construction site at Punta Arenas run by the South African firm Sandok Austral and the Chilean firm Asmar. Replying to the Chairman's appeal for an investigation of the matter, the Permanent Representative of Chile indicated that "neither the purchase of technology from a South African firm by a Chilean company, nor co-operation in the construction of a shipyard intended to cater for repairs to non-military vessels can be considered violations of the mandatory provisions of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) on an arms embargo against South Africa". In a letter of 11 August 1989, the Chairman, as in previous years, appealed to the Government of Chile to undertake immediate steps to prevent South Africa from participating in the 1990 Feria Internacional del Aire (FIDA), an armaments exhibition fair. In a reply, the Government of Chile stated that "participation of South Africa in the said Fair is not contemplated" (see para. 138).

220. On 9 March 1989, the Chairman sent a letter to the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations drawing attention to an official visit to South Africa in February 1989 by a 90-member delegation of Austrian police officers at the invitation of the International Police Academy and conveying the hope that such action would not be repeated in the future. The Austrian Government replied that the visit "took place in the context of activities of the International Police Association (IPA) which is a private organization outside the jurisdiction of Austrian authorities". The visit thus "was a private trip by members of the Austrian branch of the IPA". The Austrian Government gave assurances that "there will be no official contacts between the Austrian police and South Africa".

221. On 5 April 1989, the Acting Chairman sent a letter to the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations regarding information on shipments to Iraq via Chile of South African-made G.5 155-mm artillery guns and military collaboration of the Chilean company Cardoen with Iraq. In a letter dated 11 April 1989, the Permanent Representative of Iraq stated that his Government "abides by the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly relating to the boycott of South Africa" and "denies the allegations made". Further, the Special Committee was given assurances that Iraq "has no dealings with South Africa and is continuing to impose sanctions on it".

222. On 15 and 31 May 1989, the Chairman sent letters to the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations expressing his concern at the participation of ARMSCOR in IDEA '89 at Ankara from 2 to 6 May 1989 and appealing to the Government of Turkey to undertake action to remove ARMSCOR's products from the Exhibition. Noting that the South African press had reported widely that South Africa had succeeded in exhibiting arms for the first time in a NATO member

country, the Chairman requested that an urgent investigation be conducted concerning South Africa's participation in IDEA '89 and that concrete action be taken against those involved in that violation of the arms embargo. In a letter dated 30 June 1989, the Permanent Representative of Turkey noted that the private organizer of the IDEA '89 fair "has been cautioned not to repeat the mistake it made this year by allowing ARMSCOR to exhibit at subsequent IDEA fairs". The Committee was given assurances that "Turkey has absolutely no political links" with South Africa and that "every effort is being made to maintain trade with South Africa at the lowest possible level" (see para. 140).

223. In a letter of 11 August 1989, the Chairman of the Special Committee informed the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations about a luxury tour to South Africa organized for United States police officers in co-operation with the South African police and the South African Tourism Board. Although the tour was private, the Chairman invited appropriate United States governmental action to prevent and discourage United States police officers and travel agencies from participating in the tour of South Africa. No reply has thus far been received.

4. Economic collaboration

224. In a statement issued on 7 November 1988, the Chairman expressed the Special Committee's concern over the reported intention of the United States-based Chemical Bank to finance Minorco Corporation's bid to take over Consolidated Gold Fields PLC. Stressing that the bid by South African-controlled Minorco could give virtually total control of the world supply of gold to a South African conglomerate, the Chairman invited the international community to prevent the take-over and appealed to Chemical Bank to comply with United Nations resolutions regarding loans to South Africa.

225. On 28 December 1988, the Chairman sent a letter to the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations concerning information on the involvement of the Italian jewellery industry in commercial gold trading with South Africa. Noting that a report published in London in November 1988 by the World Gold Commission, a non-governmental organization research group, indicated that the Italian jewellery industry had become "*apartheid*'s biggest customer", the Chairman requested that the Government of Italy investigate the matter and make the results of its investigation available to the Special Committee. So far, no reply has been received (see paras. 109 and 161). The Special Committee also received a letter on 30 March 1989 from the Director of the External Relations Department of the Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano denying "any involvement of the Bank in the financing of the Government of the Republic of South Africa".

226. On 4 January 1989, the Chairman directed a letter to Member States regarding information on South Africa's participation in the International Tourism Fair which was scheduled to be held in Berlin (West) from 4 to 10 March 1989. Stating that South Africa's participation in the fair was contrary to relevant decisions of the General Assembly, the Chairman invited concrete action by Member States traditionally present at the fair should South Africa be invited again. On 23 February 1989, the Acting Chairman sent a similar letter to the Governing Mayor of Berlin (West) inviting the use of his power to prevent South Africa's participation in the fair. The Special Committee received a reply on 22 February 1989 from the Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of

Germany to the United Nations indicating that, while the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany "will continue to consult with its partners in the European Community with a view to maintaining and possibly increasing the political and diplomatic pressure on South Africa", it did not have "the legal means to exclude South Africa from participating in the tourism fair in Berlin (West)". Responses were also received from the Governments of Costa Rica, Senegal, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Republic of Tanzania.

227. In a letter addressed to the Chairman on 5 June 1989, the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations transmitted information on Japanese trade with South Africa. Special attention was drawn to the fact that Japanese trade with South Africa "has shown a consistent trend of decline in yen terms in recent years and both in dollar and yen terms last year in spite of a sharp rise in the value of the yen, thanks to the conscientious efforts by the Japanese cabinet ministers and the co-operation of the Japanese private business". On 24 January 1989, the Special Committee had received similar information from the Permanent Mission of Japan (see table 2 and para. 109).

5. Sports contacts

228. On 23 January 1989, the Chairman sent a letter to the Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations concerning the participation of South Africa in the General Assembly of the International Equestrian Federation to be held at Budapest from 19 to 24 March 1989. The Chairman expressed the hope that the Hungarian Government would take urgent action to prevent the entry of any South African participant in that or any other sporting event. Subsequently, in a letter dated 3 May 1989, the Chairman raised anew the issue of the participation of a South African delegation in the above-mentioned event. A reply from the Government of Hungary, which was received on 17 August 1989, stated that the above-mentioned meeting had been organized by an international body which itself had chosen the participants. Therefore, the Government had not "been in a position to decide which delegation should or should not be invited". In a letter dated 11 September 1989, the Chairman noted that States members of the Special Committee "are expected not to grant visas to South African sportsmen and women".

229. On 13 February and 23 March 1989, the Chairman sent letters to the President of the Oak Hill Country Club, Rochester, New York; to the President of the Professional Golfers Association, Palm Beach, Florida; and to the Acting Executive Director of the United States Golf Association, Far Hills, New Jersey, expressing his concern at the proposed participation of the South African golfer Mark McNulty in a golf tour of the United States in June 1989. In the letters, the Chairman appealed to those organizations to reconsider or rescind their invitations and to prevent South Africa from participating in other tours until that country was free from apartheid.

230. On 30 May 1989, the Chairman sent a letter to the Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations concerning South Africa's participation in an international fishing competition scheduled to be held at San José. In a reply dated 6 June 1989, the Government of Costa Rica stated that a fishing event with South African participation "was organized by a private group with no participation by the Government of Costa Rica or even by public sports organizations" at Flamingo Beach, Guanacaste province, on 31 May 1989, and that "no action could have been taken by the Government to prevent the participation of South African citizens" in

that event. The Government reaffirmed its opposition to the policies of apartheid and reported that the Convention against Apartheid in Sports was being studied by its legislative assembly.

231. In a statement issued on 31 May 1989, the Chairman expressed his regret that rugby unions of Australia, France, England, Scotland and Wales had permitted their individual players to accept South Africa's invitation to participate in the August 1989 centenary celebration of rugby football, which is traditionally favoured by the racists of South Africa. Since the event was being organized in defiance of the international boycott of apartheid sports, the Chairman called upon the relevant authorities to persuade those sportspersons concerned not to participate in the event and to deny South Africa the opportunity to break its international isolation (see paras. 51 and 188).

232. In a letter dated 5 June 1989, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on the Implementation of United Nations Resolutions and Collaboration with South Africa appealed to the President of the United States National Rifle Association, based in Washington, D.C., not to participate in the South African annual pistol challenge match, as such participation violated the sports boycott of South Africa. The Chairman stated further that the names of those individuals participating in the Match would be included in a future Register of Sports Contacts with South Africa.

233. On 12 July 1989, in cables to the contests' organizers, the Chairman protested the participation of South African tennis players Andrew Burrow in the United States Pro Championships and of Gary Muller, Pieter Aldrich and Neil Broad in the Volvo Hall of Fame Championships respectively. He appealed for the exclusion of South African tennis players from future championship events.

234. In a statement on 4 August 1989, the Acting Chairman expressed the Special Committee's concern over plans for cricketers from the United Kingdom to tour South Africa in early 1990 and in 1991. Calling the tour an affront to international efforts to isolate apartheid sports, he regretted that the appeal by the Government of the United Kingdom to the cricket players not to tour South Africa had not been heeded. The Acting Chairman expressed the hope that the Government would adopt meaningful measures to dissuade its nationals from engaging in sporting activities in South Africa (see para. 189).

235. Pursuant to a decision taken in 1980, the Special Committee released the Register of Sports Contacts with South Africa at a press conference held on 13 June 1989. The Register contains information on sports contacts for the period 1 January 1988 to 31 December 1988 and includes a cumulative list, by country, of sportspersons who participated in sports events in South Africa. It also includes those whose names had been deleted because they undertook not to engage in further sports events in South Africa (see para. 185).

6. Cultural and other contacts

236. On 5 May 1989, the Chairman of the Special Committee's Sub-Committee on Implementation of United Nations Resolutions and Collaboration with South Africa noted in a statement that the United States film "Red Scorpion", largely filmed in the South African-administered Territory of Namibia and supported by the South African régime, violated the cultural boycott against South Africa. Deploring the disturbing increase in the production of foreign films being made in South Africa,

the Chairman of the Sub-Committee announced that the names of those involved in the "Red Scorpion" production had been placed on the United Nations Register of Entertainers, Actors and Others Who Have Performed in Apartheid South Africa (see para. 178).

237. The Special Committee continues to publish the Register of Entertainers, Actors and Others Who Have Performed in Apartheid South Africa. The Register, which was issued for the first time in October 1983, is revised on a semi-annual basis and the names of persons who undertake not to engage in further cultural activity in South Africa are deleted from it accordingly. The names of 23 artists were deleted between September 1988 and August 1989.

238. The Chairman sent a letter on 17 May 1989 to the Permanent Representatives of Member States concerning an invitation sent by the "World Conference of Mayors" (Washington, D.C.), on behalf of the United Municipalities of South Africa, to governors, mayors, and other members of local governments to participate in a Trust Summit Conference of Mayors of Large Cities, which was scheduled to be held in Johannesburg from 28 May to 1 June 1989. On 31 May, the Chairman sent a letter to the Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations concerning the Congress of the International Union of Speleology, which took place in Hungary in August 1989. He appealed to the Hungarian Government to prevent any South African participation in the Congress. A reply from the Government of Hungary was received on 17 August 1989 (see para. 228). A letter was also sent on 14 June 1989 to the President of DIALOG Information Services, Inc., of Palo Alto, California, expressing concern about the number of South African subscribers to DIALOG and pointing out that providing information service to them was contrary to the policy of the United Nations. On the same day, a similar letter was sent to the Secretary-General of the International Federation of Library Associations (IFLA) at The Hague, requesting the removal of the Transkei, a South African "independent homeland", from its list of subscribing nations. A reply from IFLA, dated 7 July 1989, indicated that IFLA has "decided to list Transkei and the other homelands from now on under South Africa instead of listing them as an independent country".

D. Further actions to isolate the apartheid régime

1. International Non-Governmental Organizations Seminar on Education against Apartheid

239. The International Non-Governmental Organizations Seminar was organized by the Sub-Committee on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Apartheid and Decolonization of the Special Non-Governmental Organizations Committee on Human Rights in co-operation with the Special Committee, and was held at Geneva from 4 to 6 September 1989. Presided over by Mr. Romesh Chandra, President of the World Peace Council and Chairman of the Sub-Committee, the Seminar was attended by special guests, representatives of international and national non-governmental organizations, including education associations, teachers' and students' federations, anti-apartheid movements and representatives of the national liberation movements of South Africa. Representatives of missions of Member States at Geneva, of United Nations bodies and of specialized agencies directly involved in education and apartheid participated as observers. The delegation of the Special Committee was led by its Chairman, Major-General Joseph N. Garba, who opened the Seminar. The Seminar adopted conclusions and recommendations.

2. Support of anti-*apartheid* activities; participation in meetings and other events

240. The Special Committee participated in, contributed to and sponsored conferences, seminars and other events. It also supported the campaigns or projects of international and national non-governmental organizations and anti-*apartheid* groups aimed at mobilizing public opinion in solidarity with the liberation struggle in South Africa. Anti-*apartheid* activists from within and outside South Africa attended the conferences, seminars and other events.

241. The Special Committee actively supported the Anti-*Apartheid* Asia and Oceania Workshop organized by the Japan Anti-*Apartheid* Committee and held at Tokyo from 27 to 29 August 1988. The workshop, the first of its kind organized on a regional basis, brought together approximately 70 representatives from nine Asian countries. The participants agreed on the need to raise public awareness about increasing East Asian economic links with South Africa and to mobilize public opinion in support of the liberation struggle.

242. The Special Committee co-operated closely with the American-South African Peoples' Friendship Association, of Albany, New York, in organizing a Seminar for Teachers on South Africa and *Apartheid*, which was held at United Nations Headquarters on 28 and 29 October 1988 and was attended by 220 participants. The widespread interest demonstrated by teachers and educators in the subject of the Seminar led its organizers to undertake another seminar, held on 28 and 29 April 1989. Both seminars provided pertinent background information on South Africa and *apartheid*, together with explanations and demonstrations of instructional techniques and methods of teaching the subject.

243. The Special Committee actively supported an International Conference on *Apartheid* organized by Nigeria's National Committee against *Apartheid*, held at Lagos from 7 to 9 November 1988. Participants included representatives of Governments, anti-*apartheid* groups, non-governmental organizations and representatives of national liberation movements. The wide range of discussion topics centred on the process aiming towards the eradication of *apartheid*. The Conference participants adopted a set of recommendations in support of the international campaign against *apartheid* (see A/43/854-S/20288).

244. On 16 and 17 February 1989, the Special Committee participated in the Local Authorities Against *Apartheid* Biennial Conference held at Sheffield Town Hall, United Kingdom. Reaffirming the need for continued international pressure against the Pretoria régime, participants expressed their support for the imposition of economic sanctions and other measures to isolate South Africa in the fields of sports and culture. Representatives of local authorities discussed ways to educate their constituencies further on *apartheid* and the steps necessary to engage in joint actions with trade unions and professional associations involved in the campaign against *apartheid*.

245. On 21 March 1989, the Chairman of the Special Committee, the Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Public Information and the Assistant Secretary-General of the Centre against *Apartheid* opened at United Nations Headquarters an exhibit entitled "*Apartheid* South Africa", which was produced jointly by the Centre against *Apartheid* and the Department of Public Information. Following its opening in New York, the exhibit was presented in Tokyo from 5 to 16 June 1989, under the sponsorship of the United Nations Information Centre

and the DENTSU Corporation, and in Canberra and Sydney, Australia, from 9 August to 3 September 1989. The French version of the exhibit opened in Geneva in September 1989 during the International Non-Governmental Organizations Seminar on Education against *Apartheid*. The exhibit will be mounted in different parts of the world in connection with major annual events organized by the United Nations to promote international support for the liberation struggle in South Africa. The Department of Public Information of the United Nations Secretariat, in co-operation with the Centre against *Apartheid*, has also produced two half-hour video tapes entitled "Artists against *Apartheid*" and "World against *Apartheid*", respectively, which are being used to strengthen the international campaign for the isolation of the régime.

246. The Special Committee contributed to the Summit Conference on *Apartheid* for Justice and Peace in Southern Africa, organized by the Religious Action Network of the American Committee on Africa, New York, from 4 to 6 April 1989. In acting as host, the Special Committee convened its 626th regular meeting at the opening of the Conference. Following the statement of the Acting Chairman, the meeting was addressed by the Reverends Wyatt Tee Walker of New York City, Charles G. Adams of Detroit, Mary Anne Bellinger of Atlanta, Darrel Rollins of Richmond, J. Alfred Smith of Oakland and Hayward E. Wiggins of Houston. During the Conference, religious leaders of different congregations stressed the importance of political and economic sanctions against South Africa and pledged continued support for the struggle against *apartheid*. Noting the mounting campaign of direct and indirect repression against all progressive religious individuals in South Africa, participants emphasized the need for the effective mobilization of religious communities in the United States in support of the people of South Africa.

247. The Special Committee on several other occasions supported and participated in events designed to develop strategies to strengthen the international anti-*apartheid* campaign. On those occasions, representatives of the Special Committee called upon the international community to increase the cost of maintaining *apartheid* through the imposition of sanctions and reiterated the demands for the unconditional release of all political prisoners and detainees, the lifting of bans and restrictions on individuals and organizations, the ending of the state of emergency, the withdrawal of troops from the townships and the repeal of all repressive legislation. They stressed that the attainment of those demands was necessary to create a climate conducive to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the country. Events that the Special Committee supported and/or participated in included the International Non-Governmental Organization Conference for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination in the Second United Nations Decade, held at Geneva from 11 to 14 October 1988; the Conference of the European Campaign against South African Aggression on Mozambique and Angola, held at Bonn from 8 to 10 December 1988; the Nineteenth African-American Institute Conference on African-American Priorities in the 1990s, held at Lusaka from 9 to 13 January 1989; the General Assembly of African Anti-*Apartheid* Committees and Movements, held at Brazzaville from 12 to 14 January 1989; the Meeting of Senior Officials of the AFRICA-Fund Committee, held at New Delhi from 14 to 17 February 1989; and the Eighty-first Inter-Parliamentary Conference, held at Budapest from 13 to 18 March 1989.

248. In addition, the Special Committee undertook action to support the campaign launched by the Anti-*Apartheid* Bewegung in Berlin (West) against the participation of South Africa in the International Tourism Fair, held from 4 to 10 March 1989. It also supported the activities of the Anti-*Apartheid* Bewegung in connection with

the annual shareholders meeting, on 28 June 1989, of the Daimler-Benz Corporation, which maintains links with South Africa. The Special Committee provided support to the Boycott Bandwagon project, organized by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, and the Casspir Cross-Country Summer Tour, organized by several United States anti-apartheid groups. Both projects aimed at building popular support for stronger sanctions, disseminating information on the situation in South Africa and the region and strengthening the international anti-apartheid campaign. As in previous years, the Special Committee supported projects carried out by the Shipping Research Bureau (Amsterdam), the World Gold Commission (London) and the National Labour Boycott Shell Committee (Washington, D.C.).

249. The Chairman and the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee transmitted messages of support and appreciation to intergovernmental, non-governmental and other organizations, anti-apartheid movements and groups that organized conferences, seminars, hearings and other events on the issue of apartheid. Among those were messages to the Conference on Nordic Sanctions against South Africa, held at Copenhagen on 19 and 20 November 1988, and to the Conference entitled Isolate South African Gold, held at Vicenza, Italy, on 16 January 1989.

E. Missions of the Chairman of the Special Committee

250. The Chairman visited several countries and held discussions with senior officials about the need to strengthen the international campaign against apartheid. At the invitation of the President of France, he attended the ceremonies marking the fortieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which were held in Paris on 10 December 1988. The Chairman met with the President of Zambia (11 January 1989), the President of the Congo (13 January) and the President of Zimbabwe (17 January) during his visits to those countries to attend anti-apartheid events. Following the Special Committee's Consultations on the Arms Embargo against South Africa, the Chairman met with the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany.

251. On 7 December 1988, the Chairman participated in a ceremony in London in which the Annual Media Peace Prize awarded by the United Nations Association of the United Kingdom was presented to the External Services of the British Broadcasting Corporation. On that occasion, the Chairman delivered an address on media coverage in the United Kingdom of United Nations action on South Africa.

F. Co-operation with other United Nations bodies and other organizations

252. The Special Committee co-operated closely with other United Nations bodies concerned with southern Africa. It continued to co-operate with the Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa. The Chairman consults frequently with the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Group and exchanges relevant information with the Group. During the period under review, consultations were held between the President of the Economic and Social Council and the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee. 112/ The Special Committee also continued to co-operate with ILO in the framework of the ILO Committee on Action against Apartheid.

253. The Special Committee co-operated with the Commission on Human Rights, particularly its Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Southern Africa. Co-operation also intensified with the Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Office at Vienna, specifically its Division for the Advancement of Women.

254. OAU attended meetings of the Special Committee as an observer and its representatives addressed several meetings and conferences of the Special Committee. Likewise, the Special Committee was invited to all the meetings of OAU, including those of its Liberation Committee. The Special Committee continued to co-operate with the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and with other intergovernmental, non-governmental and anti-apartheid organizations.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

255. Despite a number of developments, the situation in South Africa remains, in essence, as grim as ever and the state of emergency has been renewed for the fourth consecutive year. After a year of continued resistance to repression, culminating in the recent Defiance Campaign, it has become clear that the new leadership of Pretoria is facing a formidable domestic and international challenge. The black majority, through the national liberation movements and the Mass Democratic Movement, and supported by an increasing portion of the white population, have shown that neither the permanent state of emergency nor the efforts of co-option will suppress their quest for freedom and equality. The international community, after a brief "wait-and-see" period, is expecting initiatives for real change in South Africa.

256. The régime can no longer repackage with immunity the tenets of apartheid by promising the future end of white domination while at the same time denying equality to all South African citizens. It would have to take substantive steps towards a fundamental change which, through negotiations, will lead to the eradication of apartheid in all its forms and the establishment of a democratic and non-racial society. In this regard, the recent declaration of the OAU Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa on the Question of South Africa provides a blueprint that appears to be amassing increasing international support.

257. It is not clear, however, that this imperative has been fully understood by Pretoria. Despite recent developments in Namibia regarding the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and despite pronouncements and diplomatic activities, even under the new leadership of Mr. de Klerk, Pretoria has continued to suppress with savagery any peaceful opposition to its policies.

258. While Mr. de Klerk made pronouncements about the advent of peace and prosperity for all South Africans, the security forces and the arsenal of security laws were used to suppress the anti-apartheid opposition. The growing Defiance Campaign organized by the Mass Democratic Movement against not only apartheid laws but also the racially segregated elections of 6 September suffered the brunt of the repression. The death of more than 20 protestors, among them children and elderly women, the increasing number of injuries and the more than 1,500 arrests all constitute evidence of the régime's lack of intention to engage in a genuine process of political negotiations with the anti-apartheid opposition.

259. The exclusion of the black majority from the elections to the racially segregated tricameral Parliament intrinsically denies the demands of the black majority for full political rights. It indicates that the régime intends to implement its political "reform" programme for blacks through repression and regardless of the opposition to it.

260. The widespread boycott of the elections within the Coloured and Indian communities shows once more that most of the Coloureds and Indians, as part of the black majority, reject the Parliament as it is presently constituted. Furthermore, the reduced majority of the National Party and the gains made by the liberal Democratic Party suggest that the National Party monolith is gradually eroding, an important development for any future negotiations. The results of the elections, according to Mr. de Klerk, are a mandate for "reforms". But the "reforms" he has espoused in the past in the Five-Year Plan of Action have been not only vague but, more important, a refurbished version of white domination concealed in the rhetoric

of "group rights" and "power sharing". In effect, Pretoria is purporting under the group concept to ensure the veto power of whites. Such a programme is no answer to the country's severe political, economic and social conflict.

261. As recent protests suggest, the opposition to apartheid is undiminished and has re-emerged with a new strength. Despite the state of emergency and the bans and restrictions placed on many black leaders and organizations, the Mass Democratic Movement's Defiance Campaign has had a remarkable impact. It was significant that on election day more than 3 million workers and students stayed at home. This growing resistance shows that any effort by the régime to co-opt "moderate" blacks into its constitutional programme will be rejected by the black majority, thereby increasing the possibility of further violent conflict in the country. Only when Mr. de Klerk makes tangible his plans for a democratic society will he be able to convince his opponents both within and outside South Africa that he is serious about a process of fundamental change in the country.

262. Under the circumstances, the international community has two options: it can take no further action and adopt no new sanctions, thus maintaining a lifeline to apartheid and allowing Mr. de Klerk to proceed with his paced "reforms"; or it can step up the pressure, either by adopting comprehensive and mandatory sanctions or by imposing concerted and strictly monitored sanctions on the vulnerable areas of the South African economy, until Pretoria resists no further the need for genuine negotiations. The first option will undoubtedly lead to a deepening of the conflict and further bloodshed and suffering for South Africans and ominous consequences for southern Africa and the world. The second option would lead to a peaceful and prompt end of apartheid.

263. Despite claims made by Pretoria, present sanctions, even if their implementation, monitoring and enforcement has been unco-ordinated and lax, have had a serious impact on the economy and have increased the isolation of the white minority. Experts' studies show that sanctions have contributed to slow rates of growth, adding to the chronic structural difficulties of the South African economy. The combined effects of disinvestment, the dearth of new capital investment and the denial of long-term credit have all contributed to undermining South Africa's ability to impose its designs both within and outside its borders. In view of the fact that South Africa remains extremely dependent on the rest of the world for its economic viability, the denial of external trade, transport facilities, foreign financing, foreign technology and expertise remains crucial for the demise of apartheid.

264. Sanctions do indeed work, as is evident in the mandatory arms embargo, which, in spite of violations, has prevented South Africa from obtaining modern weapons systems, particularly aircraft, a fact that contributed to Pretoria's retreat from Namibia, and in the oil embargo, which has cost Pretoria $25 billion over the past 10 years. Furthermore, the sports and cultural boycotts have increased the sense of isolation of South Africa.

265. While the vulnerability of the economy is clear, measures adopted by those countries imposing sanctions have been inadequate to the objective. South Africa continues to be able to purchase oil and petroleum products, at a premium price, and has managed to expand parts of its armaments production and has even attempted to secure markets for them, as manifested in its participation in armaments fairs in Chile and Turkey. Likewise, South Africa's external trade continues to thrive as a result of unco-ordinated sanctions, the loopholes within sanctions and the

eagerness of some smaller countries to expand their trade with South Africa and to take advantage of restrictions imposed by other States. While the Nordic States are in the forefront of those which have curtailed trade with South Africa, the Federal Republic of Germany surpassed Japan and has become the first trading partner of South Africa. The United Kingdom and the United States continue to be major trading partners of South Africa. At the same time, a disturbing shift in regional trade is taking place. Some Far Eastern and Western European States are increasing trade with Pretoria, thus undermining the positive action undertaken by other States. Taiwan, province of China, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Belgium/Luxembourg and France all showed significant increases in trade.

266. A grave concern to the international community should be the many reported violations of the mandatory arms embargo, which allow Pretoria to pursue its armaments production and to increase its export of armaments through third-party States. In this respect, the most serious violations were reported in Chile, Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany. In the same vein, the continued collaboration of the Government of Israel with South Africa is providing missile technology that is assisting the régime in developing a missile delivery capability.

267. While the disinvestment campaign has succeeded from the point of view of cutting off new investment capital to South Africa, the mode of disinvestment used by the majority of transnational corporations continues to provide the domestic South African companies with invaluable access to technology, managerial know-how and foreign markets. It is disquieting that the rate of disinvestment from South Africa fell in 1988 compared to the previous year. The retention of non-equity links by more than half of the disinvesting companies allows a flow of licensing and franchise fees to the transnational corporations as well as technology and other skills to South African companies. Non-racial trade unions in South Africa have developed guidelines for a fair disinvestment procedure that provide for advance notice, a disclosure-of-sale agreement and negotiations between transnational corporations and the relevant trade union on the terms of disinvestment.

268. As the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa concluded, financial sanctions are one of the most effective forms of pressure on Pretoria. With an estimated $8.5 billion due for repayment in June 1990, the most important economic constraint facing Pretoria is the need to reschedule payment of its foreign debt, given its reduced access to international capital markets and its more than $1.2 billion losses on foreign exchange. Since short-term trade credits, which are still provided by several States, serve to ease the foreign exchange constraints of South Africa, the terms of the repayment of the debt next year assume critical importance. The transnational banks should require the normal full payment of the outstanding debt in June 1990. Rescheduling will be construed as a sign of confidence of the banks in the financial and political stability of South Africa and could be interpreted as an endorsement of the *apartheid* régime.

269. The Special Committee considers that in order to achieve maximum effectiveness sanctions should be mandatory and comprehensive. Pending appropriate action by the Security Council, further sanctions must target explicitly the main areas of dependence and vulnerability of the South African economy. Sanctions must be adopted in unison and must be strictly monitored and enforced. The Committee believes that targeted measures could have a significant impact on South Africa by increasing the economic hardship on the white constituency and structures that

support apartheid. This growing hardship could help persuade the régime to create a climate conducive to negotiations.

270. Accordingly, the targeted measures should include: non-rescheduling of debt payment, a prohibition by all States of new loans and investment of any sort to South Africa; a ban on the importation of all South African agricultural products; a ban on the importation of all non-strategic South African minerals, including coal, gold, base metals, iron ore, uranium and non-metallic minerals; a restriction on trade credits for sales to South Africa, including both buyers' and suppliers' credits; a ban on the transfer of technology that allows South Africa to circumvent current sanctions, in particular in the areas of arms, oil and computers; a prohibition of the sale of all computers, software and electronic and communications equipment; the imposition of tighter restrictions on the re-export to South Africa of strategic goods and technology, either directly or included in other products; and the extension of the ban on air links to all States other than those in the SADCC region.

271. A powerful weapon against the régime would be the imposition of a mandatory oil embargo and, short of that, a widening and tightening of the current voluntary oil embargo. As recent events in southern Africa have shown, the mandatory arms embargo, despite its weaknesses, is of extreme significance and should be monitored and enforced more strictly. In addition, all sanctions should apply to South African-controlled firms to prevent them from assisting Pretoria in evading sanctions.

272. The effectiveness of the above-mentioned measures lies in the willingness of all States to co-ordinate the imposition, monitoring and enforcement of these measures. In addition, such measures must be adopted with speed to prevent South Africa from adapting to new and changing trading partners and conditions. In that context, the Special Committee welcomes existing proposals aimed at the monitoring and enforcement of sanctions of all types. Measures should also be adopted to prevent States from benefiting from the vacuum created by other States that have imposed sanctions. Information on violations of sanctions and economic links with South Africa should be widely publicized, particularly concerning the arms and oil embargoes.

273. While there are initiatives concerning the region, the impasse continues in South Africa. As long as Pretoria clings to apartheid in any form and is unwilling to create a climate conducive to negotiations, a peaceful resolution of the political conflict in South Africa shall remain elusive. Already in 1986 the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons concluded that "the South African Government is concerned about the adoption of effective economic measures against it. If it comes to the conclusion that it would always remain protected from such measures, the process of change in South Africa is unlikely to increase in momentum and the descent into violence would be accelerated". The urgent task confronting the international community is now to make sanctions effective by targeting the key areas of the highly vulnerable South African economy.

274. The liberation struggle and international pressure, which is facilitated by recent positive developments in the world political scene, have opened new possibilities for a prompt and peaceful end to apartheid. Intensified and co-ordinated pressure by the international community can induce Pretoria to take the steps conducive to a climate for negotiations as spelled out by the General Assembly, OAU and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. It would finally bring

about an end to a system that has been a cause of profound embarassment to our civilization and of much suffering to the people of southern Africa.

275. In view of the above, the Special Committee recommends to the General Assembly that it:

(a) Reaffirm its condemnation of the apartheid system and the régime's acts of repression, aggression, destabilization and terrorism;

(b) Reiterate that concerted measures should be intensified now to bring a speedy end to the apartheid system in the interest of all the people of South Africa and the region;

(c) Reaffirm the legitimacy of the struggle of the black majority of South Africa and its white allies for the total eradication of apartheid and for the establishment of a united, non-racial, democratic society in which all the people, irrespective of race, colour or creed, enjoy the same fundamental freedoms and human rights;

(d) Reaffirm its full support to the national liberation movements, the African National Congress of South Africa and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, which pursue their noble objectives of eliminating apartheid through political, armed and other forms of struggle;

(e) Demand that Pretoria annul the capital punishment imposed on opponents of apartheid, including the "Upington 14", and abide by the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocol I of 1977, which accord prisoner-of-war status to captured fighters;

(f) Support the efforts of the majority of the people of South Africa to arrive at a political settlement through genuine negotiations;

(g) Call upon the present régime of South Africa to create the necessary climate for negotiations by:

(i) Lifting the state of emergency;

(ii) Unconditionally releasing Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners and detainees;

(iii) Lifting the ban on individuals and political organizations opposing apartheid and repealing press restrictions;

(iv) Withdrawing the troops from black townships;

(v) Ceasing all political trials and political executions;

(h) Urge the Security Council to take immediate action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations with a view to applying comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the régime as long as it continues to disregard the above demands of the international community;

(i) Urge the Security Council to take concrete steps for the strict implementation of the mandatory arms embargo imposed by its resolutions 418 (1977) and 558 (1984) in order to bring an end to the continued violations of the arms embargo, and strongly urge those States which directly or indirectly infringe the arms embargo and continue to collaborate with South Africa in the military intelligence and technology fields to eliminate forthwith such acts;

(j) Call upon all States, pending the adoption of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions:

(i) To impose embargoes on the supply of oil, petroleum products and oil technology; investments, loans and credits; computer and communication equipment and other high-technology products having potential military application;

(ii) To prohibit the import of coal, gold, other minerals and agricultural products from South Africa;

(iii) To induce transnational corporations, banks and financial institutions to withdraw effectively from South Africa by ceasing equity investment and cutting off non-equity links, particularly those involving transfer of high technology and know-how;

(iv) To deny landing and port rights to South African air and sea carriers and to sever direct transport links with South Africa;

(v) To monitor strictly the implementation of the above measures and adopt, when necessary, legislation providing for penalties on individuals and enterprises violating those measures;

(k) Urge governmental and private financial institutions to refrain from rescheduling South Africa's foreign debt and terminate any financial support or favourable treatment of South Africa as long as apartheid prevails in that country;

(l) Urge Governments and non-governmental organizations to take appropriate measures to ensure the effectiveness of the cultural and sports boycott in accordance with the policies of the United Nations on the cultural and sports isolation of apartheid South Africa;

(m) Call upon Governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and individuals to extend all possible assistance to the struggling people of South Africa and their national liberation movements, to South African refugees, particularly women and children, and to the front-line States that are subject to South Africa's destabilization;

(n) Authorize the Special Committee against Apartheid, in accordance with its mandate and acting as a focal point, with the support services of the Centre against Apartheid, (i) to continue monitoring closely the situation in South Africa and the actions of the international community, particularly regarding the imposition and implementation of sanctions and their impact on apartheid South Africa; (ii) to continue mobilizing international action against apartheid, inter alia, through collation, analysis and dissemination of information, liaison with non-governmental organizations and relevant individuals and groups able to influence public opinion and decision-making, as well as through hearings, conferences, consultations, missions, publicity and other relevant activities;

(o) Request the Secretary-General to ensure the co-ordination of activities of the United Nations system regarding the struggle against apartheid and the support of the oppressed people of South Africa and to undertake appropriate initiatives to facilitate all efforts leading to the peaceful eradication of apartheid;

(p) Appeal to all Governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, information media and individuals to co-operate with the Centre against Apartheid and the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat in their respective activities against apartheid, and in particular in monitoring developments concerning international action against apartheid and in disseminating information on the situation in South Africa.

Notes

1/ Press release on hunger strike, Human Rights Commission (Johannesburg), 7 March 1989.

2/ The Guardian (London), 30 June 1989, and The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 30 June-6 July 1989.

3/ NMS co-ordinates security and township upgrading through a series of up to 700 committees, which reach from the Cabinet directly into communities. NMS pervades nearly all spheres of community life. Its highest echelon is the State Security Council, which is chaired by the President; Work in Progress/WIP 56-57 (Braamfontein), November-December 1988.

4/ The administrative structures in the African townships were rendered largely ineffective following the popular uprising in 1984. In areas of militant resistance to its policies, Pretoria has undertaken major "upgrading schemes", notably in Mamelodi (R 500 million), Alexandra (R 95 million), Crossroads (R 90 million) New Brighton and Bonteheuwel; South African Labour Bulletin/SALB (Braamfontein), vol. 13, No. 7, November 1988.

5/ Ibid., and New Nation (Johannesburg), 3-9 November 1988.

6/ The Human Rights Commission places special emphasis on repressive measures exercised by the State through security legislation, emergency regulations and other formal and informal powers and actions. It uses the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a yardstick to measure the degree of respect for or violation of human rights; Press release announcing the establishment of the Human Rights Commission by the Black Sash, Five Freedoms Forum, National Association of Democratic Lawyers, National Medical and Dental Association, Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference and the South African Council of Churches (Johannesburg), 20 September 1988.

7/ "Order without law", by Nicholas Haysom, in Southern African Review of Books (London), December 1988-January 1989.

Notes (continued)

8/ The sentences were as follows: 12 years - Patrick "Terror" Lekota (39); 10 years - Moss Chikane (39) and Popo Molefe (36). Co-accused Thomas Manthata (48) was sentenced to six years. Another accused, Petrus Malindi (28), was convicted of "terrorism" only and sentenced to five years in prison. The case is at present under appeal; "Political prisoners in South Africa", Research and Information Department of the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa/IDAF (London), February 1989.

9/ In a Human Rights Day speech, the United States Ambassador to South Africa, Edward Perkins, in a thinly veiled reference to the case, said: "It seems that the security laws too are being used in an ever more political manner. Court decisions which convict genuine, non-violent community leaders of treason or terrorism cannot be expected to command respect"; The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 15-22 December 1988 and 23 December 1988-12 January 1989; Suppressing Apartheid Opponents, The State of Emergency - June 1987 to March 1989, by David Webster and Maggie Friedman, Working Group Kairos (Utrecht, the Netherlands), June 1989.

10/ When the State Kills ... The Death Penalty versus Human Rights, Amnesty International publication (London), 1989; Human Rights Update, April-June 1989, Human Rights Commission in association with Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand (Johannesburg), vol. 2, No. 2, July 1989.

11/ The names of the "Sharpeville Six" are: Mojalefa Reginald Sefatsa, Reid Malebo Mokoena, Oupa Moses Diniso, Theresa Ramashamola, Duma Joshua Kumalo and Francis Don Mokhesi.

12/ When the State Kills ... The Death Penalty versus Human Rights, Amnesty International publication (London), 1989.

13/ An international campaign for clemency for the 14 individuals is under way, as is another for Robert McBride, who is on death row; Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 10 February 1989; The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 26 May-1 June 1989.

14/ Some of the organizations are the Society for the Abolition of the Death Penalty, the Black Sash, Lawyers for Human Rights, Amnesty International and various religious groups; Inside South Africa's Death Factory, A Black Sash Research Project (Johannesburg), February 1989; Human Rights Update, by the Human Rights Commission, in association with the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand (Johannesburg), vol. 2, No. 2, July 1989.

15/ Some of the accused in these trials include ANC members Ismail Ebrahim, Action Maseko and Simon Dladla; 6 PAC members; 28 ANC members allegedly involved in military activity; and 8 residents of the Alexandra township; "Political Prisoners in South Africa", IDAF (London), February 1989.

Notes (continued)

16/ "Detention without trial", Fact Paper FPI, Human Rights Commission (Braamfontein), 1989; Human Rights Update - October 1988-March 1989, by the Human Rights Commission in association with the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand (Johannesburg), vol. 2, No. 1, May 1989, and vol. 2, No. 2, July 1989.

17/ Human Rights Update - October 1988-March 1989, by the Human Rights Commission in association with the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand (Johannesburg), vol. 2, No. 1, May 1989; 1988 Review, Human Rights Commission (Johannesburg), 1989.

18/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-third Session, Supplement No. 22 (A/43/22), paras. 20-22.

19/ New Nation (Johannesburg), 1-7 September, 13-19 October and 27 October-2 November 1988; The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 23-29 September 1988; City Press (Johannesburg), 16 October 1988 and 19 February 1989.

20/ According to the Five Freedoms Forum, 59 anti-apartheid activists have been assassinated in South Africa in the past decade and a further 61, including ANC members, have been assassinated in exile. At least 30 others have simply disappeared or been abducted from neighbouring States. No one has ever been charged for any of these crimes. Victims of these assassinations include Rick Turner, Chief Ampie Mayisa, Sonwabo Mgxale, Fuzile Lupulwalla, Fabian and Florence Ribeiro, Mathew Goniwe, Victoria and Griffiths Mxenge, Caiphus Myoka, Amos Tshabala, Michael Banda, Abu Baker-Asvat and Sicelo Dhlomo. Stanza Bopape (an employee of the Community Resource and Information Centre in Johannesburg) is one of the increasing number of "disappeared"; information provided by the Human Rights Commission (Johannesburg), 3 May 1989; The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 5-11 May 1989; Financial Times (London), 8 May 1989; and Suppressing Apartheid Opponents - The State of Emergency - June 1987 to March 1989, by David Webster and Maggie Friedman, Working Group Kairos (Utrecht, the Netherlands), June 1989.

21/ "Order without law", by Nicholas Haysom, in Southern African Review of Books (London), December 1988-January 1989; S.A. Barometer (Johannesburg), vol. 3, No. 5, 24 March 1989; The Guardian (London), 9 June 1989; The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 30 June-6 July 1989.

22/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 10-16 February 1989.

23/ Death, Devastation and Destruction - Refugees in Natal, by Wendy Leeb, Centre for Adult Education, University of Natal (Pietermaritzburg); "Memorandum of the role of the police in vigilante violence in the Pietermaritzburg area", press conference held by COSATU/UDF affiliates (Pietermaritzburg), 29 March 1989.

24/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 21-27 April 1989; "Statement by the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress on the Campaign for Peace among the People in Natal", ANC Department of Information and Publicity (Lusaka), 10 May 1989.

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25/ Political Conflict in South Africa - Data Trends 1984-1988, Indicator Project South Africa, Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal (Durban), December 1988.

26/ "Update of hunger strike", Human Rights Commission (Johannesburg), No. 8, 27 April 1989, and No. 10, 25 May 1989; Human Rights Commission Update (Johannesburg), 16 August 1989.

27/ "Banning and restriction of organizations", Fact Paper FP2, Human Rights Commission (Braamfontein), January 1989; "Banning and restriction of persons", Fact Paper FP3, Human Rights Commission (Braamfontein), March 1989.

28/ "A free choice? Memorandum on repression and the municipal election", Special Report SR-1, Human Rights Commission (Braamfontein), 25 October 1988.

29/ Africa News (Durham), vol. 30, No. 11, 28 November 1988; Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 14 April 1989.

30/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 12-18 May 1989.

31/ "Freedom of the press", Fact Paper FP4, Human Rights Commission (Braamfontein), June 1989; telex sent by the Committee to Protect Journalists to Adriaan Vlok, Minister of Law and Order in South Africa (New York), 28 July 1989.

32/ Uprooting Poverty: The South African Challenge, Report for the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa, by Francis Wilson and Mamphela Ramphele (New York), 1989.

33/ Episcopal Churchpeople for a Free Southern Africa (New York), 18 August 1989.

34/ New Nation (Johannesburg), 15 to 28 September 1988; WIP 56-57 (Braamfontein), November-December 1988; South African Labour Bulletin (Braamfontein), vol. 13, No. 8, February 1989.

35/ Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 2 December 1988; The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 3-9 March 1989.

36/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 12-18 May 1989; "A letter sent to Cabinet Ministers" (Houghton), 6 June 1989.

37/ The Soweto Delegation is composed of the Reverend Lebamang Sedibi, Ellen Khuswayo, Frank Chikane, Sister Bernard Ncube, Cyril Ramaphosa, Albertina Sisulu and Archbishop Desmond Tutu. It was elected to represent Sowetans after the banning of the Soweto Civic Association; The Soweto Rent Boycott - a report by PLANACT, commissioned by the Soweto Delegation (Yeoville), March 1989; New Nation (Johannesburg), 20-26 April 1989.

Notes (continued)

38/ South African Labour Bulletin (Braamfontein), vol. 13, No. 7, November 1989; The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 15-22 June 1989.

39/ Financial Times (London), 23 June and 22 August 1989; "Press Release - Communiqué National Executive of the ANC" (Lusaka), 27 June 1989; declaration of the OAU Ad-Hoc Committee on Southern Africa on the Question of South Africa (Harare), 21 August 1989.

40/ Press release by COSATU and NACTU on "Latest developments on the new labour bill (Johannesburg), 12 August 1988.

41/ South African Labour Bulletin (Braamfontein), vol. 14, No. 1, April 1989; COSATU News (Johannesburg), No. 1, February 1989; "NACTU statement on the position of 10 General Secretaries" (Johannesburg), March 1989; Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 10 March 1989; The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 17-22 March 1989; "NACTU press statement on workers summit".

42/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 10-16 March 1989; WIP 58 (Braamfontein), March-April 1989.

43/ Special Report of the Director-General on the Application of the Declaration Concerning Action against Apartheid in South Africa and Namibia to the International Labour Conference, seventy-sixth session, 1989, International Labour Office (Geneva); GB.241/CD/1/2 (Geneva), November 1988.

44/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 30 September-6 October 1988.

45/ Collective Bargaining at Anglo-American Mines - A Model for Reform or Repression, Media and Research Department, National Union of Mineworkers/NUM (Johannesburg), 9 December 1988; NUM News (Johannesburg), December 1988; Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 13 January 1989.

46/ S.A. Barometer (Johannesburg), vol. 3, No. 1, 27 January 1989.

47/ Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 5 May 1989; S.A. Barometer (Johannesburg), vol. 3, No. 8, 5 May 1989.

48/ In May 1989, security police threatened to assassinate two student leaders at the University of the North (Turfloop); Letter and supporting information sent to the Special Committee against Apartheid by the President and General-Secretary of both the National Union of South African Students and the South African National Students Congress (Johannesburg), 17 May 1989; "Update on the situation at Turfloop, July to 18 August 1989", National Union of South African Students (Johannesburg), 21 August 1989.

49/ "Whites in a Changing Society", Joint communiqué by the Five Freedoms Forum and the African National Congress (Lusaka), 2 July 1989.

50/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 28 April-4 May 1989.

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51/ Children on the Front-line - The impact of apartheid, destabilization and warfare on children in southern and South Africa, 1989 update with new section on Namibia, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), New York, 1989.

52/ Africa News (Durban), vol. 31, Nos. 6 and 7, 3 April 1989.

53/ International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund (Washington, D.C.), June 1989.

54/ Special Report of the Director-General on the application of the Declaration concerning action against Apartheid in South Africa and Namibia to the International Labour Conference, seventy-sixth session, 1989, International Labour Office/ILO (Geneva).

55/ Southern African Dossier, Centro de Estudos Africanos, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (Maputo), April 1989.

56/ Country Report, Economist Intelligence Unit (London), No. 1, 1989.

57/ Independent Expert Study on the Evaluation of the Application and Impact of Sanctions, Final Report to the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa, Commonwealth Secretariat (London), April 1989.

58/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-third Session, Supplement No. 22 (A/43/22).

59/ Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 21 July 1989.

60/ United Nations Statistical Papers, Series M, No. 34 and Rev.1-3.

61/ The Independent (London), 15 June 1989.

62/ Independent Expert Study on the Evaluation of the Application and Impact of Sanctions, Final Report to the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa, Commonwealth Secretariat (London), April 1989.

63/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 28 April-4 May 1989.

64/ Financial Times (London), 16 May 1989.

65/ Business Day (Johannesburg), 22 May 1989.

66/ Disinvestment and Non-Equity Links, United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (Geneva), (E/C.10/AC.4/1989/2) September 1989.

67/ Investor Responsibility Research Centre, Inc. (Washington, D.C.), 17 July 1989.

68/ See E/C.10/1989/8 and Corr.1.

69/ The Chairman of the Government Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) has said: "These disinvesting companies have been acquired in entirety by South

Notes (continued)

African companies who have both the financial and the managerial capability to do so. They have continued to function as total businesses and in the process the business activity, the jobs and technology have been preserved to the benefit of the South African economy. In this way, the potentially serious negative effects of disinvestment have largely been negated". Address delivered by the Chairman of ESCOM, Dr. J. B. Maree, in seconding the motion for the adoption of the annual report and financial statements of the South African Mutual Life Assurance Society at the Annual General Meeting held on 1 December 1988.

70/ Assessing U.S. Corporate Disinvestment, The CASE Report for the Equal Opportunity Foundation, researched and written by Debbie Budlender, published by Community Agency for Social Enquiry/CASE (Cape Town), 1989.

71/ Apartheid for Export? South African Transnational Corporations Abroad, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions/ICFTU (Brussels), June 1989.

72/ Southern African Dossier, Centro de Estudos Africanos, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (Maputo), April 1989.

73/ Agence France-Presse dispatch (Pretoria), 26 July 1989.

74/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-third Session, Supplement No. 22 (A/43/22).

75/ Facts and Reports (Amsterdam), 14 January 1989: Press release by the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa (Oslo), 25 August 1989.

76/ Press release by the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa (Oslo), 19 January 1989; The Citizen (Johannesburg), 20 January 1989.

77/ Jane's Defence Weekly (London), 18 March 1989.

78/ Press release GA/AP/1913, United Nations (New York), 11 April 1989.

79/ Financial Times (London), 25 April 1989; The Star (Johannesburg), 3 May 1989; Resister, Journal of the Committee on South African War Resistance/COSAWR (London), No. 62, June-July 1989.

80/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 18 May 1989; Jane's Defence Weekly (London), 20 March 1989; Business Day (Johannesburg), 9 and 12 June 1989; Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 16 June 1989.

81/ The Washington Post, 2 June 1989.

82/ The Wall Street Journal (New York) and The New York Times, 22 December 1989.

83/ The Wall Street Journal (New York), 3 January 1989; The Citizen (Johannesburg), 19 April 1989.

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84/ *Xinhua* (Gaborone), 21 June 1989; *The Star* (Johannesburg), 28 June 1989.

85/ *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), 7 August 1989.

86/ Information for Action on Southern African Issues, Washington Office on Africa, 21 March 1989.

87/ Concluding Statement of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CFMSA), 3rd meeting, Commonwealth news release (Harare), 8 February 1989.

88/ *Ibid*., 4th meeting, Commonwealth news release (Canberra), 9 August 1989.

89/ *Apartheid and International Finance* (Penguin, Victoria, 1989).

90/ *Report of the Committee on Apartheid, Action Taken on the Declaration concerning Action against Apartheid in South Africa*, International Labour Conference, seventy-sixth session, provisional record (Geneva), 1989.

91/ *The Italian jewellery industry: Apartheid's biggest customer*, The World Gold Commission (London), November 1988; *The Star* (Johannesburg), 10 March 1989.

92/ Press statement by ANC (London), 17 July 1989.

93/ The three car makers concerned were B.M.W., Volkswagen and Daimler-Benz; "The Week in Germany", relay from Bonn, 31 March 1989; *South African Labour Bulletin* (Braamfontein), vol. 14, No. 2, June 1989.

94/ *Labor Notes* (Detroit), June 1989.

95/ *The Guardian* (London), 15 February 1989.

96/ *The Weekly Mail* (Johannesburg), 19-25 May 1989.

97/ *Africa News* (Durham), 20 February 1989.

98/ See A/AC.115/L.656, and *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-third Session, Supplement No. 22* (A/43/22), chap. IV.C, para. 162, and annex IV, D.

99/ *South* (London), 21 September 1988; *The Times* (London), 16 May 1989; *The Guardian* (London), 17 and 18 May 1989; Press releases GA/AP/1918 and GA/AP/1928 of 31 May and 4 August 1989 respectively.

100/ United Nations Centre against *Apartheid* Notes and Documents, June 1989.

101/ *The Star* (Johannesburg), 10 May 1989.

102/ *Democrat and Chronicle* (Rochester), 23 March 1989; *The Star* (Johannesburg), 10 May 1989; *The New York Times*, 10, 17 and 24 July 1989.

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103/ Sowetan (Johannesburg), 30 June and 3 July 1989; The New York Times, 28 July 1989.

104/ The New York Times, 6 February and 23 July 1989.

105/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 2 June 1989.

106/ The Star (Johannesburg), 10 and 24 May 1989.

107/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 20 January 1989; The Daily Telegraph (London), 23 January 1989.

108/ See footnote 88/.

109/ "Official Spokesman Statement", Government of India, 9 August 1989.

110/ The New York Times, 30 September 1988 and 11 May 1989; The Citizen (Johannesburg), 20 January 1989; The Star (Johannesburg), 2 February 1989.

111/ "Position Paper on the Cultural and Academic Boycott", adopted by the ANC National Executive Committee (Lusaka), May 1989.

112/ See E/1989/130.

ANNEX I

Composition of the subsidiary bodies of the Special Committee against Apartheid, of the Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa, of the Commission against Apartheid in Sports and of the Support Group of Eminent Women

1. Subsidiary bodies of the Special Committee

(a) Sub-Committee on the Implementation of United Nations Resolutions and Collaboration with South Africa:

Ghana (Chairman), Hungary, India, Indonesia, Peru and Sudan

(b) Sub-Committee on Petitions and Information:

Algeria (Chairman), German Democratic Republic, Nepal, Somalia and Trinidad and Tobago

(c) Task Force on Women and Children under *Apartheid*:

India, Philippines, Sudan (Chairman) and Trinidad and Tobago

(d) Task Force on Political Prisoners:

German Democratic Republic, Guinea, India, Malaysia, Peru (Chairman), Somalia and Syrian Arab Republic

(e) Task Force on the Legal Aspects of *Apartheid*:

Hungary, Nigeria (Chairman), Peru and Syrian Arab Republic

2. Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa

Algeria, Cuba, German Democratic Republic, Indonesia, Kuwait (Vice-Chairman), New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway (Chairman), Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and United Republic of Tanzania (Rapporteur)

3. Commission against Apartheid in Sports

Hamad Abdelaziz Al-Kawari (Qatar)
Ahmad Fathi Al-Masri (Syrian Arab Republic)
Hocine Djoudi (Algeria)
Raúl Gonzalez Rodríguez (Mexico)
James Victor Gbeho (Ghana)
Lionel Hurst (Antigua and Barbuda)
Besley Maycock (Barbados)
Abraham Ordia (Nigeria)
Vladimir Platonov (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic)
Allan Rae (Jamaica)
Tesfaye Shafo (Ethiopia)

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Claudio Teehankee (Philippines)
Boris Topornin (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
Zoumana Traore (Burkina Faso)
Georg Zorowka (German Democratic Republic)

According to the International Convention against Apartheid in Sports, in particular article 11, paragraph 5, thereof, the members of the Commission "shall be elected for a term of four years. However, the term of nine of the members elected at the first election shall expire at the end of two years; immediately after the first election, the names of these nine members shall be chosen by lot by the Chairman of the Commission".

4. Support Group of Eminent Women

Lisbet Palme (Sweden, Chairperson)
Glenys Kinnock (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
Lucille Mair (Jamaica)
Arja Saijonmaa (Finland)
Leticia Shahani (Philippines)
Johanna Toepfer (German Democratic Republic)
Jeanne-Martin Cisse (Guinea)
Maria Pia Fanfani (Italy)

ANNEX II

Selected excerpts of statements issued by the Special Committee

The Special Committee issued a number of statements during the period under review. Below is a list of those statements and selected excerpts from some of them.

GA/AP/1888 (9 September 1988)	Message of the Chairman sent to Zephania Mothopeng, President of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday
	"... On the occasion of your birthday, the Special Committee renews its commitment to furthering the international campaign against *apartheid*, in particular, to intensify actions for your immediate and unconditional release and that of all other political prisoners in South Africa ..."
GA/AP/1890 (6 October 1988)	Statement by the Chairman appealing for wide observance of the International Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners (11 October)
	"... The Special Committee considers that the observance of the Day of Solidarity this year takes on an added significance as a result of the increased repression in South Africa. This fact has been brought to the foreground by four leading opponents of the régime who took refuge in September in the United States Consulate in Johannesburg after escaping from hospital ... As they stated in a memorandum to the South African authorities, they are in the Consulate to demand, among other things, the release of detainees, the lifting of the state of emergency and the restrictions on all organizations and individuals, and an assurance that they will not be re-detained or restricted in terms of the state of emergency regulations. Only a few days ago, the régime conducted massive raids against the offices of anti-*apartheid* organizations and the homes of opponents. Significantly, the authorities banned a conference of anti-*apartheid* organizations that was to take place in September and was to discuss common strategies against the scheduled municipal elections to be held on 26 October 1988. The raids, the ban and, more recently, the hundreds of arrests, were designed to thwart any opposition to the scheduled 26 October municipal elections. The Special Committee condemns the scheduled municipal elections because it believes they are a further entrenchment of the current racist constitution, which has already been condemned and declared null and void by the General Assembly and the Security Council. It calls on Governments to condemn these sham elections ... and to join with the majority population in South Africa in their quest for a just and lasting solution to the conflict in the country. The Special Committee is convinced that only the eradication of *apartheid* will bring about conditions to

establish a united, non-racial and democratic society in South Africa through peaceful negotiations involving the genuine leaders of the black majority population. Thus, the release of Nelson Mandela, Zephania Mothopeng and other leaders, as well as hundreds of other opponents of *apartheid*, ... is an indispensable prerequisite for a just and peaceful solution in South Africa ..."

GA/AP/1894
(12 October 1988)

Statement by the Chairman denouncing South Africa's plans to conduct nationwide municipal elections on 26 October

"... Far from answering the demands of the black majority for full political rights, the régime is trying, through the elections, to impose an official body for blacks which will function solely in an advisory capacity. As such, this scheme will further entrench the present constitution ... which was overwhelmingly rejected by the black majority in 1984 and declared null and void by the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Special Committee considers further that the scheduled elections are devoid of any legitimacy since they will take place amid a state of emergency, severe restrictions on popular organizations and their leaders and a general climate of harassment, intimidation and violence against the anti-*apartheid* opposition ... The municipal officials chosen in these 'elections' will have no more legitimacy than the present councillors who continue to be rejected by the black majority ..."

GA/AP/1896
(4 November 1988)

Message of the Chairman sent to the anti-*apartheid* newspaper *The Weekly Mail* deploring its one-month banning by the South African régime

"... In the face of stringent restrictions on the press and the banning of anti-*apartheid* organizations and individuals, the closing of *The Weekly Mail* is a further attempt to muzzle the press and keep from public scrutiny any reports about Pretoria's inhuman policies ... *The Weekly Mail*'s determined and forthright reporting continues to be a source of inspiration to those inside and outside South Africa who support the majority of the South African people in their struggle to eradicate *apartheid*."

GA/AP/1897
(7 November 1988)

Statement by the Chairman on the reported intention of Chemical Bank to finance the takeover bid for Consolidated Gold Fields by the South African conglomerate Minorco

"The Special Committee against *Apartheid* views with particular concern the reported intention of Chemical Bank to finance Minorco's bid to take over Consolidated Gold Fields PLC. As is well known, Minorco, a Luxembourg-based investment company owned mainly by Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Ltd. and DeBeers Consolidated Mines Ltd. of South Africa, is controlled by South African interests. Such a take-over could give virtually total control of the world supply of gold to a South African conglomerate. ..."

GA/AP/1898
(23 November 1988)

Statement by the Chairman calling for international action to prevent the "judicial murder" of South African death row prisoner Paul Tefo Setlaba on 24 November

"... The recent conviction of political opponents of *apartheid* in the Pretoria Supreme Court and the continued issuance of execution orders demonstrates clearly that Pretoria ... is still committed to ruthless persecution of anti-*apartheid* activists and to systematic violence and terror against the black majority population ... The 24-year-old Paul Tefo Setlaba was originally sentenced to death in 1986 on charges of murder relating to the death of a police informer. Although he did not personally take part in the alleged offence, he was found guilty on the basis of 'common purpose'. It should be remembered that the use of this barbaric concept of collective responsibility is rejected by national and international legal standards ..."

GA/AP/1899
(29 November 1988)

Statement by the Chairman welcoming the release from prison of PAC President Zephania Mothopeng

"... The Special Committee hopes that this humanitarian gesture by the Pretoria régime is also a political gesture, and that it will be followed by the genuine release of Nelson Mandela and the other political prisoners. The Special Committee considers that at this juncture Member States, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations should redouble their efforts and demand that Pretoria release all other South African political prisoners. Their release must constitute the first necessary step in the process of negotiations leading to the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the country."

GA/AP/1900
(6 December 1988)

Statement by the Chairman on the death of African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) official Johnstone Makatini

"The Special Committee against *Apartheid* is profoundly shocked and grieved at the sudden death of 'Johnstone' Mafanafuthi Makatini, member of the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and Director for the International Affairs Department. Forced into exile by the South African authorities as early as 1960, the year when ANC was banned, Mr. Makatini tirelessly and unflinchingly devoted his life as a freedom fighter to the struggle against *apartheid*. The Special Committee, and I personally, developed a close and fraternal relationship with 'Johnstone' since the 1970s when he became the head of the observer mission of the African National Congress to the Special Committee against *Apartheid* and in his most recent capacity as Director of the ANC Department of International Affairs. On behalf of the

Special Committee and the Centre against *Apartheid*, I sincerely wish to convey to the people of South Africa, to ANC and to the family of Mr. Makatini, our most profound sympathy and condolences."

GA/AP/1901
(9 December 1988)

Statement by the Acting Chairman calling for international efforts to secure the release of convicted United Democratic Front leaders

"The Special Committee against *Apartheid* views with grave concern the conviction of three leaders of the United Democratic Front for 'high treason', and of eight other opponents of *apartheid* for 'terrorism'. The sentences pronounced on Patrick Lekota (12 years), Popo Molefe (10 years) and Moses Chikane (10 years), as well as the sentence passed on Thomas Manthata (6 years), are a flagrant example of the use of the judiciary as an instrument of suppression of any political opposition to *apartheid* rule ... The Special Committee calls, therefore, on Governments, intergovernmental and other organizations as well as individuals to exercise their influence and persuade Pretoria to release the eleven. It urges ... legal professionals all over the world to denounce the South African judiciary which appears to have become an instrument of *apartheid* rule as the decision of Supreme Court Justice Kees van Dijkhorst manifests. It urges them further to undertake steps to isolate that judiciary from any international forums and to increase direct support to political prisoners in South Africa."

GA/AP/1905
(9 February 1989)

Statement by the Acting Chairman expressing solidarity with political detainees on a hunger strike in South Africa

"The Special Committee against *Apartheid* has learned that detainees at several prisons in South Africa have gone on a hunger strike to protest against their 'unjustified and prolonged detention without trial'. Of increasing concern to the Special Committee are the long-term detainees, many of whom have been in prison for nearly three years ... The long-term detention of political opponents, the harsh sentences delivered in the Delmas trial, the persistent restrictions used against the press are evidence that the régime is unwilling to accept legitimate and even peaceful opposition which would be considered normal in any society that abides by the rule of law. On the contrary, it is clear that the régime is ready to use the judiciary to silence any opposition to its rule ..."

GA/AP/1913
(11 April 1989)

Statement by the Chairman expressing concern at talks aimed at closer military collaboration between South Africa and Chile

"The Special Committee against *Apartheid* is gravely concerned at the news of the recent two-week visit to Chile by the Minister of Defence of South Africa, Lieutenant-General Magnus Malan, with the purpose of discussing closer military collaboration between the two countries. During his visit, General Malan inspected the testing of the 155-mm G.5 gun, which is being assembled by the Chilean Industrias Cardoen with technology provided by the South African State-owned enterprise ARMSCOR (Armaments Corporation). Reports indicate that, while the G.5 gun may be assembled in Chile, the ammunition for it cannot be made there and will have to be supplied by South Africa. In the past, Industrias Cardoen has engaged in business relations with ARMSCOR and has purchased armament components from private South African companies ... The Special Committee expressed its grave concern on these developments to the Government of Chile in a letter dated 8 March 1989, to which no substantive reply has been received. The Special Committee once again calls on the Government of Chile to respect the will of the international community and cease its military and any other collaboration with racist South Africa."

GA/AP/1914
(19 April 1989)

Statement by the Chairman expressing concern over scheduled executions in South Africa and calling for international action to save lives

"The Special Committee against *Apartheid* views with grave concern the scheduled execution on 20 April 1989 of two political prisoners, Ndumiso Silo Siphenuka and Mackezwana Menze. They and two other co-accused, Similo Lennox Wonci and Mziwoxolo Makeleni, were sentenced to death in January 1987 on the grounds of 'common purpose'. The death sentences pronounced on Wonci and Makeleni were later commuted to 25 years' imprisonment. The four, all of whom are members of the anti-*apartheid* organization, the Addo Youth Congress, were convicted of 'common purpose' for allegedly participating in an incident that resulted in the death of a farmer and his wife at the height of political protest in South Africa in 1985 ..."

GA/AP/1915
(5 May 1989)

Statement by the Chairman condemning the assassination of David Webster, an anti-*apartheid* activist

"Dr. David Webster, a leading South African white democrat, was assassinated in Johannesburg on 1 May. The police autopsy report has confirmed that he was shot in the chest with a large bore shotgun at very close range, which would indicate the work of a professional hit squad. The assassination of Dr. Webster marks the latest in a long line of as yet unresolved assassinations of anti-*apartheid* activists. It comes in the wake of continuous acts of harassment, intimidation and brutality against anti-*apartheid* organizations and activists, including assassinations and bombings. Dr. Webster's killing evidences an ominous and growing trend whereby death squads - constituted by highly trained professionals - carry out their violent acts against the régime's opponents under the protective cover of the state of emergency. The international community condemns this dastardly act. It calls on the *apartheid* régime to conduct a thorough investigation into the circumstances surrounding Dr. Webster's assassination ... The régime can no longer claim ignorance of the existence of these extralegal forms of repression whose sole objective is to eliminate the régime's opponents ..."

GA/AP/1917
(24 May 1989)

Statement by the Acting Chairman on the scheduled executions of three political prisoners

"The Special Committee against *Apartheid* is gravely concerned about the scheduled executions on 24 and 25 May 1989 of three political prisoners, Sibusiso Masuku, Oupa Mbonane and Abraham Mgomezulu. The Special Committee ... condemns the persistent and extensive use of the death penalty ... to counter politically motivated acts ... The Special Committee calls upon the international community to vigorously protest the use of the death penalty and of the South African judiciary to counter legitimate political opposition."

GA/AP/1918
(31 May 1989)

Statement by the Chairman concerning the decision of rugby unions in several countries to allow players to participate in South Africa

"The United Nations Special Committee against *Apartheid* has learned with dismay that rugby unions of Australia, France, England, Scotland and Wales have permitted their individual players to accept South Africa's invitation to participate in the centenary celebration of rugby football, which has always been seen as a symbol of *apartheid*. This commemoration of 100 years of racist rugby, which is to take place in August this year, is organized in defiance of the international boycott of *apartheid* sports and to boost the attempts of the South African régime to break its international isolation ... The Special Committee is of the view that the authorities concerned should take effective steps to persuade those sportspersons who have announced their intentions to participate in the tour not to go to South Africa ..."

GA/AP/1919
(8 June 1989)

Statement by the Acting Chairman on the observance by the Special Committee of the International Day of Solidarity with the Struggling People of South Africa (Soweto Day - 16 June)

"... This observance marks the thirteenth anniversary of the infamous and brutal massacre in Soweto, South Africa, when the racist régime killed and wounded hundreds of African students peacefully demonstrating against the forcible imposition of Afrikaans and the so-called Bantu education on 16 June 1976. This incident will always be a reminder of the tragic consequences of *apartheid* ... described by the General

Assembly as a crime against humanity. The Special Committee recognized ... that the international community must redouble its efforts in lending support to the freedom struggle ... The racist régime must be made to realize that only the creation of conditions favourable to peaceful negotiations with the genuine leaders of the oppressed people of South Africa can create a process that will shape a harmonious future of the country ..."

GA/AP/1920
(12 June 1989)

Statement by the Acting Chairman condemning South Africa's decision to extend the state of emergency in the country

"... This ruthless and desperate act clearly shows that the apartheid régime is determined to continue with its repressive domestic policies which can only further aggravate the conflict in South Africa. The extension of the state of emergency coincides with a campaign of attacks against the Congress of South African Trade Unions, democratic organizations and ... individuals opposing apartheid ..."

GA/AP/1921
(23 June 1989)

Statement by the Chairman calling on the international community to press for the reprieve of the "Upington 26"

"The Special Committee against Apartheid is gravely concerned over the harsh sentences imposed by an apartheid court on 13 May 1989 on black South Africans convicted solely on grounds that they shared 'common purpose' to commit the murder of a municipal police officer at Paballelo, near Upington, Northern Cape Province. Of the group, known as the 'Upington 26', 14 were sentenced to death ... six other defendants received long prison sentences, while the remaining six received long suspended sentences combined with obligation to perform community service ... The Special Committee appeals to Governments, lawyers' associations, anti-apartheid movements and men and women of conscience to denounce most vehemently the harsh sentences and to spare no effort to put pressure on the apartheid authorities to stop the judicial execution of these innocent South Africans."

GA/AP/1927
(9 August 1989)

Statement by the Acting Chairman calling for world-wide observance of the International Day of Solidarity with the Struggle of Women in South Africa and Namibia

"... The International Day of Solidarity coincides with the thirty-third anniversary of the historic and heroic demonstration by South African women in 1956 in protest against the extension of the racist régime's 'pass laws' to women. The world-wide observance of the Day - in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 36/172 K of 17 December 1981 - is intended once more to draw attention to the unjust and brutal nature of the apartheid system, especially as it affects the women of South Africa and Namibia, and to promote increased material and moral support for their struggle ..."

GA/AP/1928
(4 August 1989)

Statement by the Acting Chairman expressing concern over the planned tour of South Africa by United Kingdom cricketers in early 1990 and in 1991

"... The tour is an affront to international efforts aimed at the total isolation of the *apartheid* régime in sports, as well as in other fields ... This tour will take place while our efforts in the United Nations to begin implementation of the International Convention against *Apartheid* in Sports have come to a successful conclusion ... by the recent election of the members of the Commission against *Apartheid* in Sports and by the ratification and/or accession to the Convention by 41 States and by its signature on behalf of a number of States ... The proposed cricket tour as well as the rugby tour which is expected to commence soon are in contravention of the Convention and the principles of the International Olympic Committee. We regret to state that the appeal of the Government of the United Kingdom has not been heeded by the players. We earnestly hope that the Government of the United Kingdom will adopt meaningful measures to dissuade its nationals from engaging in sporting activities in South Africa ..."

GA/AP/1930
(11 August 1989)

Statement by the Chairman calling for international efforts to save the lives of Robert McBride and other South African political prisoners

"The Special Committee against *Apartheid* is concerned that political prisoner Robert John McBride is still on death row along with 70 other political prisoners. Their continued imprisonment demonstrates that repression against *apartheid* opponents is a permanent feature of the Pretoria régime and shall remain an obstacle to any process aimed at resolving the conflict in South Africa. The Special Committee calls on the international community to strengthen its efforts to save the lives of McBride and the 70 other political prisoners on death row at present. It calls, in particular, on the international legal community to isolate the *apartheid* judiciary."

GA/AP/1931
(22 August 1989)

Statement by the Chairman expressing grave concern at the increasing violent attacks against opponents of the Pretoria régime

"... The violence committed against the people's poet Mzwakhe Mbuli and his family and the arrest of United Democratic Front leader Mohammed Valli are some of the latest manifestations of legal and extralegal intimidation exercised by Pretoria ... The Special Committee considers that these attacks are not isolated incidents carried out by unknown assailants. They rather constitute a pattern of intimidation which is fostered by the provisions of the state of emergency. The Special Committee further believes that this violence is ultimately aimed at suppressing - once more - the growing movement of defiance to Pretoria's *apartheid* policies ..."

ANNEX III

List of documents issued by the Special Committee

A/AC.115/L.657	Messages received on the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity with the Struggle of Women in South Africa and Namibia
A/AC.115/L.658	Messages received on the occasion of the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners
A/AC.115/L.659	Report of the Seminar on the Special Needs of South African and Namibian refugee women and children, held at Harare from 16 to 18 January 1989
A/AC.115/L.660	Messages received on the occasion of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination

PART TWO

REPORT ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Special Committee, at the request of the General Assembly, has systematically monitored collaboration between Israel and South Africa, including in the especially dangerous nuclear and military spheres. Despite the announcement by the Government of Israel in 1987 that it would curtail its relations with South Africa, reports about their collaboration, particularly in the military field, indicate that such collaboration continues.

2. In its resolution 43/50 E of 5 December 1988, the General Assembly called upon Israel "to abide by the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council by terminating forthwith all forms of military, nuclear, intelligence, economic and other collaboration, particularly its long-term contracts for military supplies, with South Africa".

II. MILITARY COLLABORATION

3. The co-operation between Israel and South Africa in the military and nuclear fields is difficult to detect because of strict censoring of information on these matters in both countries. However, certain media and intelligence reports have revealed such collaboration. Whereas Israel was the major supplier of arms and ammunition to South Africa in the 1970s, during the present decade the relationship became one of partnership and joint production of armaments. Israel has provided South Africa with military technology needed for its growing armaments industry. The role of Israel in helping to expand the military capability of the South African Defence Force (SADF) was highlighted in evidence presented by the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa to the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa at their meeting at Harare in February 1989. Particular attention was drawn to the continuing programme of updating and modernizing the Mirage fighter aircraft into Cheetahs with the assistance of Israel. The Cheetahs, as will be mentioned later, are virtually identical to the Israeli Kfir aircraft. 1/

4. The most disturbing aspect of the collaboration between Israel and South Africa in the military field is the reported development and preparation for testing of an intermediate-range ballistic missile. The missile is expected to have a range of 1,440 kilometres and to be capable of carrying nuclear devices. The missile appears to be a modification of the Israeli missile, Jericho II. It was reported that satellite photographs showed the Cape range near De Hoop, where launch preparations were being made, to be identical to the Israeli launch site in the Negev desert. It should be noted that an intermediate-range ballistic missile usually carries an atomic warhead and South Africa has admitted possessing nuclear-weapons capability. According to intelligence sources of the United States of America, South Africa might soon test a more advanced Israeli missile, the Shavit (comet), which has a range of 2,000 miles. It was also reported that, as Israeli missile testing facilities are limited by geographical factors, South Africa provides a better testing area. 2/ This joint Israeli-South Africa missile project has been under development since at least 1987 in spite of a promise by Israel in March 1987 not to enter into any new defence contracts with South Africa. According to the South African media, the modified version of the Jericho II missile was "capable of carrying a nuclear warhead". It was added that "according to CIA and U.S. Defence Intelligence agents, the tests were of far more ominous nature and the joint South African/Israeli missile programme, believed to have started in 1987, was viewed 'with concern'". 3/ This was not the first time that reports concerning nuclear military collaboration between the two countries have been widely circulated in the media, based on information received from the intelligence community. It should be recalled that in 1977 and 1979 there were reports concerning the preparation of a site for a nuclear test and the detection of a possible nuclear explosion in the South Atlantic region.

5. Israel appears also to have been involved in the Blowpipe missile case, which led to the arrest of five South African agents in Paris. According to the press, Israel delivered weapons to an extremist Unionist group in Northern Ireland in exchange for missile technology stolen from the Short Brothers plant in Belfast. The Sunday Telegraph (London), of 14 May 1989, stated that, according to British Government sources, Israel, whose State-run weapons industry shares close links with ARMSCOR of South Africa, was keen to acquire details of the new Starstreak high-velocity missile of the United Kingdom, based on technology pioneered in the

Blowpipe design. The ultimate goal of the Blowpipe deal, which involved South Africa and Israel, was to undertake joint development of a series of high-speed missiles for use by both ground and air forces of both of these countries. It was further reported that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom was planning to bring the matter up at a May 1989 meeting with her Israeli counterpart. 4/

6. During the consultations on the implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa by the Federal Republic of Germany, organized on 27 April 1989 by the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, in co-operation with the Special Committee, it was revealed that blueprints of the U-209 submarine were delivered to South Africa by two companies from the Federal Republic of Germany via Israel.

7. The role of the Israeli Company Tadiran in supplying military equipment and technology to South Africa has been a matter of concern to the Special Committee for a number of years. The United States Government was reported to be investigating the involvement of Tadiran in the sale of military equipment and technology to South Africa. 5/

8. The contribution of Israel to the development of South Africa's naval technology was also detected. Much of this technology, with the exception of the assistance of Plessey of the United Kingdom in the development of a mine hunter, had originated in Israel. 6/

9. Israeli assistance to South Africa in the development of the latter's air force is concentrated in three areas. The first area focused on research concerning the development of a twin-engine multi-role combat aircraft. The so-called CAVA would replace aging South African aircraft such as Canberras and Buccaneers. It was reported that several hundred Israeli designers and technicians recruited by ARMSCOR after the cancellation of the Israeli Lavi aircraft project would assist in the CAVA project. According to the Sunday Times (Johannesburg), of 14 May 1989, "The cancelled Lavi fighter [of Israel] was initially a joint Israeli-South Africa project, but South Africa left in the early stages so that Israel could obtain U.S. aid". The newspaper quoted the statement by Mike Gaines, the defence editor of the British weekly, Flight International, that "South Africa definitely has the expertise for the project but the power plants are still a problem". The report also stated that South Africa "maintains good relations with Israel, Taiwan and Chile". According to Mr. Gaines, there is nothing in the arsenals of the front-line States to match the CAVA. The second area concerned the co-operation between the two countries to develop the Cheetah airplane. South Africa gained experience from the project of converting its old Mirage III into Cheetah, which was also done with Israeli assistance. The World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa also informed the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa that the new single-seat Cheetah aircraft had been stationed near the Zimbabwe border at the Louis Trichard air base, that the planes were equipped with improved fuel-efficient Snecma Atar engines of French design, and that work was being carried out by Israeli technicians in South Africa. The Ministers were also informed that Israel had also assisted South Africa by providing converted in-flight-refuelling Boeing 707 aircraft, which helped to extend the range of South African aircraft as far as the United Republic of Tanzania and that those aircraft were also equipped for electronic surveillance. The third area of co-operation between Israel and South Africa involved Chile. A deal was worked out by which the latter would sell old

16 F-5 aircraft to Israel. The cost of the deal was estimated at $US 60 million in addition to the 16 F-5 aircraft for 12 Kfir bombers to be bought by Chile. The old engines of the 16 F-5 aircraft were expected to be replaced with new ones by Israel, and the aircraft are expected to be delivered to South Africa. 7/

10. The Commonwealth Ministers were further informed that South Africa had recruited a large number of Israelis as well as other foreign nationals for its internal armaments industry and that Pretoria had embarked on a massive armaments build-up following the withdrawal of its troops from Angola. 8/

11. A British Member of Parliament, Tony Marlow, who was on a visit to the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip in September 1988, was reported as saying that he had been told that South African army generals dressed in civilian clothes were advising the Israelis on how to curb the Palestinian uprising. A spokesman for SADF stated that it was not SADF policy to comment on the movement of its members, either within or outside South Africa. However, Israeli military officials denied the report. 9/

III. OTHER COLLABORATION

12. The Special Committee has stated in its previous reports that economic relations between Israel and South Africa depend on diamonds, gold and other precious metals, which are exported through London and Zurich. Therefore, the trade figures between the two countries do not reflect the real extent of their co-operation, taking into consideration the fact that Israel is one of the major export centres in the world for diamonds and jewellery.

13. According to figures provided by the Government of Israel concerning its trade relations with South Africa, there was a decrease in their trade in 1988. 10/ However, reports emanating from South Africa indicated the contrary. The *Financial Mail* (Johannesburg) reported that:

> "In 1987 total trade between Israel and South Africa was $247 million. In 1988, the figure rose to $341 million. In 1988 imports of goods from South Africa to Israel exceeded exports by some $80 million. Among the major products imported by Israel from South Africa are mineral products, petrol, coal and base metal. In 1988, exports from Israel totalled $131 million of which the leaders were chemical products, precious stones and metals and machinery. Also included were medical and optical products, rubber, plastics and textiles." 11/

14. In addition to massive imports of coal from South Africa, there have been attempts to use Israel as a conduit for South African coal going to Western Europe. Official discussions took place between representatives of the two Governments to make arrangements for the import and storage of South African coal for the purpose of re-exporting it to Western Europe. However, the Israeli Deputy Minister of Finance declared that he would stop any attempt to re-export South African coal. Taking into consideration the controversy concerning the re-export of South African coal through Israel, it is suggested that West European Governments and anti-*apartheid* organizations should maintain vigilance to prevent such circumvention of restrictions on the import of South African coal. 12/

15. South African institutional investors were reported to be involved in rescuing the ailing Israeli Koor group. Koor was offered $500 million in a 20-year loan at 8.5 per cent by a Johannesburg company called Central Trust. Koor played an important role in the ongoing co-operation between Israel and South Africa. Its control by South African companies would have serious implications in respect to the military co-operation between the two countries because of the major role played by Koor in Israeli military production. Koor denied that it was seeking help from South African investors and banks. However, other reports indicated that it had already borrowed $80 million from South African banks. 13/ The sudden generosity of South African financial institutions, apparently with the tacit approval of the country's financial regulatory authorities, suggests that the maintenance of foreign trade links via Koor is of the utmost importance to the *apartheid* régime.

16. It was reported that the Israeli Kibbutz Ayelet Hashahar was planning to sell a complete tyre factory to South African investors. The latter intended not only to ship the machinery to South Africa but also to hire the Israeli workers, who would be relocated to South Africa. The factory, called Eitan, builds moulds for automotive tyres using a sophisticated process to transfer the design from paper to

metal. It was also reported that the factory would be expected to provide tyres to the South African military. 14/

17. The exchange of visits between trade delegations from Israel and South Africa is an indication of continuing economic co-operation. Notwithstanding the declared policy of the Government of Israel, an Israeli trade delegation visited South Africa in August 1988 to discuss investment in Israel and Israeli fishing rights in South African waters. 15/

18. The Special Committee has reported in previous years on co-operation between Israel and the "homelands". In February 1989, a delegation from the "independent homeland" of Bophuthatswana visited Israel. The delegation included the so-called minister of economic planning and the head of a Bophuthatswana national development group and attempted to encourage Israeli investment in Bophuthatswana. 16/

19. In its reply to the Secretariat dated 20 July 1988 (see A/44/533) concerning concerted action for the elimination of *apartheid*, the Government of Israel elaborated further on the decision taken in March 1987. In that reply, Israel claims that no exchanges of official visits had taken place between the two countries. No athletes or artists identified with the *apartheid* régime were allowed into Israel owing to a prohibition on sports exchanges with South Africa. No new agreement regarding scientific collaboration was signed between the two countries. The reply stated that Israel continued to abide by its Cabinet decison of 1987 concerning economic and trade relations with South Africa. It was also stated that Israel neither imported krugerrand nor sold oil and oil-related products to South Africa. The note claimed that "furthermore, no new investments in South Africa have been approved". It further stated that "in its endeavours to assist the black population of South Africa, Israel has offered training programmes for appropriate candidates from the black communities". No reference is made in the reply to the question of military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa.

20. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned reply, reports concerning collaboration between Israel and South Africa in mililtary and other fields, as stated earlier, indicate that such collaboration has continued in spite of efforts to conceal it in order to avoid international criticism.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

21. The Special Committee took note of the repeated Israeli statement that its relations with South Africa had been curtailed. However many reports still point to ongoing collaboration, especially in military matters.

22. The Special Committee still considers it essential that Israel reveal its existing secret agreements and arrangements with South Africa for the supply of weapons and military technology and that all such agreements and arrangements be abrogated. The assistance provided by Israeli engineers and technicians to South Africa's armaments industry constitutes a violation of relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

23. Even in the economic sector, where the Israeli Government repeatedly asserted that it had curtailed its relations with South Africa, there are reports indicating continuing trade and other commercial relations.

24. The Special Committee recommends that the General Assembly call upon Israel to cease forthwith its collaboration with South Africa, particularly in the military field and authorize the Special Committee to continue to monitor the relations between Israel and South Africa and report thereupon as appropriate.

Notes

1/ The Herald (Harare), 8 February 1989.

2/ Washington Times, 20 June 1989; The Star (Johannesburg), 21 June 1989; The Guardian (London), 21 June 1989; Pretoria News, 6 June 1989.

3/ Pretoria News, 6 July 1989.

4/ The Sunday Telegraph (London), 14 May 1989; Business Day (Johannesburg), 21 May 1989.

5/ The Tallahassee Democrat (Tallahassee, Florida), 14 June 1989; Israeli Foreign Affairs (Sacramento, California), July 1989.

6/ Business Day (Johannesburg), 18 July 1989.

7/ Sunday Times (London), 14 May 1989; Israeli Foreign Affairs (Oakland, California), November 1988; Azania Combat (Dar es Salaam), Issue No. 8, August 1989; Southscan (London), 22 February 1989.

8/ The Globe and Mail (Toronto), 8 February 1989.

9/ Capital Radio, Umtata, Oboogmt, 25 September 1988; The Star (Johannesburg), 28 September 1988.

10/ See table 2 in part one of the present report.

11/ A survey, Supplement, Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 5 May 1989.

Notes (continued)

12/ The Star (Johannesburg), 19 July 1989; Business Day (Johannesburg), 14 July 1989; The Citizen (Johannesburg), 17 July 1989; Evening Post (Port Elizabeth), 17 July 1989.

13/ Southscan (London), 11 January and 22 February 1989; Israeli Foreign Affairs (Sacramento, California), April 1989.

14/ Israeli Foreign Affairs (Sacramento, California), July 1989.

15/ Southscan (London), 10 August 1988.

16/ The Jerusalem Post, 1 February 1989.

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